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Abstract 
Can high levels of poverty be a competitive advantage for a country in the world economy? Or, 
put differently, can low labour costs provide a sustainable basis for a small country’s export 
strategy? In this study poverty is represented by low real wages that are at a physiological 
minimum subsistence level. Poor countries are frequently recommended to carry out export 
strategies based on their comparatively lower labour costs. But what is the merit of the low-
wage strategy for competitiveness? Are the policies of trade liberalisation effective in terms of 
generating economic development and reducing poverty, in a small economy with natural 
comparative advantage in activities that intensively use cheap unskilled labour?  
The analysis arrives at two fundamental lessons for trade strategy: First, in order to 
attain international competitiveness without holding back living standards, trade strategies 
should aim for a development where real wages rise, but where productivity increase even 
more. Second, labour-cost advantage should be a temporary part of a conscious strategy for 
upgrading production into activities in which technological progress and productivity growth is 
still achievable.  
World Bank and IMF policy-documents promote ‘flexibility’ in wage-setting to allow 
‘downward adjustment’ of wages. The two institutions argue that this policy is positive for 
national economic development and ‘pro-poor’, i.e. good for job-seeking individuals. However, 
this study argues that this policy advice may not be consistent with the aim of raising living 
standards as that will require rising real wages.  
Low production costs represented by cheap labour are attractive to entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, high levels of poverty may themselves encourage a specialisation in low labour-
cost advantages. The self-reinforcing dynamics of specialisation may perpetuate the dependence 
on supply of cheap labour. Such cumulative causation may aggravate the vicious circle of 
poverty, locking a small outward-oriented economy with an undiversified export structure into 
dependence on low costs and low wage levels. This situation may impede the possibilities to 
raise real wages and thereby standards of living for the majority of workers and their families.  
After adopting trade liberalisation policies in 1990, Zimbabwe has experienced a pattern 
of specialisation where export-oriented production has made increasingly intensive use of basic 
factors such as tobacco leaves, cereals, minerals, and cheap labour. As a result, the liberalisation 
has allowed the dictates of natural comparative advantage to reassert itself, resulting in a 
stronger orientation of export production towards primary goods, making more intensive use of 
abundant resources (basic factors). In these activities in which Zimbabwe has a natural 
comparative advantage, the vital productivity growth required for long-term development is not 
likely to be achievable. 
 iv 
 
 
 
 v 
Contents 
1 The openness dogma ....................................................................................... 1i 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................1 
Methodology...........................................................................................................................9 
Structure of the thesis ...........................................................................................................15 
2 Theoretical approaches to labour-cost advantages in trade ...................... 16 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................16 
Standard neo-classical approaches - on low factor costs and comparative advantage.........16 
New trade theory: An intermediate position ........................................................................20 
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches - on low factor costs and comparative advantage.............22 
Summary...............................................................................................................................29 
3 Zimbabwe’s trade regime 1965-1997 ........................................................... 32 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................32 
The external sector in Zimbabwe: From controls to liberalisation.......................................32 
Export strategy and export performance ..............................................................................35 
Production structure and export structure.............................................................................43 
Summary...............................................................................................................................48 
4 Employment, real wages and labour costs in Zimbabwe........................... 50 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................50 
Employment and wage policies............................................................................................50 
Real wages............................................................................................................................52 
Labour costs..........................................................................................................................62 
Summary...............................................................................................................................64 
5 Zimbabwe’s competitive advantages............................................................ 65 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................65 
Possible determinants of comparative advantage.................................................................65 
Human capital development .................................................................................................70 
Natural versus created comparative advantage ....................................................................73 
Zimbabwe’s experience with liberalisation..........................................................................74 
Summary...............................................................................................................................75 
 vi 
6 Implications for standard trade theory........................................................ 77 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................77 
Self-reinforcing specialisation in inferior activities .............................................................77 
Summary...............................................................................................................................80 
7 Implications for policy ................................................................................... 82 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................82 
Dilemmas with different trade regimes ................................................................................82 
Questioning the low-wage strategy for competitiveness......................................................84 
Summary...............................................................................................................................92 
8 Conclusions ..................................................................................................... 94 
Introduction ..........................................................................................................................94 
The argument........................................................................................................................94 
The case ................................................................................................................................95 
Limitations of the argument advanced in this thesis ............................................................96 
The bottom line.....................................................................................................................97 
References .......................................................................................................... 99 
Statistical Appendix ........................................................................................ 104 
 
Boxes  
Box 1 Taxonomy of theoretical approaches to labour-cost advantages in trade….......30 
Box 2 Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) ...…...……………………45 
Box 3 Advantageous and disadvantageous factors for location of export-oriented  
production in Zimbabwe ……………………………………………………………..67 
 
Figures 
Figure 1 Trade balance 1965-1998..…………………………………………………...34 
Figure 2 Exports and imports 1965-1998……………………………………………...35 
Figure 3 Production structure 1965-1997……………………………………………...43 
Figure 4 Export structure 1976-1997…………………………………………………..46 
Figure 5 Detailed export structure 1976-1997…………………………………………47 
Figure 6 Real wages (1972-1995) for workers in non-agricultural activities………….54 
Figure 7 Real wages (1972-1995) for workers in agriculture………………………….55 
Figure 8 Consumer price index 1972-1997…………………………………………….59 
 vii
Figure 9 Wages compared to CPI 1972-1997………………………………………….60 
Figure 10 Linkages of competitive advantage of poverty at the individual and national  
levels.……………………………………………………………………….………….89 
 
Tables 
Table 1 Export performance 1965-1979……………………………………………….36 
Table 2 Exchange rate 1965-1999……………………………………………………..37 
Table 3 Export performance 1980-1989……………………………………………….39 
Table 4 Export performance 1990-1999……………………………………………….41 
Table 5 Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1972-1997…………….54 
Table 6 Real wages for workers in agriculture 1972-1997…………………………….55 
Table 7 Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1972-1979…………….56 
Table 8 Real wages for workers in agriculture 1972-1979…………………………….56 
Table 9 Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1980-1989…………….57 
Table 10 Real wages for workers in agriculture 1980-1989…………………………...57 
Table 11 Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1990-1997…………...58 
Table 12 Real wages for workers in agriculture 1990-1997…………………………...58 
Table 13 Consumer price index (CPI) 1972-1997……………………………………..59 
Table 14 Labour costs in Zimbabwe 1960-1994……………………………………….61 
Table 15 Labour costs per worker in manufacturing…………………………………...62 
Table 16 Composition of exports by destination in 1990………………………………66
 viii
 
Abbreviations and acronyms 
 
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CSO Central Statistical Office (Harare) 
EOI Export Oriented Industrialisation 
EPZ Export Processing Zone 
ERF Export Revolving Fund 
ERS Export Retention Scheme 
ESAP Economic Structural Adjustment Programme 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GoZ Government of Zimbabwe 
ILO International Labour Organisation  
IMF International Monetary Fund 
ISI Import Substitution Industrialisation 
ISIC International Standard Industrial Classification of all economic activities 
NIC Newly Industrialising Country 
OECD Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development 
OGIL Open General Import License 
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement of Southern and East African states 
R&D Research and development 
SADC Southern African Development Community 
SITC Standard International Trade Classification 
TNDP Transitional National Development Plan 
UDI Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
UN United Nations 
ZCTU Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
ZIMPREST Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 
 
 ix 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
I am indebted to a number of people who assisted and encouraged me throughout this 
challenging (and for me terribly novel) process of writing this thesis: 
Dr. Erik Reinert, who first triggered my interest for the economic mechanisms of 
underdevelopment by his most fascinating approach to these issues. Since 1999, he has inspired 
me and provided thought-provoking comments on my work.  
My supervisor Dr. Sylvi Endresen, Associate Professor at Department of Sociology and 
Human Geography, University of Oslo, who put faith in my various novel – but many futile 
departures, and encouraged me until I practically pushed against the insurmountable and – 
perhaps regrettably – flexible wall. Nevertheless, I learned a lot from these efforts, even if they 
are not all explicitly reflected in this thesis. 
I will especially thank Dr. Halvor Mehlum at the Department of Economics, University 
of Oslo, who gave me valuable advice and answered my innumerable questions, and from 
whom I borrowed much statistics published by CSO in Harare.  
Several researchers at the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM), 
University of Oslo, provided me with experience-based advice. Especially Dan Banik, Anne 
Gjerdåker, and Desmond McNeill, who all took special interest in my project and used their 
valuable time to assist me when I asked for their opinions.  
I have been attached to SUM since September 2000. Researchers, administrative staff, 
and students at SUM, and my fellow students at the Department of Human Geography, have 
provided me with a pleasurable social environment in the course of writing this thesis.  
Especially, my student colleague Gunvald Steen has given me remarkable assistance 
through our exchange of ideas, and he has generously shared with me his insights from on-the-
ground experiences in Zimbabwe. 
I am also grateful to Vibeke Trålim who kindly let me borrow official documents she 
obtained during her own fieldwork in Harare. Martin Rama, Lead Economist in the 
Development Research Group in the World Bank, supplied me with data on labour costs from 
their international database that was not yet ready for print. Furthermore, I acknowledge the 
invaluable service given by the librarians at the Social Science Library at the University of 
Bergen, the library at Christian Michelsens Institute (CMI), and the Library of Arts and Social 
Sciences, University of Oslo.  
The responsibility for the findings presented here is entirely my own, and the remaining 
errors and weaknesses are mine alone. 
Oslo, February 2002 
Erik Blytt 
 x 
 1 
1  The openness dogma 
Introduction  
In this thesis I analyse the demand for openness, and specifically the policy recommendation 
directing poor countries to take advantage of their relatively lower labour costs in international 
trade. In existing literature this is referred to as ‘the low-wage strategy for competitiveness’ 
(Freeman & Soete 1994). Primarily, I am concerned with how alternative theoretical approaches 
which I refer to as ‘neo-Schumpeterian’, may qualify standard approaches to theory on 
international trade – and subsequently how this may affect the merits of the recommended low-
wage strategy as it supports itself on standard trade theory.  
 
Issues concerning development are interrelated and take place at all spatial scales, running from 
the individual, household or village levels to the more abstract national and international levels. 
Specific development strategies depend in part upon the economic policies of a given country 
and on global trading regimes. By the same token, abstract demands for trade liberalisation 
should have regard to the context-specific economic, social and political structures through 
which these demands or policies must be operationalised.  
But as real-world development is far from abstract and general, an analysis of the 
abstract theories and policy recommendations will benefit from being informed by concrete 
empirical evidence. One way of doing this would be to perform a cross-country analysis with 
very aggregated statistical regressions. However, as this is a study in Development Geography, I 
focus on the highly context-specific nature of empirical facts concerning development. I have 
therefore chosen to examine the experience of one particular country. I selected Zimbabwe 
because this case allowed me to study an exceptionally extensive process of opening-up. 
Moreover, this study must be seen in context of a central issue which continues to face 
development studies: namely, how to be sensitive to the particularities of place and to the 
essentially different catching-up (or falling behind) experiences of poor countries (Abramowitz 
1986), while at the same time remaining sensitive to the ‘asymmetrical insertion of poor 
countries’ societies into a global political economy’ (Terlouw 1989, in Corbridge 1990). 
Naturally, this unresolved tension between context-specific factors at the local level and wide-
ranging processes of international economic integration at the global level is inherent also in 
this study. Sensitivity to the differential spatial impact associated with international trade 
liberalisation is in this study appreciated as an over-riding goal, but admittedly acknowledged as 
practically unattainable in this analysis of what is a rather abstract and general policy advice.  
Importantly, the experience that I record of Zimbabwe’s export strategy from 1965 to 
1997, is meant to serve as an illustration of one, perhaps quite unique, process of economic 
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liberalisation. But the case may also be a small building block in the complex account of the 
130 or so developing countries that recently have, or currently are, undertaking trade 
liberalisation. As such, the investigation of the case serves to highlight one tangible example of 
a country’s export strategy and its real wage development. In other words, the case is brought in 
as an empirical illustration to the theoretical analysis. 
It may also be worthwhile to point out that as this basically is a study of economic 
development, I draw mostly on economic literature. Importantly, however, I do not study the 
issue of specialisation in low labour costs in the same manner as I believe a student in 
Economics would have been predisposed to do. I do a more historical, institutional (political 
economy), context-specific social-science analysis, supported by statistical data. And as I am 
primarily concerned with the merits of the low-wage strategy for competitiveness, I also attempt 
to suggest implications for theory and policy based on theoretical examinations. Ultimately, it is 
my contention that the issue of economic development is an issue too important to be left to be 
studied by economists alone. In my view, this study has in its own right something original to 
contribute with to the stock of knowledge on mechanisms of economic underdevelopment. The 
originality lies in the application of multiple geographical levels in the analysis, with 
implications for the design of policy recommendations at the global level, for the design of trade 
and development strategies at the national level, and for decisions by individuals or households 
to invest in human capital – although these decisions are considered to be very much dependent 
on demand for labour by firms which again is dependent upon policies at the national level.  
This study questions the current policy advice given to poor countries of trade 
liberalisation based on existing comparative advantages1 in primary products and low labour 
costs, and specifically the (neo-classical) theoretical underpinnings for these (neo-liberal2) 
recommendations. Primarily, the study aims at contributing to a more balanced understanding of 
the low-wage strategy for international competitiveness than the one which currently reigns in 
major agenda-setting and policy-making institutions like the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Point of departure 
Poverty is the most central dimension of underdevelopment. Low real wages are one of the most 
important causes of poverty3. Many workers in poor countries, whether they are employed in the 
                                                 
1
 In this thesis I employ the term ‘comparative advantage’ as synonymous with ‘competitive advantage’. I 
will use the two terms interchangeably. This understanding is broader than the one defined by Ricardo 
(1817) in which a country could have an absolute (competitive) disadvantage in trade with one 
commodity, but a relative (comparative) advantage in production of the same commodity compared to its 
trading partner. 
2
 By ‘neo-liberal’ I understand a position which validation is largely derived from a laissez-faire approach 
to the governing of markets.  
3
 Poverty has several dimensions, including powerlessness; insecurity; vulnerability; physical, social, 
emotional and material illbeing. Low income in the form of low real wages is only one of these 
dimensions, and is the one referred to in this study.  
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formal or the informal sector, have jobs that pay less than what they and their families consider 
a liveable wage (ILO 2000, Narayan et al. 2000). Real wages that are at a physiological 
minimum subsistence level are the result of the drive by employers to keep labour costs low4. 
Accordingly, low labour costs are a symptom of poverty. 
In contradiction, the opportunity to take advantage of low labour costs is currently 
recommended as the main development path available for poor countries, in order to catch up 
with richer ones through export revenues from increased international trade. Outward-
orientation – or ‘openness’ – is today the norm in policy recommendations for economic 
development (Lall 1999b, Rodrik 1999). Trade liberalisation is forcefully recommended to poor 
countries by international financial institutions in Washington D.C., and likewise by influential 
bilateral aid donors. The centrepiece of this policy advice is to specialise in activities where a 
country can utilise its existing comparative advantages. Specifically, according to this 
mainstream view, poor countries should follow “an outward-oriented strategy based on 
exporting labour-intensive goods and taking advantage of relatively lower labour costs” (IMF 
2000:23).  
Policy makers and planners in poor countries are under intense pressure to open up. 
There is a strong, if not excessive, faith in what openness can accomplish. A recent policy 
briefing from the IMF may serve as a good example:  
“Further trade liberalisation in these areas [the agricultural products and labour-
intensive manufactures in which developing countries have a comparative advantage] 
(…) would help the poorest escape from poverty (…). Policies that make an economy 
open to trade and investment with the rest of the world are needed for sustained 
economic growth. (…) Freeing trade frequently benefits the poor especially. (…) New 
jobs are created for unskilled workers, raising them into the middle-class. (…) 
Developing countries would strengthen their own economies (and their trading 
partners’) if they made a sustained effort to reduce their own trade barriers further.” 
(IMF 2001:1-4).  
Taking advantage of relatively lower labour costs is supposed to benefit both poor unskilled 
people and the country as a whole. Poor unskilled people can get new employment as 
production requiring cheap labour expands. The country as a whole is supposed to benefit as the 
economy’s production structure is specialised according to its comparative advantage. This is 
supposed to enable the country to penetrate international markets with its cost-competitive 
products. The remarkably rapid catching-up process by countries in East Asia has been used as 
evidence supporting this argument (see IMF 2000). 
However, considering the contemporary spatial division of labour in the world 
economy5, a highly unequal pattern of specialisation emerges. Many poor countries are at risk of 
                                                 
4
 This drive is in turn the result of a desire for profit, a pressure for cost-competitiveness, or a 
combination of the two. This study is primarily concerned with the downward pressure on labour costs as 
a result of the need to stay competitive in a liberalised economy.  
5
 By ‘spatial division of labour in the world economy’ I refer to differences in activities of production 
between different regional entities (here countries). 
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being marginalized in the dynamics of increasing international economic integration through 
world-wide trade liberalisation and rapid technological change in production of goods for which 
there is demand in world markets. They lack the technological skills and capabilities to compete 
in high-return (often manufacturing) activities, where buyers in world markets have 
sophisticated demands for state-of-the-art products. Their main competitive advantages in 
international trade remain unprocessed primary products or products embodying cheap 
unskilled labour by which they compete on price. A central question is whether these 
advantages hold the promise of sustained growth in incomes and productive employment that 
can benefit the poor masses of hard-working – including underemployed – people.  
The point of departure for this thesis is the policy advice to poor countries 
recommending them to carry out export strategies based on their comparatively lower labour 
costs. The focus is on the merit of the low-wage strategy for competitiveness. Are the policies 
proposed to poor countries effective in terms of generating economic development or reducing 
poverty? Or is the dominant policy advice fundamentally misguided? Will poor countries 
undertaking liberalisation necessarily benefit from increased openness, or may they risk 
becoming marginalized as specialisation in the competitive labour-cost advantage proceeds and 
is continually self-reinforced? And if the latter development takes place, may such a pattern of 
specialisation result in a ‘lock-in’ in the situation of having many poor people who are willing 
to work for low real wages – or what may be termed the competitive advantage of poverty?  
 
The case 
Zimbabwe has high levels of poverty. During the last decade the poverty levels seem to have 
grown markedly (CSO 1998b, Raftopoulos 2001). A recent study talks of “the increasing 
impoverishment of the working majority” (Raftopoulos 2001:197). A Poverty Assessment 
Study Survey carried out in 1995 found that 62% of all Zimbabweans were living in households 
with income per person below a level regarded as sufficient to provide basic needs (CSO 
1998b).  
Zimbabwe is particularly interesting for this study of export strategies, because of its 
recent economic history with three distinct periods of changing trade policies. From a directly 
controlled trade regime (1965-1980) via a semi-controlled regime (1980-1989) to a liberal(ised) 
regime after 1990, its history allows us to study an exceptionally extensive liberalisation 
process. In other words, the basis on which Zimbabwe is selected is not its particular 
experiences with land reform; with wide-spread corruption; with dramatically high HIV/AIDS 
prevalence; or with excessive repression of the opposition by the same political establishment 
that has been in power since Independence in 1980. But rather it is Zimbabwe’s recent 
economic history. To some extent, its evolution of trade regimes during the last 35 years is 
different from that of most other poor countries. Between 1965 and 1980 Zimbabwe went 
through a period of de facto import substituting industrialisation (ISI) compelled by the 
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international sanctions against the white racist regime. The controlled trade regime was for the 
most part continued in the 1980s by the new government, although some restrictions were 
removed. In 1990 trade was liberalised as part of the World Bank and IMF-supported structural 
adjustment programme. Other developing countries have also had trade restrictions and then 
liberalised their foreign trade, but in Zimbabwe the controls were unusually effective due to the 
international sanctions. 
Being land-locked is often considered a competitive disadvantage in international trade. 
The port through which most import and export of goods to and from Zimbabwe is being 
shipped, is Beira in neighbouring Mozambique. Infrastructure in the war-torn Mozambique is 
poor and transport networks are underdeveloped (Hanlon 1996). Moreover, Zimbabwe is 
drought-prone, something which adversely affects agricultural production in which 
approximately 27% of the recorded labour-force is employed (CSO 1997). Another 
distinguishing feature of the Zimbabwean economy is its high share of manufacturing in total 
output (Riddell 1990). Manufacturing is averaging around 25% of total private sector 
production (see figure 3 in chapter 3). Statistics shows that in June 1996, 184 thousand people 
were employed in manufacturing whereas 335 thousand were employed in agriculture (CSO 
1997)6. In other words, recorded employment in manufacturing was more than half of that in 
agriculture, which is unusually high in Sub-Saharan Africa (ILO 1998).  
Based on Zimbabwe’s experience with foreign trade during the last 30 years, I will look 
at the determinants of its competitive advantages. And I will also explore the trends in real 
wages during the period with import-substitution from 1965-1980, and compare with the period 
after liberalisation in 1990. 
 
Theoretical framework  
Theories on trade and development are frequently classified by the debate in development 
studies on the two supposedly incompatible models of export-oriented industrialisation (EOI) 
and import-substituting industrialisation (ISI). The basic neo-liberal theory of EOI advocates 
exchange rate devaluations to make exports cheaper, the liberalisation of trade and elimination 
of subsidies to force firms to be competitive, and the elimination of other distortions to the 
market, such as minimum wages and price controls (Balassa et al. 1986 in Kiely 1998). The 
structuralist theory7 underpinning ISI on the other hand, advocates active government 
intervention (Shapiro & Taylor 1992) which protect the domestic market through high tariffs 
and import restrictions; transfer of resources from the agricultural to the industrial sector 
through price-, tax- and credit policy; and also efforts to keep the exchange rate high to allow 
relatively cheap import of intermediate inputs and capital goods to promote a domestic 
                                                 
6
 The Quarterly Digest of Statistics for September 1997 (CSO 1997) does note that these figures exclude 
the employees of small agricultural units because of collection difficulties. Consequently, the actual 
employment in agriculture is likely to be higher than the figures suggest.  
7
 See Hunt (1989). 
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industrial base (Hunt 1989). Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the contrast 
between the two strategies is frequently overdrawn (Gereffi 1996). It should also be noted that 
both strategies include a gradual process with different phases, and for ISI at least, different 
specific strategies are recommended for the different stages (Kiely 1998, List 1841, Martinussen 
1997).  
Within the setting of this broader debate, there is a whole body of literature which is 
preoccupied with the special problems of poor developing countries in the world economy 
(Helleiner 1990, Stewart 1985). A part of this literature deals specifically with the relationship 
between trade policy and industrialisation in poor countries (e.g. Helleiner 1992, 1994, 1995; 
Morrissey & Filatotchev 2001; Rodrik 1999). Much of this literature is typically focusing on 
Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Bigsten et al. 1988; Frimpong-Ansah et al. 1991; Lall 1995, 1999b; 
Riddell 1990; Söderbom & Teal 2001; Wood & Mayer 2001). It is within this context the study 
of competitive advantages in Zimbabwe is developed, with a particular emphasis on theorising 
on the creation of factors suggested as sources of competitiveness.  
 
Defining and understanding competitiveness 
In a recent book assessing the global policy environment for development, Dani Rodrik writes 
that “traditional developmental concerns relating to industrialisation and poverty have been 
crowded out by the pursuit of international competitiveness.” (Rodrik 1999:1). Competitiveness 
is sometimes understood as a vehicle that can be used by a country to achieve development, 
whereas ‘development’ is often understood as a goal. The picture is definitely blurred. In the 
mid-1990s there was an intense debate among academics over what international 
competitiveness really was (Boltho 1996; Fagerberg 1996; Krugman 1994, 1996; Reinert 1995; 
see also Lall 2001).  
There are many definitions of competitiveness. Castells (1996) adopts the definition 
used by Stephen Cohen et al. (1): “Competitiveness at the national level is based on superior 
productivity performance by the economy and the economy’s ability to shift output to high 
productivity activities which in turn can generate high levels of real wages.” (Cohen et al. 
1985:1 in Castells 1996:87). According to the OECD, competitiveness (2): “may be defined as 
the degree to which, under open market conditions, a country can produce goods and services 
that meets the test of foreign competition while simultaneously maintaining and expanding 
domestic real income.” (OECD 1992:237 in Reinert 1995:25). In a later publication (in 1996), 
the OECD maintained the emphasis on income, and added employment and long-term 
sustainability (3): “… ability to generate, while being and remaining exposed to international 
competition, relatively high factor incomes and factor employment levels on a sustainable 
basis.” (OECD 1996 in ILO 1998:115). More emphasis on the welfare of workers is given by 
Lall (4): “… the ability of an economy to grow in an open market with advantages that yield 
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rising wages, sustained employment creation and improved working conditions.” (Lall 1999a:2-
3).  
These four definitions have in common an inclusion of the ability to generate, or raise, 
wages – while simultaneously participating in, or being exposed to, international competition. 
This understanding of competitiveness is central to this analysis.  
The main argument advanced by Porter concerning the competitive advantage of 
nations is that “a nation’s standard of living in the long term depends on its ability to attain a 
high and rising level of productivity in the industries in which its firms compete” (Porter 
1990:2). And, he continues: “This rests on the capacity of its firms to achieve improving quality 
or greater efficiency” (Porter 1990:2). As will be described more carefully in chapter 2, the 
central element Porter emphasizes is ‘upgrading’. Therefore, in my opinion, Porter does not 
suggest that a high and rising level of productivity strictly resting on the capacity to achieve 
continually greater efficiency in the industries (or activities) in which its firms compete today, is 
sufficient in itself. As Reinert points out:  
“Although it is difficult to be competitive if you are not efficient and have high 
productivity, it is by no means obvious that being the most efficient producer of an 
internationally traded product makes a country competitive – i.e. enables it to raise the 
standard of living. Some very efficient producers and nations are desperately poor – 
they are efficient in products which do not provide competitiveness in the income-
raising meaning of the word.” (Reinert 1995:26).  
Reinert makes the case that economic growth is activity specific. As an example, he points to 
the world’s most productive manufacturers of baseballs, Haitians, who earn 30 cents an hour by 
using needle and thread technology, which is the most efficient production method. In light of 
this recognition, this study analyses the competitive advantages of Zimbabwe (chapter 5), and 
especially focus on trends in real wages, as this is one factor that have a direct impact on living 
standards and ultimately on poverty.  
 
Trade liberalisation and real wages 
The relationship between increasing trade liberalisation and possibilities to increase real wages 
is a central one in this study. This is highly relevant, because in order to advance from being a 
poor country to becoming a rich country, an outward-oriented economy must be able to raise its 
national wage level and still be able to sell its products on international markets (in line with 
the understanding of competitiveness above).  
In standard (or orthodox) trade theory, trade liberalisation is assumed to give cheaper 
imports as tariffs are reduced. The increased competition from foreign imports is expected to 
out-phase uncompetitive parts of domestic import-competing production. The closing down of 
inefficient industries is expected to free up resources, which can be invested in export-oriented 
industries where the country has a comparative advantage. Likewise, as trade liberalisation 
gives cheaper imports, the increased competitive pressures on domestic production will give 
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more efficient markets that will ‘get the prices right’. Prices are assumed to fall as competition 
is increased. But as foreign (established) competitors are likely to be more competitive, it is 
easier for them to penetrate the market than it is for domestic producers to build up export 
production. In the short term, the allocation of resources will change, as domestic producers will 
respond by producing less. This will bring about retrenchments, and increased supply of labour 
will result in lower wages. But as investments in export production come about, production is 
predicted to pick up, employment opportunities may expand, and wages may rise in the long 
term. Accordingly, incomes generated from increased export production may allow for higher 
wages, while the competitive pressures keep domestic prices right and thereby inflation low. In 
this case, real wages will increase (in the long-term) following trade liberalisation.  
However, markets are imperfect in poor countries (in particular), and inflation is 
persistently high in many poor countries despite liberalisation of trade and lowering of tariffs. 
One reason for high inflation can be deficits in government budgets, financed through money 
printing and borrowing. Budget deficits can instigate deteriorating confidence in the currency, 
and force the government to devalue. The government may also resort to devaluation to make 
export products more competitive in world markets. When national currencies in poor countries 
depreciate against rich trading partners’ currencies, imports will not be so cheap after all, and 
the price level may not go down. Moreover, trade liberalisation is likely to intensify competitive 
pressures that may induce employers to keep labour costs low, in order to not lose 
competitiveness when competing on price. This may result in a situation where wages increase 
less than inflation, and real wages fall. This tendency could be partly off-set by minimum 
wages, but a part of the economic reforms that accompany liberalisation in poor countries, is 
usually a demand to dismantle minimum-wage legislation in order to allow for ‘labour-market 
flexibility’. In theory, the relationship between trade liberalisation and real wages is produced 
by the mechanisms explained above.  
 
Contradictory theoretical approaches  
To analyse the role of real wages – or labour costs – in determining competitive advantage in 
international trade, this study identifies and explores a few contradictory theoretical approaches. 
Standard neo-classical approaches essentially support the contemporary policy advice of trade 
liberalisation described above. A rival set of theoretical approaches which can be labelled neo-
Schumpeterian, essentially suggests that to rely on specialisation in low wages as the major 
source of competitiveness in international trade would be a path of deliberate 
underdevelopment. The core argument is that productivity growth, which is seen as the ‘source 
of the wealth of nations’, requires improvements in the quality of the factors of production.  
The different theoretical approaches to specialisation in international trade will be more 
rigorously spelled out in the next chapter. In the subsequent chapters, the empirical evidence 
from Zimbabwe’s experience with international trade, realisation of competitive advantage and 
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real wage development, is presented as an illustration to highlight the merit of the policy advice 
for openness, seen in context of the theoretical approaches considered in this study.  
 
Research questions 
The main question guiding the investigation and analysis in this study is whether using low 
labour-costs as the main source of competitiveness is necessarily beneficial to poor countries (in 
terms of raising living standards). The following questions are addressed in the subsequent six 
chapters: 
1. How do various approaches to theory on specialisation in international trade consider 
low wages as a source of international competitiveness?  
2. What are the outcomes of the export strategies pursued by Zimbabwe since 1965, in 
terms of export policies, export performance and export structure?  
3. How is Zimbabwe’s prospective labour cost advantage in international trade determined 
by the historical evolution of employment and wage policies; trends in real wages; and 
by development in labour costs compared to other countries in the region?  
4. Based on Zimbabwe’s experience with international trade over the last 30 years, in 
which types of activities does Zimbabwe have competitive advantages in international 
trade?  
5. Can the inclusion of dynamic and cumulative elements in the theoretical analysis of 
specialisation in international trade qualify propositions of low wages as a source of 
international competitiveness?  
6. Which implications for the current mainstream policy advice (and its theoretical 
underpinnings) may be generated from an appreciation of the roles of technology; of 
aggregate demand; of self-reinforcing mechanisms in specialisation; and of poverty 
traps at the individual and national levels?  
 
Methodology  
This section outlines the research strategy I have followed, how the thesis is operationalised, 
and why I have not carried out fieldwork. Moreover it explains why I selected Zimbabwe as a 
case, and challenges I have been confronted with concerning validity and reliability in using 
various sources.  
 
Research strategy  
The methods used in producing this thesis are quantitative and historical in character, based on 
critical analysis of secondary literature and existing data sets from official statistics. A purely 
descriptive historical analysis would be inadequate without some attempt of using statistical 
data to measure the overall trends in the areas of particular concern in this study. My method is 
basically a time-series analysis, where I interpret the statistical evidence of changes in exports 
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and wages, in the light of a critical examination of the changing trade- and development 
strategies pursued in Zimbabwe. This was a natural choice due to the exceptional opportunity to 
study particularly far-reaching changes in trade regimes over a relatively long time period in a 
poor country.  
A case study may be defined as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident” (Yin 1994:13). According to Yin the results of a case can be 
generalised in an analytic method (as opposed to statistical generalisation) whereby a previously 
developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results. In other 
words, theory becomes the main vehicle for generalising the results of the case study. This 
captures much of what I do, as I also analyse implications for theory and policy. This study may 
therefore be considered a ‘theoretical case-study’.  
“Theories are generalisations pertaining to a ‘universe’ of cases, case-studies [are] 
interpretations of one unit in such a universe, and theoretical case-studies a kind of 
synthesis of the two. Their object is to interpret specific cases through established 
generalisations and, by doing so, to cast a sharper light on the cases to confirm or 
modify the theories, or, if necessary, to generalise new ones” (Eckstein 1966:177 in 
Andersen 1997:128, emphasis added).  
The generalisability of case studies has been subject to much debate (see Gomm et al. 2000a). 
Some have argued that a case is a bounded system, and have emphasised the importance of 
respecting the boundaries of the case. On these grounds they have suggested ‘naturalistic’ 
generalisation as the alternative to law-like generalisation (Stake 1978). Others have criticised 
the idea that generalisation is the aim of science, and have identified several problems with this 
positivistic belief (Lincoln & Guba 1985). It seems evident that case-study researchers are not 
faced with the choice between either searching for general laws – or studying the unique; 
between these extremes there is a broad range of incidents related to the case which may be 
explained by the same mechanisms. Others maintain that case study research is not barred from 
producing general conclusions as long as they are presented as analytical generalisations and 
not universal laws (Gomm et al. 2000b, Schofield 1990).  
An important question is therefore to what extent Zimbabwe’s experience is unique. 
The question is particularly important concerning the possibilities for generalisation from the 
case of Zimbabwe to the theoretical propositions that I examine. My initial contention is that the 
particular experience of Zimbabwe is (for obvious reasons) unique, whereas the process of 
undertaking trade liberalisation is (in general) common to most developing countries. 
Importantly, as the starting point for this study is not the particular experience of Zimbabwe, but 
rather the general policy recommendation of trade liberalisation, this thesis is not only 
concerned with the case of Zimbabwe but also with the general policy recommendations and 
their theoretical underpinnings. For this reason, the empirical and theoretical analysis is mostly 
kept separate, as the theoretical analysis goes beyond the specific experience of Zimbabwe.  
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The analysis can be understood to be more exploratory than explanatory. According to 
my knowledge there is no uncontested, useful and comprehensive theory that explains all the 
relationships involved in specialisation in the competitive advantage of low labour costs and its 
effects on (1) the possibilities to raise real wages, and (2) the capacity to generate progressively 
more export revenues. Therefore, much of the study is centred on identifying theoretical 
propositions, especially those of relevance from the heterogeneous ‘neo-Schumpeterian’ 
approaches. And it is also centred on identifying empirical patterns. One apparent problem, 
which is common in social science, is that observable data do not correspond exactly to the 
concepts of theoretical analysis. Theoretical concepts can be open to a number of different 
interpretations or defined in a number of ways. Hence, the identification of theoretical 
propositions, conditioned by the particular context and scope of this analysis, becomes central in 
this study. On the other hand, even if the concept to be measured can be identified fairly 
precisely, there is still a potential problem of measurement error. This explains why much of the 
study is devoted to relatively detailed exploration of data. Finally, the study is centred on how – 
by putting together these ideas in a new way – the theoretical underpinnings of the mainstream 
policy advice can be questioned. Rather than building an explanation of trends in exports and 
real wages, I attempt to explore possibilities and constraints that determine Zimbabwe’s 
capacity to benefit from international trade based on further specialisation in its existing 
competitive advantages.  
 
Choice of study object 
As the starting point for this study is the general policy recommendation to carry out export 
strategies based on low labour costs, all poor countries with significantly lower labour costs 
than rich ones were relevant at the outset. The case of Zimbabwe serves as an empirical 
illustration to how a poor country responds to this advice, and performs in its efforts to ‘reap the 
benefits of openness’. Some country-specific characteristics (described below) determined the 
choice of case. In my opinion, these characteristics make Zimbabwe a good case, and an 
interesting one too. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, three distinct periods of different trade regimes can be 
identified over a relatively long time-period (1965-1997) for which there is available data. 
Importantly, the availability of aggregated statistical data over many years is better than for 
most countries in the region, which allows an exploration of trends over time. This enables us to 
study change over time, allowing for trends in exports and real wages to be manifested after 
changes in policy. Of course, there is a time lag after policy changes that may postpone and 
even obscure the effects on real developments. Nonetheless, the pattern of real wages and actual 
export-oriented production has surely been affected by policies that have been put into 
operation. Furthermore, it is evident that the concrete ways in which particular policy changes 
are implemented over time can differ, and are often not transparent to an external observer 
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relying on secondary literature and aggregated statistical evidence. Such differences in policy-
implementation may also contribute to explain different outcomes.  
In a more distinct way than many other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Zimbabwe 
(then Southern Rhodesia) went through a period of de facto import substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) from 1965 until the end of the 1970s (when the war severely reduced economic activity). 
More than anything, the explanation for this lies in the UN-led international sanctions that 
where imposed in 1966. The one question that caused me to select Zimbabwe rather than any 
other country was the following: How did real wages develop during the ISI period compared to 
the period after liberalisation? As I measure real wages, and not nominal wages, they can be 
compared meaningfully at different points in time as increased costs of living (inflation) is 
accounted for. Moreover, as pointed to above, the availability of aggregated statistical data over 
many years is in fact better than for most poor countries in the region. This was a necessary 
condition in order to explore trends over time, and accordingly excluded a number of other 
potential countries. 
In case study research, both single and multiple case studies are possible. I have 
selected only one country rather than several. The desire to study change over time also explains 
this, as comprehensive data sets on exports and wages have been carefully investigated. The 
ideal scheme would be to examine several countries or cases that could strengthen the analysis. 
However, this was not possible given my limited resources. Rather than having information on 
many specific contexts, this study has therefore accumulated relatively detailed information on 
one particular empirical context.  
Moreover, I have chosen to study the national economy of a country, rather than 
specific economic activities in this country (or across a number of countries). The reason is 
quite simple. The availability of wage data is very limited. To acquire reliable and comparable 
wage data for specific industries was not possible given the available wage data on Zimbabwe 
in the ILO publications.  
The starting point for this study is at the international level – in what Rodrik (1999) 
calls the ‘global policy environment for development’. On this basis, I operate with national 
variables, and not with data from specific industries or regions. It was therefore possible to 
undertake the study by using available statistics and secondary literature without fieldwork in 
Zimbabwe.  
 
The challenge of validity in the use of 
secondary literature 
The selection of secondary literature is partly a result of the extent of relevant literature 
available to me through university libraries in Norway and working papers downloadable from 
the internet. But the selection is also partly a result of my preferences of studies that I 
considered relevant (within the range of studies available to me). Furthermore, the appropriate 
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sources of evidence are likely to be conditioned by the particular context of the case (Phelan & 
Reynolds 1996). Regarding the role of the secondary literature, there are several aspects that 
have some bearing on how these previous studies affect this one. First of all, researchers have in 
general a predetermined view of a certain topic. This influences their presentations of data. In 
my selection, some authors seem to have been biased against the controlled trade regime prior 
to 1990. Secondly, no researchers are able to show the entire range of existing data in their own 
surveys. They are more prone to emphasise what they consider to be central according to their 
own theoretical perspectives and prior insight. In many of the studies I have consulted, labour 
costs and wage issues have had a marginal role. Equally, I have in this study focused on trends 
in labour costs and real wages rather than other issues (such as (un-) employment; the 
production base of the major export commodities; the nature of policy-making in Zimbabwe; 
etc.). However, this has been necessary as I focus on labour costs and real wages in analysing 
specialisation in international trade. Another dimension of this problem is that I sometimes 
make use of statistical data in constant prices (especially in chapter 4) which may reduce the 
data’s applicability. Thirdly, it is not possible to perform two identical studies of the same case. 
This makes it all the more important to examine the secondary sources critically (and especially 
what they have to say about labour costs and real wages) in order to say something new with a 
different perspective, and guided by different research questions. Fourthly, it is important to 
make use of a range of sources and studies that can inform the topics covered in one source, and 
thereby qualify and substantiate the presentation. I believe that I have managed to deal fairly 
well with the challenges of validity in using the various sources. In many ways, the study object 
is a relatively extensive one, and many more inputs could have been used. However, in the 
writing process I had to engage in some dimensions more rigorously than others. Consequently, 
I have by necessity drawn more on some sources than on others.  
 
The challenge of reliability in the use of data 
Any discussion of development policies at the aggregated level in a Sub-Saharan African 
country like Zimbabwe must necessarily be tentative, because of the low quality of the 
statistical evidence available. When considering how extraordinarily difficult it is to collect 
statistics in less developed countries, one should realise that much of the data that are 
commonly used may be very unreliable. Furthermore, the major gap in our knowledge of the 
processes of change, or development over time, is partly a result of the large differences in data-
bases used by different agencies in different publications. The way that statistics are presented 
can be a function of a conscious effort to communicate a certain belief. Herein lies considerably 
power on the part of the institutions that publish the statistics. I have made use of statistics 
published by ILO, IMF, UNCTAD and the United Nations Statistical Division (UNSD). 
Statistics used in cross-country publications by international agencies are often collected from 
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many different sources. And the caveats that accompany the original surveys and sources are 
often not recorded very clearly in the footnotes of the final publications. As McNeill puts it: 
 “The more that statistics are repeated, quoted, and compiled from different sources, the 
more the errors tend to be compounded, and the more the revealing footnotes are 
concealed, or simply excluded” (McNeill 2000:147).  
The analysis presented in this study suffers from these inadequacies. However, the fact that I 
have analysed some data that may be unreliable (as I also believe, see below), does not imply 
that I have consciously tried to understate the unreliability of the statistical evidence employed 
in this study. McNeill (2000) argues that development researchers who do not visit the field but 
use available statistics, may not only be ignorant of the unreliability of the available statistics, 
but may also have an incentive to remain ignorant – what he calls a ‘conspiracy of silence.’ He 
suggests: “Certainly those who provide statistics and those who use statistics have a vested 
interest in overstating rather than understating their reliability” (McNeill 2000:149).  
That has not been my intention, and I hope this study does not suffer from such 
shortcomings. Rather, I arrive at a position where I question the reliability of parts of the wage 
data I use. Most of the UN data I use are derived from data collected by the Central Statistical 
Office (CSO) in Zimbabwe. To some extent, these data suffer from the common weaknesses 
and limitations, but are generally held to be of good quality and coverage compared to other 
countries in the region. Still, in the wage data that I rely upon (issued by ILO and collected by 
CSO), I have discovered what seems to be an incorrect U-turn in the data series. The real wages 
for Zimbabweans employed in formal sector activities could not possibly have increased by 
more than one third between 1996 and 1997, when the economic crisis worsened drastically and 
inflation soared (see figure 8). Minor fluctuations in real wages may of course happen from one 
year to another. However, the sudden change in the data series is simply too large to be 
plausible.  
I have consulted other researchers and observers of Zimbabwe8 and presented this 
finding to them. However, they could not think of a reasonable explanation of this statistical 
(mis)-representation. I have searched, but not found an explanation for this incident. Of course, 
one should bear in mind that data for the most recent year in a dataset is often corrected in later 
publications, reflecting the dubious nature of the statistics available. The fact that data after 
1997 have not been released (as of December 2001), may in itself be a good enough reason to 
leave out the doubtful and last published data for 1996 and 1997. Based on this, I have chosen 
to include data for 1996 and 1997 in the tables (table 5, 6, 11 and 12) but not in the illustrative 
figures (figure 6 and 7).  
 
                                                 
8
 Dr. Halvor Mehlum, Department of Economics, University of Oslo and Professor Bill Derman, 
Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University and Centre for Applied Social Sciences, 
University of Zimbabwe. 
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Structure of the thesis 
The rest of this study is organised as follows. In chapter 2, different sets of theoretical 
approaches to cost advantages in international trade are laid out. It gives a presentation of 
standard neo-classical-, ‘new trade-theory’-, and neo-Schumpeterian approaches. Chapter 3 
describes the export strategies in Zimbabwe from 1965-1997, focusing on export policies, 
performance and structure. Chapter 4 starts with a presentation of employment and wage 
policies in Zimbabwe, before portraying its real wage development and its recent levels of 
labour costs compared to other countries in the Southern Africa region. Chapter 5 begins with 
an exposition of possible determinants of competitive advantages in Zimbabwe based on 
empirical evidence in the two foregoing chapters. It then connects human capital development 
in Zimbabwe with exports and wages. Subsequently, it analyses Zimbabwe’s export strategies 
with reference to the notions of natural and created comparative advantage, before assessing its 
experience with trade liberalisation. Chapter 6 employs examples of theorising on self-
reinforcing specialisation to draw implications from neo-Schumpeterian insights for standard 
trade theory. Chapter 7 analyses the merits of the low-wage strategy for competitiveness 
through considering the roles of technology; of aggregate demand; of self-reinforcing 
mechanisms in specialisation; and of poverty traps at the individual and national levels. 
Conclusions are drawn in chapter 8.  
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2  Theoretical approaches to labour-
cost advantages in trade 
Introduction  
This chapter outlines how different theoretical approaches to specialisation in comparative 
advantages in international trade consider low labour costs as a source of international 
competitiveness. The purpose is to display the theoretical underpinnings of the mainstream 
policy advice on one hand, and a set of alternative approaches that may modify these theoretical 
underpinnings on the other. Insights from the alternative approaches on dynamic elements such 
as cumulative causation, will be addressed later in the analysis (chapter 6). Implications for 
policy are addressed in chapter 7. The theoretical propositions that are put forward here are also 
intended to serve as guidance for understanding the issues raised in the two chapters that 
presents the empirical evidence on export strategies and real wages (chapter 3 and 4), and 
indeed the issues illuminated as part of the analysis of Zimbabwe’s competitive advantages in 
chapter 5.  
It should be kept in mind that it is not possible here to do justice to the richness and 
variety of the different approaches to competitive labour-cost advantages and specialisation. 
Despite these limitations, the approaches should, in the condensed form they are represented, 
provide some relevant and significant propositions. 
First, standard neo-classical approaches are presented. Then, I briefly expose the 
intermediary position represented by ‘new trade theory’ as a modified version of standard neo-
classical approaches. Third, I introduce a rather heterogeneous set of neo-Schumpeterian 
approaches. At the end of the chapter, I summarise central propositions from the different 
approaches in the form of a short taxonomy. The chapter will make evident that the different 
approaches have rather contradictory recommendations regarding low wages – or low labour 
costs – as a source of international competitiveness.  
 
Standard neo-classical approaches - 
on low factor costs and comparative 
advantage 
According to the basic theorems of standard neo-classical approaches to trade theory, trade 
liberalisation will increase demand for the more abundant factor of production because this 
factor will be relatively cheap. Since cheap unskilled labour, apart from natural resource 
endowments, is an abundant factor in poor countries, opening up to free trade is assumed to 
increase demand for unskilled labour and hence benefit the poor.  
 17 
The legacy from Ricardo 
The traditional argument in favour of free trade is that it allows countries to specialise in the 
production of those goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage. The 
doctrine of comparative advantage is commonly ascribed to David Ricardo. He assumed that 
through increased trade9, prices would fall making possible a reduction in wages to allow for 
increased profits.  
“It has been my endeavour to show throughout this work that the rate of profits can 
never be increased but by a fall in wages, and that there can be no permanent fall of 
wages but in consequence of a fall of the necessaries on which wages are expended. If, 
therefore, by the extension of foreign trade, or by improvements in machinery, the food 
and necessaries of the labourer can be brought to market, at a reduced price, profit will 
rise” (Ricardo 1817:92).  
Ricardo based his theory of comparative advantage on a static model of trade between England 
and Portugal in which neither capital nor land was required for production. In his example, both 
England and Portugal could produce both cloth and wine using only labour (Ricardo 1817). He 
assumed that labour was perfectly mobile between cloth and wine production in each country; 
that labour was required in fixed proportions to produce each commodity; that there were 
constant returns to scale; that there were no externalities; and that there was perfect competition. 
In the Ricardian model, it is the relative labour inputs that determine the pattern of trade. 
Relative labour costs per unit can therefore be said to determine comparative advantage in the 
Ricardian sense. Accordingly, trade was, in Ricardo’s view, based on labour productivity 
differences between countries10. 
The dominant version of theory on comparative advantage, is usually ascribed to works 
by the two Swedish economists Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin in 1933, later supplemented by 
Paul Samuelson in 1948. The underlying notion is that countries differ in their endowments of 
factors of production such as land, labour, natural resources, and capital. According to the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) theory, countries gain comparative advantage in activities 
that make intensive use of the factors they possess in abundance. The differences in factor costs 
give ‘factor-based comparative advantage’. The H-O-S model takes endowments as given and 
does not address the question of where these endowments come from in the first place – or how 
they are created. As such, it has little to say about the different initial conditions from which 
industrialisation started in different countries (Lall & Latsch 1999).  
                                                 
9
 Or through technological change (‘improvements in machinery’ as Ricardo writes) – but this has mostly 
been neglected by mainstream economists. 
10
 Surprisingly perhaps, Ricardo and Marx had in common a notion of labour as the source of surplus 
product: 
“Ricardo, in line with other classical political economists, identified in labour the source of surplus 
product. The mercantilists were rightly criticised by the classical political economists for their 
identification of the source of surplus product in exchange, just as the French physiocrats were criticised 
for their identification of agriculture as the source of surplus product. The idea that labour is the source of 
surplus product, still retained by the fundamentalist Marxian tradition, is not useful” (Evans 1989:47, 
italics in original).  
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Differences in factor costs have certainly played a role in determining patterns of trade 
in many industries, but there has been a growing awareness that comparative advantage solely 
based on factors of production is not sufficient to explain patterns of trade. The H-O-S theory 
assumed that there are no economies of scale; that competition is perfect; that technologies 
everywhere are identical; that products are all equal; and that national factors are fixed, and do 
not move among countries. All these assumptions have been criticised for being unrealistic, and 
bearing little relation to actual competition (Porter 1990, Stewart 1985). Take for instance the 
assumption of perfect competition. The likelihood of finding a competitive market structure 
composed of a large number of small agents interacting without market power over each other 
is, to say the least, very small. Local product and factor markets (in any country) may rather be 
segmented because of poor infrastructure. And competition between firms in different countries 
would certainly not be ‘perfect’ and undisturbed by market power.  
 
The ‘black box’ of technology and skills 
Another weakness with standard approaches to trade theory is that they do not give a significant 
role to technology in determining competitive advantage. Rather the role of technology is in 
standard neo-classical approaches considered a black box of which we know very little 
(Rosenberg 1982). In H-O-S theory, technology is assumed to be fully diffused across firms and 
countries. Firms automatically select techniques suited to their relative factor prices (i.e. labour-
intensive techniques for developing countries). They use the technologies efficiently without 
cost, lags, risk, learning or effort, and thereby automatically reach ‘best practise’ levels (Lall 
1999a). Evidently, this neo-classical view is too simplistic. The assumptions violate reality, and 
can lead to wrong policy conclusions (Lall 1990).  
Some neo-H-O-S theories incorporate skill as a third factor of production (in addition to 
the cost of capital and labour). However, these theories leave the policy conclusions essentially 
unchanged, as countries are still recommended to specialise in abundant factors. Moreover, they 
do not ask how the relevant factors come into existence or are created, or what role markets, 
history and institutions play in determining endowments. According to these approaches, the 
advantage of developing countries lies in low-skill, labour-intensive activities (Lall 1999a). A 
new version of this approach (see Owens & Wood 1997; Wood & Berge 1997; Wood & Ridao-
Cano 1999; Wood & Jordan 2001; Wood & Mayer 2001), assumes capital to be fully mobile 
and comparative advantage to be dependent on two immobile factors, skills and natural 
resources. Technology remains a freely available factor through import, and thereby irrelevant 
in explaining differences in possibilities to benefit from trade. Furthermore, skills are only 
measured by years of schooling. No distinction is drawn between formal education-based skills 
and experience-based capabilities. This approach also ignores the importance of specific skill 
acquisition, which can only be acquired by prolonged experience and problem solving with 
those specific technologies (Lall 1999a).  
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Adjusting resource allocation to ‘natural’ 
comparative advantage 
In this section, I elaborate more on the expected effects of trade liberalisation as assumed in 
neo-classical standard approaches (trade liberalisation’s expected effects on real wages were 
briefly outlined in chapter 1).  
Trade liberalisation is supposed to change a country’s specialisation in international 
trade towards its ‘natural’ comparative advantage. Exposure to competition from imports is 
expected to cause three kinds of favourable resource allocation: within firms (from inefficient to 
efficient activities), between firms (from ‘bad’ to ‘good’ performers) and between industries 
(from less to more productive activities). Trade liberalisation is supposed to remove the 
economic ‘distortions’ that impede economic efficiency, and “resources previously devoted to 
relatively inefficient or unproductive uses move to more efficient production” (Thomas & Nash 
1991b:9 in Lall & Latsch 1999:38). As market failures11 are assumed to be unimportant, the 
adjustment process is expected to be smooth, rapid and efficient (Lall & Latsch 1999). This 
surprisingly confident assertion in the ‘blessings of outward orientation’ (Singer 1988) is also 
upheld in a World Bank sponsored survey which maintains that “Trade liberalisation results in 
the contraction of inefficient sectors and the expansion of new, efficient ones. Over time, a new 
and more efficient production structure develops that will be better suited to the international 
environment” (Michalopoulos 1987:24 in Lall & Latsch 1999:36).  
It is important to recognise that the stimulating effects of liberalisation that are 
postulated in the standard neo-classical approach can only be theoretically justified given all the 
assumptions made. But these effects will only manifest themselves if the policy changes lead to 
appropriate supply responses (i.e. new export-oriented production emerge in activities where the 
country has a natural comparative advantage). The expected effects will not manifest 
themselves if there is something lacking in the ability of enterprises to produce efficiently in 
response to liberalisation. As Helleiner puts it, “’getting prices right’, through trade and other 
policies, however important, can achieve little in the absence of responsive capacity” (Helleiner 
1995:31 in Lall & Latsch 1999:34-35, emphasis added). In other words, if the capacity – of 
markets in poor countries – to provide supply of necessary inputs to new export-oriented 
production (as a response to trade liberalisation) is inadequate, then the positive effects of trade 
liberalisation – as assumed by standard neo-classical approaches – will not come about. It seems 
plausible to expect that such responsive capacity is indeed inadequate in poor countries. Recent 
theorising has established a ‘new mainstream’ position which incorporates imperfect 
competition and economies of scale into models building on standard neo-classical theory.  
                                                 
11
 Market failures are deviations from the ‘competitive equilibrium’ assumed in standard neo-classical 
economic theory. Commonly mentioned causes of market failure are public goods (e.g. security), 
externalities (e.g. pollution) and imperfect information (where information is not freely and fully 
available and is costly to collect). See Stiglitz (1989) for an exploration of causes and consequences of 
market failures.  
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New trade theory: An intermediate 
position 
As noted in chapter 1, standard neo-classical approaches to international trade theory essentially 
supports the contemporary policy advice of trade liberalisation. However, some economists 
have in recent years taken a different view on what they see as mainstream theory. Their 
arguments modify the conception that ‘mainstream’ theory (in their sense) is – and can be – 
used to support the dominant policy recommendation.  
 
A new mainstream 
According to Lall & Latsch (1999:26-27) “neo-liberal propositions have acquired almost 
axiomatic status. They continue to inform thinking about development policy in institutions 
such as the IMF and the World Bank”. Thereby they share the starting point of this thesis. 
However, they argue that “over the last ten years, advances in the tools and techniques of 
economic theorising appears to have outpaced thinking about development histories, paths and 
policies”. In essence, they argue that what may be regarded as the most modern, and dominant, 
frontier in economic theory, do not support the current policy recommendations for economic 
development. They support their argument by referring to the high-ranking mainstream 
economist, Paul Krugman, who casts doubt on the theoretical case for free trade: “There is still 
a case for free trade as a good policy, and as a useful target in the practical world of politics, but 
it can never again be asserted as the policy that economic theory tells us is always right” 
(Krugman 1987:132 in Lall & Latsch 1999:27)12. My point here is that regardless of whether the 
‘dominant frontier’ in economic theory no longer supports the dominant policy prescriptions, 
what matters for real-world development is the actual recommendations and the effects from the 
ensuing policies that are carried out. Consequently, the standard neo-classical approach to 
theory on international trade, which is used by policy-making institutions to underpin the neo-
liberal policy advice, is the relevant approach to consider. This is certainly the case if the merits 
of the policy advice are to be assessed by investigating its theoretical support. 
 
Modifying standard trade theory 
In the early 1980s, the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale were 
relaxed by some trade theorists. Realities of market structure (such as imperfect competition) 
and considerations of scale economy (such as increasing returns) were systematically inserted 
into the formal structure of trade theory. These modifications in standard trade theory were 
labelled new trade theory. The changes generally support a basic view in which trade patterns 
not only reflect specialisation according to natural comparative advantage, but also additional 
                                                 
12
 Notably though, some dissenting economists claim that ever since 1613 (indeed 163 years before the 
first publication of The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776)), there has been another canon in economic 
theory that has never supported the view that ‘free trade is always right’ (see Reinert & Daastøl 2000). 
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specialisation to realise economies of scale (Helpman & Krugman 1985 in Helleiner 1990). 
Krugman (1990) argues in the introduction to a collection of many of his articles that formed 
much of new trade theory, that much trade (especially between similar countries) represents 
specialisation to take advantage of increasing returns, rather than to capitalise on inherent 
differences between countries’ factor endowments as the old Ricardian trade theory claims. 
Krugman (1990:6) reasons that “a pattern of specialisation can be established, and then get 
locked in by the cumulative advantages that go with large scale”.  
Whereas technology was ignored in standard trade theory, some departures in new trade 
theory include technology as an explanatory variable. One such departure is the ‘neo-
technology’ approach taken by Paul Krugman, which is grounded in models of imperfect 
competition. In this approach the pattern of trade is depending on relative rates of innovation 
and imitation – or ‘technology gaps’ between countries. It is assumed that trade leads to the 
diffusion of knowledge, allowing technology gaps to be closed over time. However, as 
technologies mature, factor costs are assumed to reassert themselves as the primary determinant 
of comparative advantage. It may therefore be argued that even if new trade theory approaches 
relax some assumptions used in standard approaches, they still have a neo-classical bias.  
 
Not a new mainstream, but an old 
underground river? 
New trade theory approaches acknowledge the fact that much trade can be explained by self-
reinforcing specialisation in comparative advantages to take advantage of economies of scale. 
However, the policy conclusions from new trade theory remain largely unchanged compared to 
standard neo-classical theory. According to Erik Reinert “Krugman has been sitting on the lid of 
the Pandora’s box he opened” (Reinert & Riiser 1994:18). Krugman’s conclusion is that trading 
inside the same product groups (e.g. trading cars for cars) is necessarily mutually beneficial to 
both trading partners. Thereby, Krugman excludes the possibility that within the same sector or 
industry only some activities are subject to increasing returns13. The very same differences that 
exist between economic sectors (e.g. between manufacturing and primary production) also exist 
within sectors, within industries, and even within companies (Reinert & Riiser 1994). According 
to Reinert, trading manufactured goods for other manufactured goods is beneficial to both 
trading nations only if the goods are subject to the same degree of increasing returns. Moreover, 
while some activities are subject to increasing returns, others are subject to diminishing returns 
(Reinert 1980, 1994). New trade theory has not taken into account that economic activities are 
different, and consequently are subject to different degrees of economies of scale. The bottom-
                                                 
13
 Economies of scale imply that when increasing the scale of production (producing a greater quantity of 
a product), unit costs are reduced. Increasing returns to scale imply that output increases more than 
proportionately to the increase in input. With diminishing returns to scale, output increases less than 
proportional to the increase in input.  
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line is that the disposition to benefit from increased trade is activity-specific (Reinert 1980, 
1994, 1995, 1999).  
Reinert & Daastøl (2000) argue that increasing returns has, implicitly or explicitly, been 
at the core of what they call the other canon of economic analysis, ever since 1613. Regarding 
the role of increasing returns in economic theory they borrow a metaphor used by Kenneth 
Arrow: “This tradition acts like an underground river, springing to the surface every few 
decades” (Arrow in his foreword to Arthur (1994) in Reinert & Daastøl 2000:3). The 
mainstream policy advice given to poor countries is clear: They should specialise in activities in 
which they have a natural comparative advantage. The standard neo-classical approaches to 
trade theory that are used to support the recommendations are also clear: Countries have a 
natural comparative advantage in activities that intensively use abundant factors. But as the 
presentation so far has showed, and will expose more thoroughly below, there is a range of 
theoretical approaches that diverge from the standard approaches. Some, such as new trade 
theory approaches, may modify standard trade theory in some respects, but fail to draw 
significantly different lessons for policy. This may especially be the case with policy 
recommendations to poor countries, as they are more dependent on factor endowments based on 
natural resources that may be subject to diminishing returns. Rich industrialised countries, 
however, have more diversified factor endowments (including technological capabilities like 
human capital and technological know-how), which make it easier for them to compete in 
activities subject to increasing returns. In other words, the implications from new trade theory 
are mainly applicable to rich countries.  
However, in addition to new trade theory, there are also other approaches that contest 
the assumptions in standard neo-classical approaches.  
 
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches - on 
low factor costs and comparative 
advantage 
According to neo-Schumpeterian approaches, countries should specialise in activities where 
they have a potential to upgrade existing factors and capabilities, or create new ones, allowing 
them to compete on quality rather than costs. Consequently, low labour costs are by definition 
considered unsuitable as a principal source of competitiveness. 
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches as understood here, stem mostly from economic theory 
at the micro (or firm) level. The wealth of a country is essentially created by its private business. 
It is, after all, firms and not countries that compete in international markets. At the aggregate 
level, however, international trade is seen as trade between countries, and in this respect it 
makes sense to study the competitive advantages of a country through neo-Schumpeterian 
lenses. More than standard neo-classical approaches, neo-Schumpeterian approaches recognise 
determinants of competitive advantage at the micro-level that are likely to vary between 
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industries and economic activities, notably the role of activity-specific technology and how it 
effects labour productivity.  
 
Characteristics of neo-Schumpeterian 
perspectives  
An obvious characteristic of neo-Schumpeterian approaches is their intellectual debt to the 
works by Joseph Alois Schumpeter. Schumpeter is perhaps best known for his explicit and 
careful analysis of economic development as discontinuous, occurring through cyclical 
disturbances created by innovation – or the process of creative destruction – which he 
considered to be the strategic stimulus to economic development. The ‘neo-’ element suggests 
that his ideas reappear. For example, in the voluminous and much-cited work ‘The Competitive 
Advantage of Nations’, Michael Porter writes “My fundamental perspective is more 
Schumpeterian (1934, 1942) than neo-classical” (Porter 1990:778).  
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches represent an alternative framework to approaches based 
on standard neo-classical theory. It has been argued by Lall & Latsch (1999) that the dominant 
H-O-S model is by itself unable to explain observed trade flows, and that relaxing its least 
realistic assumptions leads to indeterminate outcomes in terms of specialisation and trade 
patterns. Neo-Schumpeterian approaches suggest that new trade theory has implications that 
could be fruitfully employed in an alternative framework that allows for a more specific, 
historical and institutional analysis. This alternative framework attempts to be more dynamic, 
emphasising the effects of trade on overall economic activity, and looking explicitly at 
processes of factor creation (Lall & Latsch 1999).  
The emphasis of neo-Schumpeterian approaches is on international differences in 
innovative and productive capabilities, and on the dynamics of evolving comparative advantage. 
These ‘dynamics’ are related to historical processes of institutional development, increasing 
returns, learning, and accumulation of technology – including the physical equipment, 
knowledge and specialised skills involved in the mastering of technologies (Lall & Latsch 
1999). Whereas neo-classical standard approaches saw economic efficiency as static and 
allocative, ‘Schumpeterian efficiency’, by contrast, is characterised as “dynamic, long-run 
innovative potential and flexibility” (Lall & Latsch 1999:34).  
 
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches are characterised by empirical generalisations. In this respect, 
they can be clearly distinguished from formal model and theory building based on a set of 
assumptions that allow the researcher to ‘control’ the model as in an experiment in a laboratory. 
In accordance with what Arestis & Sawyer (1994) label ‘radical political economy’14, neo-
Schumpeterian approaches value relevance more than formalism. The underlying principle in 
                                                 
14
 The approach is radical – not in the sense of having a left-wing political point of view, but in the sense 
that it re-examines the very roots of economic analysis. 
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neo-Schumpeterian approaches is that theory should represent reality as accurately as possible. 
To do so, these approaches often begin with observation and proceeds to build upon what 
Rogers (1989 in Arestis & Sawyer 1994) calls ‘realistic abstractions’ rather than ‘imaginary 
models’. However, appreciation of context-specific factors do not imply that generalisations are 
impossible. An implication of this methodology is that explanation is emphasised and less 
attention is given to prediction.  
Another feature of neo-Schumpeterian approaches is that they tend to view the economy 
as part of a socio-cultural system; it is formed by this system, but at the same time influences 
culture and society. Such an understanding of economic phenomena can best take place in a 
multi-disciplinary way, which explains why e.g. sociologists have made important contributions 
to neo-Schumpeterian approaches regarding the role of institutions in economic change (see e.g. 
Chang & Evans 2000; Evans 1995).  
Below, I outline some neo-Schumpeterian perspectives on specialisation in international 
trade, and particularly the role of labour cost advantages, wages and employment.  
 
International trade and productivity growth 
As pointed out in chapter 1, the issue of international competitiveness has become central in the 
debate on development strategies. Porter claims that “the only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is national productivity” (Porter 1990:6). Productivity 
growth can be seen as the source of the wealth of nations. It is now widely accepted that the 
major productivity-inducing factor is technological change (Fagerberg 1996; Freeman et al. 
1982; Freeman & Soete 1987, 1994; Nelson 1995; Perez 1999). Competitiveness and 
profitability (in firms) are the actual determinants of productivity growth and technological 
innovation. 
But it is not only technological change which boost productivity. Other forms of 
innovation, such as organisational (process) innovation, may also induce productivity growth. 
 
Competition resulting from increased international trade may threaten national productivity. If 
the industries that are losing position to foreign rivals are the relatively more productive ones in 
the economy, a country’s ability to sustain productivity growth is threatened (Porter 1990). The 
competition can result in downward pressure on wages, and if enough of a country’s industries 
and activities are affected (by some considered as de-industrialisation15), there may also be 
downward pressure on the value of the country’s currency. Devaluation may lower the standard 
of living in a country by making imports more expensive and reducing the prices obtained for 
its exports abroad.  
Moreover, developing countries may face a trade-off between specialising according to 
existing comparative advantage (in ‘low-technology’ goods), or entering sectors in which they 
                                                 
15
 For a discussion of different definitions of de-industrialisation, see Jalilian & Weiss (2000). 
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currently lack a competitive advantage, but may acquire such an advantage in the future as a 
result of the potential for productivity growth (in ‘high-technology’ goods). According to 
Redding (1999), comparative advantage is domestically determined by past technological 
development, while simultaneously shaping current rates of innovation. Specialisation 
according to current comparative advantage results in the static gains from trade predicted in 
standard approaches. However, if individual firms fail to fully internalise the potential for 
productivity growth in each sector, it may also mean that an economy fails to specialise in 
activities where its potential for productivity growth is large relative to its trading partners. As a 
result, such specialisation under free trade may generate “dynamic welfare losses” (Redding 
1999:36). If sufficiently large, these welfare losses may outweigh the static welfare gains 
explained by Ricardo, so that the net-effect from trade is welfare-reducing.  
Dodaro (1991) has argued that when allowing for market distortions, productivity in the 
export sector may be lower than in other sectors. Moreover, Rodrik (1992b) has argued that 
there is no good reason to expect that trade liberalisation will generally be helpful to overall 
technological performance:  
“if truth-in-advertising were to apply to policy advice, each prescription would be 
accompanied with a disclaimer: ‘Warning! Trade liberalisation cannot be shown to 
enhance technical efficiency; nor has it been empirically demonstrated to do so’” 
(Rodrik 1992b:171-172).  
Labour-saving technological change and 
demand 
Technological innovation is likely to lead to efficiency improvements in production, which may 
reduce demand for labour (Freeman et al. 1982). Labour-displacing innovations result in lower 
employment if growth in output does not compensate sufficiently for productivity gains. 
Whether it does so will depend on price and income elasticity – whether growth in output leads 
to larger demand capacity and more actual demand, which may create more jobs. The most 
well-known cases where such compensating effects will be insufficient relate to food and other 
basic commodities (cocoa, coffee, cotton, tobacco etc.). Engel’s law postulates that a declining 
proportion of rising income is spent on food. The steady long-term decline in agricultural 
production in rich countries is mostly due to the combined effect of technological change and 
this law. Furthermore it “indicates that poor resource rich countries are engaged in the wrong 
activities when they specialise their economy even more on basic primary products” (Freeman 
& Soete 1994:77). The relevant policy implication here is that poor countries should not 
specialise their economy (even more) in existing comparative advantages in the production of 
commodities for which there is inelastic demand, as productivity growth based on such factors 
will only lead to more unemployment (as growth in output does not lead to more demand), 
resulting in more pressure to take low-paid jobs.  
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The various innovations that constitute technological change in an activity are often 
assumed to be labour-displacing rather than employment-generating. Nevertheless, 
technological change may after some time result in new activities and new jobs. Freeman & 
Soete (1987) argue that a change involving mechanisms whereby labour is intended to substitute 
capital is limited in scope not least because of the nature of technological change itself: 
“The notion that a temporary reduction in real wages will somehow ‘induce’ the 
development and adoption of more labour-intensive techniques in manufacturing is in 
our view particularly dubious and based on several fallacies about the nature and 
direction of technical change” (Freeman & Soete 1987:39, emphasis added). 
The inference is that the argument supporting low real wages as a means to increase 
employment is unpersuasive in light of the conventional nature of technological change. In the 
same study, Freeman and Soete also make the argument that: 
“The most important condition for increasing employment is sustained increase in 
investment and in productivity. As employment rises and unemployment diminishes, 
real wages can certainly increase without damaging profits, provided productivity 
increase is maintained. It is for this reason that we have stressed so strongly the 
importance of diffusion of new technology and of skills” (Freeman & Soete 1987:255, 
emphasis added). 
This argument relates directly to the core of neo-Schumpeterian approaches to competitive 
advantage in low labour costs. Productivity growth, by way of investments in – and diffusion of 
– new technology and skills, will allow labour costs to increase as the competitive advantage is 
moved from competitiveness based on costs per se to competitiveness based on quality features. 
The ideal is differentiated and specialised advantage through high levels of product quality and 
(technological) sophistication. The underlying premise to achieve this is a conscious change in 
the specialisation of production from focusing on costs to focusing on quality features.  
 
The trap of cost-advantage in basic factors 
As described above, the stock of factors in a country is taken as fixed in standard neo-classical 
approaches to trade theory. Neo-Schumpeterian approaches, however, emphasise the 
importance of factor creating mechanisms. Factor creation is cumulative. Continual 
reinvestment to upgrade the quality of factors is necessary, also in order to keep the current 
stock of factors from depreciating. As a result, the rate at which the factors are upgraded, and 
made more specialised to particular industries, is more important than the stock of factors at any 
particular time (Porter 1990).  
In actual competition the abundance or low cost of a factor often leads to its inefficient 
deployment. Consequently “an abundance of factors may undermine instead of enhance 
competitive advantage” (Porter 1990:74, emphasis added). Porter distinguishes between ‘basic 
factors’ which include “natural resources, climate, location, unskilled and semiskilled labour, 
and debt capital”, and ‘advanced factors’ which include “modern digital data communication 
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infrastructure, highly educated personnel such as graduate engineers and computer scientists, 
and university research institutes in sophisticated disciplines” (Porter 1990:77). Evidently, basic 
factors are typically not created, but rather inherited by a country. By contrast, the more 
advanced and specialised factors are created. It is these factors that are important in achieving 
“higher-order and more sustainable competitive advantage” (Porter 1990:80). Furthermore, 
Porter argues that disadvantages in basic factors, such as labour shortages or lack of domestic 
raw materials, create pressures to innovate.  
“innovating around basic factor disadvantages leads firms to upgrade by developing 
more sophisticated competitive advantages (…) that can be sustained longer and which 
may also support higher prices. At the same time, pressures are created to upgrade and 
specialise more rapidly other factors such as skilled human resources or infrastructure in 
order to keep pace.” (Porter 1990:82, italics in original).  
Porter claims that what is considered to be disadvantages in the standard neo-classical 
understanding of competition, can become advantages in a more dynamic one. Based on this 
reasoning, Porter suggests that firms facing ‘selective factor disadvantages’ are more likely to 
innovate than those facing a comfortable abundance of factors. But if factor disadvantages are to 
stimulate innovation, the disadvantages must motivate rather than discourage it. Therefore, the 
best combination for improvement and innovation is to have a balance of advantages in some 
areas and disadvantages in selected others (Porter 1990). Importantly, however, Porter 
underlines that the positive role of selective disadvantages in stimulating innovation depends on 
the other determinants in his ‘diamond’ model of national competitive advantage16 (apart from 
factors conditions, they are domestic demand conditions; presence of related and supporting 
industries; and firm strategy, structure, and rivalry). The ‘diamond’ is a mutually reinforcing 
system, where the advantages in one of the determinants can create or upgrade advantages in 
others. In other words, the model emphasise external economies. Consequently, for selective 
factor disadvantages to upgrade the sources of competitive advantage, the other broader 
conditions in the diamond must be present.  
Furthermore, Porter (1990) suggests four stages of competitive economic development 
of countries (factor-driven; investment-driven; innovation-driven; and wealth-driven). For 
Porter, competitive development is all about upgrading. Upgrading is the movement toward 
more sophisticated sources of higher-order competitive advantages in existing industries and 
                                                 
16
 Porter’s diamond model has been criticised for indeterminacy of the relationships in the model. For 
instance, Porter is criticised for failing to clearly define the conditions under which advantages in the 
supply of basic factors of production (such as low labour costs) are an advantage and the conditions under 
which they are a disadvantage (Grant 1991). According to Grant, the key weakness of the theory is in its 
predictive power: “Ambiguity over the signs of relationships, the complexity of interactions, and dual 
causation renders the model unproductive in generating clear predictions. (…) The result is a theory 
which is gloriously rich but hopelessly intractable” (Grant 1991:542-543). However, this criticism fails to 
appreciate the nature of the neo-Schumpeterian perspective outlined above (valuing relevance more than 
formalism and giving less attention to prediction), and therefore Grant seems to criticise Porter on 
unjustly grounds. 
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toward positions in new higher-productivity segments and industries (Porter 1990, see pp. 543-
544). Preconditions for such competitive progress include factor creating mechanisms; 
motivation; domestic rivalry; demand upgrading; selective factor disadvantages; and capacity 
for new business formation (Porter 1990). According to Porter, nearly all developing countries 
are at the factor-driven stage. He also points out that few countries ever move beyond this stage. 
Consequently, poor countries in general do not have a competitive development or progress. In 
my view, it is therefore meaningless to concurrently suggest that poor countries experience a 
factor-driven competitive development. A more relevant question is why poor countries do not 
go through factor-driven competitive development?  
Porter describes the factor-driven stage as one where “virtually all internationally 
successful industries in the nation draw their advantage solely from basic factors of production” 
and moreover, the country’s domestic firms “compete solely on the basis of price in industries 
that require little product or process technology” (Porter 1990:546-547). One explanation of 
why countries at this stage do not experience competitive development would be that they lack 
the preconditions for such development that is listed above. A related explanation is offered by 
Porter, albeit indirectly, in terms of his framework. He suggests that for countries at this stage 
only factor conditions are an advantage in the ‘diamond’ model. Furthermore he asserts “This 
source of competitive advantage limits sharply the range of industries and industry segments in 
which the nation’s firms can successfully compete in international terms” (Porter 1990:547). 
The implication in terms of the diamond framework would be that the mutually reinforcing 
element cannot operate, and there will be negligible possibilities for synergies like external 
economies. Moreover, he points out 
“Indeed, my theory contains a much more daunting challenge for a developing nation 
than a model based heavily on factor cost, factor quality, and economies of scale. The 
mutual dependency of the determinants that I have emphasised means that the weakest 
one will constrain development. (…) A nation will be most likely to be successful not in 
isolated industries but in building whole clusters” (Porter 1990:676-677). 
A third explanation can be found in the factor advantages themselves. Porter maintains that 
advantages due to basic factors are often short-lived17, and have been undermined by their 
diminished necessity and increased availability, making returns to basic factors low: “Those 
industries in which labour costs or natural resources are important to competitive advantage also 
often have industry structures that support only low average returns on investment” (Porter 
1990:15). Since such industries are accessible to many countries because of relatively low 
barriers to entry, they are prone to too many competitors and too much supply-capacity. This 
argument corresponds to the one more clearly expressed by Reinert (1994) who provides a 
tentative index of the quality of economic activities. The economic activities largely dependent 
                                                 
17
 Also Lall (1999a) argues that insofar as the suggested advantage given by low wages exists, it is 
temporary. 
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on basic factors, in the Reinertian sense the low-quality activities, are frequently subject to 
diminishing returns to scale. The implication from acknowledging the fact that economic 
growth is activity specific, is that specialisation in such low-quality basic factor advantages 
cannot sustain the productivity growth necessary to achieve a higher-order competitive 
development (Reinert 1980, 1994, 1995, 1999). Porter also recognises that “This basis for 
advantage [basic factors] is not sustainable and may limit the potential standard of living” 
(Porter 1990:677). As a priority for development strategies he recommends: 
“As a starting point, a nation must identify those industries where its factor advantages 
today provide some competitive advantage but where other determinants of national 
advantage are also actually, or potentially, present. (…) Such industries become initial 
centres of development. Import substitution will succeed if the determinants are present. 
However, a nation must move quickly to upgrade its advantages in these industries 
beyond basic factor costs” (Porter 1990:677, italics in original).  
Based on this, Porter recommends investments in forward and backward linkages along the 
same lines as Albert Hirschman did in his Strategy of Economic Development (Hunt 1989). 
Development should be stimulated (through government policy) by investments in “upstream, 
downstream, or related industries in which advantage is less factor sensitive. Investments in 
education, research, and infrastructure should concentrate on these clusters” (Porter 1990:677-
678). In addition, the theory suggests a parallel stimulation of development based on demand. 
Government and local firms should identify those industries, or industry segments, in which its 
demand conditions are favourable. These could be industries where there are sophisticated and 
demanding buyers, or where local needs are distinctive, so that there are niches left that have 
been ignored by other producers in other countries. These activities should have hitherto 
unexploited potential for productivity growth given the available technology. As poor countries 
have limited resources available to invest in research and development (R&D), it is particularly 
difficult for them to locate such niches and activities. 
 
Summary 
The main difference between the approaches considered in this chapter is the following: In 
standard neo-classical approaches, comparative advantage depends entirely on factor 
endowments (capital, labour and natural resources). By contrast, neo-Schumpeterian approaches 
emphasise factor creation through innovation (in a broad sense), as well as technology and 
technological capabilities (including tacit know-how from learning and experience).  
Moreover, in standard neo-classical approaches the overall objective and guiding 
principle is specialisation according to natural comparative advantage. In neo-Schumpeterian 
approaches by contrast, productivity growth is the overall objective and technological change is 
seen as the most important determinant of increasing productivity. The latter approaches 
emphasise forms of specialisation and prioritisation that induce the ability of firms and 
industries to follow technological change and take advantage of technological progress.  
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Standard neo-classical approaches basically have a static understanding of specialisation 
in international trade. Neo-Schumpeterian approaches, on the other hand, appreciate the 
dynamic and cumulative elements involved in such specialisation, and emphasise the effects of 
not only increasing (as in new trade theory) but also diminishing returns to scale.  
On the whole, the different approaches have rather contradictory recommendations 
regarding low wages – or low labour costs – as a source of international competitiveness. 
Standard neo-classical approaches draw heavily on the legacy from Ricardo and emphasise 
competitive advantages in abundant factors such as cheap labour. Neo-Schumpeterian 
approaches by contrast, are distinctly enriched with an appreciation of the significant roles of 
technology and cumulative causation, and consequently emphasise specialisation in sources of 
competitiveness that can be upgraded in terms of quality by technological change, rather than 
advantages of low costs. The theoretical approaches considered in this chapter can be presented 
schematically as indicated in box 1. As can be seen, the different approaches have different 
recommendations regarding specialisation in low labour costs. 
 
Box 1 
Taxonomy of theoretical approaches to labour-cost advantages in trade 
 
Standard neo-classical New trade theory Neo-Schumpeterian 
Specialisation according 
to comparative efficiency 
(Ricardo) 
Specialisation to take 
advantage of increasing returns   
(Krugman) 
Specialisation to induce  
productivity growth                
(Porter, Redding) 
Comparative cost 
advantage based on 
factor proportions        
(H-O-S theory) 
Despite imperfect competition, 
more trade will ameliorate 
technology gaps  
Productivity growth in activities with 
inelastic demand will result in more 
unemployment (Freeman & Soete) 
Technology assumed to 
be available through 
trade 
 Compete on quality – not costs          
(Porter, Reinert) 
  Cost-advantages are temporary 
and short-lived (Lall, Porter) 
Recommendations: Recommendations: Recommendations: 
- Specialise according to 
cost advantages 
- Take advantage of low 
labour costs 
- Specialise in increasing return 
activities  
- Take advantage of low labour 
costs  
- Create, and specialise in, quality-
based advantages  
- Use, but do not specialise in, cost-
based basic-factor advantages 
 
To support the analysis of the ‘low-wage strategy for competitiveness’, the concrete experience 
of Zimbabwe will be used as an empirical illustration in the following chapters. Empirical 
evidence on the export strategies carried out by Zimbabwe since 1965 is presented in chapter 3. 
Moreover, the country’s real wage development is recorded in chapter 4, before its evolved 
comparative advantage is analysed in chapter 5. I return to the tension between standard trade 
theory and neo-Schumpeterian approaches in chapter 6, by looking explicitly at how 
considerations in the latter approaches – of ‘dynamic and cumulative elements’ – may qualify 
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the assumptions in standard approaches. Finally, I move on to analyse the merits of mainstream 
policy recommendations by focusing on their theoretical underpinnings in chapter 7, before I 
draw a number of implications for policy. 
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3  Zimbabwe’s trade regime 1965-
1997 
Introduction 
This chapter outlines the export strategies pursued by Zimbabwe from 1965 to 1997, in terms of 
export policies, export performance and export structure. When studying export strategies in a 
particular country, one need to get a reasonably good insight into the country’s exports – of 
policy, performance, and a conception of export value and export structure, both aggregated and 
detailed. The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the evolution of the role of exports 
in Zimbabwe’s economy, and its export structure, so as to provide the basis for a discussion of 
Zimbabwe’s competitive advantages in international trade in the analysis in chapter 5. To 
successfully align the various factors contributing to this, I provide a presentation of the policies 
and strategies that has been pursued by Zimbabwe in the period under review relying on 
literature sources. I also present the actual export performance, trade balance, production 
structure and export structure relying on statistical sources. The focus will be on the systemic 
transformation from a controlled to a liberalised regime. Particularly the question of the external 
sector’s overall performance will be explored before I end up by displaying the structure of 
Zimbabwe’s exports.  
 
The external sector in Zimbabwe: 
From controls to liberalisation 
The recent economic history of Zimbabwe can be divided into three distinct periods. The first 
started in 1965 following the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) by the Rhodesia 
Front government on November 11th 1965. The second period started with Independence on 
April 18th 1980. This period was also characterised by ‘independence’ in another sense, as the 
new political regime, until 1990, resisted negotiations for a World Bank and IMF supported 
structural adjustment programme (Trålim 1999). The third period is the decade of the 1990s, 
which was characterised by trade liberalisation and other economic reforms in conjunction with 
the 1991-95 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) and the 1996-2000 
Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST).  
 
The system of protection 1965-1989 
The UDI period 1965-1979  
In 1965 Rhodesia made its unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from the United 
Kingdom. In response to the UDI, the United Nations (UN) imposed selective sanctions in 
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1966, and comprehensive mandatory sanctions from 1968 (Ndlovu 1994). Sanctions were 
intended to stop all trade and consequently most economic activities. Rhodesia had been 
dependent on imports of capital equipment, raw materials for manufacturing and mining, and 
consumer goods. Aided by South Africa and a number of international companies, the 
Rhodesian government started with a co-ordinated import rationing and foreign exchange 
allocation system.  
The central concern of the government’s management of the external sector, was the 
balance of payments. The government established trade controls to reduce the balance of 
payments effects of the UN imposed sanctions. Imports were controlled through import 
licensing and a foreign exchange allocation system.  
The protective feature of the system lied in the restriction of imports by denying foreign 
exchange to importers in general, and only allowing limited amounts to some selected importers 
who already had obtained an import licence. Imports were determined by the administrative 
allocation of foreign exchange based on balance of payments projections and expected export 
revenues (Ndlovu 1994). The foreign exchange allocated was the balance after allowances for 
payments of contractual obligations and other forward commitments had been made. Therefore 
import levels varied with the availability of foreign exchange.  
Ndlovu (1994:77-82) describes the complex system of foreign exchange allocation in 
Zimbabwe during the UDI and the independence periods. Applicants to the foreign exchange 
allocation system had to fulfil stringent criteria to be allocated foreign currency. To obtain an 
import licence, the goods to be imported, or commercial service to be sustained, had to “serve 
an essential need, ameliorate some deficiency in domestic supply and lead to sustained net gain 
in foreign exchange” (GOZ 1981a:72 in Ndlovu 1994:80).  
Because of the extensive foreign exchange allocation system, the Zimbabwe system of 
protection did not rely on taxes levied on trade, such as customs duties, to protect the domestic 
industries or indicate the direction of preferred development. Their main function was to raise 
revenues for the government. Under the protective trade system (1965-1990) the proportion of 
duty to import values was lowest for capital goods, then intermediate goods (excluding fuel), 
and highest for consumer goods (Ndlovu 1994). There were variations in duty rates on 
consumer goods depending on whether they were considered luxury items or necessities. 
 
The independence period 1980-1989 
The system for allocating foreign exchange introduced at UDI, was maintained after 
independence with minor modifications. Foreign exchange earnings increased (the first two 
years) after independence. Imports started to increase in 1980 when allocations were relaxed 
and reached their peak in 1982. Imports were initially increased to enable the industrial sector to 
replace ageing equipment and increase exports. When exports failed to keep pace with the rising 
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imports, the balance of payments deteriorated leading to a tightening of the import control 
regime (Ndlovu 1994). 
However, even under this tight import control regime, a small range of products was 
imported under an Open General Import License (OGIL). But OGIL did not play a significant 
role in the first decade after Independence. The share of OGIL imports in total imports declined 
from about 3% in 1983 to less than 1% in 1988 (Ndlovu 1994:81). As will be described below, 
the ESAP reform programme, initiated in 1991, rapidly expanded the list of goods imported 
under OGIL. 
 
Import liberalisation in the 1990s 
Changes in trade policy began in 1990, before the formal introduction of ESAP in 1991. The 
policy was to liberalise imports gradually by moving items from the allocation system to OGIL. 
The phasing of liberalisation was designed to be gradual in order to give domestic producers 
time to adjust before facing competition from imports. Thus the importation of production 
inputs was to go onto OGIL before consumer goods, with priority for inputs to sectors in which 
“export volumes are assured or for ‘linkage’ sectors which do not directly export but are 
important in the export chain.” (Ndlela & Robinson 1995:146). Even though only 45% of 
imports were on OGIL by the end of 1992, there was already a high degree of de facto 
liberalisation (Chipika & Davies 1998). By July 1994, all import restrictions (with the exception 
of a limited list of ‘negative’ imports) were removed resulting in full liberalisation 18 months 
ahead of ESAP schedule. Thus, the intended ‘gradual phasing’ of trade liberalisation in 
Zimbabwe went much faster than projected in the reform programme (GoZ 1990, see pp. 9-12). 
As the tight import control regime was abandoned, tariffs became all the more 
important. The major tariff rates introduced in 1992 were 10% for raw materials, 20% for 
intermediate goods and 30% for finished products (Chipika & Davies 1998:24). This was 
relatively low protection by developing country standards, but the addition of a 20% surtax 
charge raised the level of protection. However, the surtax was intended to be reduced or 
removed by 1993 according to the plans (see GoZ 1990 p. 10). In February 1997 a simplified 
tariff schedule was introduced with 0% on capital goods, 5% on raw materials, 15% on spares 
and partly processed inputs, 20-30% on intermediate goods and consumables and 40-85% on 
finished goods (Chipika & Davies 1998:24). The intention was to lower the cost of production 
and make Zimbabwe’s manufactured products more competitive while still providing some 
level of protection to the local market. This was in line with the goal set out in ZIMPREST of 
“low and uniform tariffs with the rest of the world to maximise the benefits of global trade for 
Zimbabwe.” (GoZ 1998:20). The specific aim of the policy changes was to focus “tariffs on 
incentive rather than revenue objectives” (GoZ 1998:37). 
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Export strategy and export 
performance  
In the years before liberalisation (1965-1989), Zimbabwe maintained a trade surplus for most of 
the years, as the imports were generally lower than exports in the two first periods, except for 
1981-82 (see figure 1 and 2, and table A.0 in the Statistical Appendix). This reflected the impact 
of import control, designed to maintain balance on external accounts in the face of foreign 
exchange difficulties (Ndlovu 1994). Notably, in the period after liberalisation (from 1990) the 
trade balance was in considerable deficit (see figure 1 and 2).  
All figures on exports are in current US dollars, except those on export structure, which 
are in per cent, but are based on US dollar values.  
 
Figure 1 Trade balance 1965-1998
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Source: UNCTAD. 2000. Handbook of Statistics. CD-ROM. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
See table A.0 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation. 
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Figure 2 Exports and Imports 1965-1998
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Source: UNCTAD. 2000. Handbook of Statistics. CD-ROM. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
 
From figure 1 and 2, it can be observed that Zimbabwe, in tandem with its trade liberalisation, 
experienced what Celso Furtado called ‘a breakdown of the capacity to import’ (Furtado 1964 
in Hunt 1989). Even though incomes from exports rose, import expenditures rose even more, 
and the Zimbabwean economy did not only become more dependent on foreign markets, but 
also saw a reduced ability to import as export revenues were inadequate. In turn, this added to 
the country’s balance of payments difficulties, and naturally undermined its creditworthiness on 
international capital markets.  
 
The UDI period 1965-1979 
Export strategy 
During the UDI period, Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) pursued a de facto import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) strategy. In practise (as opposed to in theory), ISI strategies have typically 
been biased towards production for the domestic market rather than production for export (Lall 
1996). However, minimising imports and producing substitutes domestically, can be combined 
with an aggressive export strategy if the required inputs to export production are available. The 
overreaching goal of the government, keeping the balance of payments positive, resulted in 
targeted attempts to export products that were not needed in the domestic economy. As will be 
shown in more detail later in this chapter, these exports were mainly minerals, tobacco, food 
and manufactured goods. The strategy to endure the sanctions also involved export promotion. 
Universal Exports (Univex) was created to find new export markets, extend existing ones and 
arrange for circumvention of economic sanctions (Ndlovu 1994). The main export market was 
South Africa (which did not abide by sanctions) to which Rhodesia was allowed to export under 
preferential conditions (Ndlela & Robinson 1995).  
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According to Ndlela & Robinson (1995), the ratio of manufactured exports to gross 
output dropped significantly from about 27% in 1965 to 15% in 1980, despite the growth in 
manufacturing under import substitution (see table A.1 in the Statistical Appendix), and the 
targeted attempts to export. How can this be explained? Presumably, this miserable trend reflect 
the fact that Zimbabwe’s exports during UDI were facing significant barriers in developed-
country markets. But it also indicates that the strategy was unsuccessful in supporting export of 
manufactures.  
 
Export performance 
The Zimbabwe economy declined between 1975 and 1978, under the combined influence of the 
liberation war, tighter sanctions and world recession. Higher oil prices increased the import bill. 
The closure of the Mozambiqan border in 1976 substantially increased transport costs, which 
resulted in higher import costs with adverse impact on the balance of payments. 
The slow growth of exports during the first years of UDI, gave rise to tighter import 
controls, and consequently positive trade balances after 1975 (see figure 2). However, there was 
a loss of export markets as a result of appreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar (1975-1979) against 
the currencies of its major trade partners (see table 2, which shows exchange rates).  
As table 1 shows, the UN sanctions had a dramatic effect on Zimbabwe’s exports, 
which were nearly halved from 1965 to 1966. Moreover, the export growth during UDI was 
modest, and in some years even negative (1975-1976).  
 
Table 1 
Export performance 1965-1979 (million US dollars) 
Year Exports 
1965 452 
1966 280 
1967 272 
1968 263 
1969 325 
1970 370 
1971 404 
1972 515 
1973 688 
1974 863 
1975 932 
1976 891 
1977 877 
1978 900 
1979 1053 
 
Source: UNCTAD. 2000. Handbook of Statistics. CD-ROM. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
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The UDI period can be summarized as a period of stagnant export as a result of poor 
commitment to export, as well as poor access to export markets, partly due to barriers in 
overseas markets and partly due to appreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar. 
 
Table 2   
Exchange rate 1965-1999 
Year US Dollars per Zimbabwe dollar 
1965 1.40 
1966 1.40 
1967 1.40 
1968 1.40 
1969 1.40 
1970 1.40 
1971 1.40 
1972 1.52 
1973 1.71 
1974 1.69 
1975 1.76 
1976 1.60 
1977 1.59 
1978 1.48 
1979 1.47 
1980 1.56 
1981 1.45 
1982 1.32 
1983 0.99 
1984 0.80 
1985 0.62 
1986 0.60 
1987 0.60 
1988 0.56 
1989 0.47 
1990 0.41 
1991 0.29 
1992 0.20 
1993 0.15 
1994 0.12 
1995 0.12 
1996 0.10 
1997 0.08 
1998 0.05 
1999 0.03 
   
Source: IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. International Monetary Fund,  
Washington, D.C.  
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The ‘independence period’ 1980-1989 
Export strategy 
Despite the fact that the highly controlled trade regime was largely maintained after 
Independence, Zimbabwe’s trade policy of the 1980s can neither be classified as export led nor 
as import substitution, as there was a clear combination.  
Realising the importance of trade, coupled with the slump in exports in 1982, the new 
government initiated several export promotion programmes. The Zimbabwe dollar was 
devalued in 1982 (see table 2) and continued to depreciate against a trade weighted basket of 
currencies to restore and maintain export competitiveness (Ndlovu 1994).  
Export incentive measures of the 1980s included the Export Revolving Fund (ERF), 
established in July 1983 with a US$ 70.6 million loan from the World Bank (Chipika & Davies 
1998). The ERF allowed exporters to have access in advance to foreign currency needed to 
purchase inputs required to manufacture goods for specific export orders. In 1987 it was 
extended to agricultural and mining sector exports. According to Ndlovu (1994) it proved 
effective in removing exporters’ input constraints. However, the ERF was brought to a close in 
the first quarter of 1993 (Ndlela & Robinson 1995).  
Another measure was the export incentive bonus, which provided cash payment in 
domestic currency equivalent to 9% of the export value, as a bonus or subsidy to exporters. A 
third measure was the incremental bonus scheme, that entitled exporters to use 25% of 
incremental export earnings (in foreign currency) to import inputs for production for the 
domestic market (Ndlovu 1994). However, it is questionable whether this was an intelligent 
export strategy. Critics have argued that “this was more linked to an opportunity for the firm to 
earn some foreign currency needed to buy inputs to produce for the under-supplied domestic 
market rather than a serious commitment to develop export markets” (Chipika & Davies 
1998:15).  
 
Export performance 
Ndlovu (1994) cite many reasons for the poor export performance of the Zimbabwean economy 
after Independence. Among these are the age of equipment, limited production and export 
capacity, and the primary nature of exports. It was possible for exports to grow at rates below 
GDP during UDI mainly because of exploitation of easy import substitution opportunities. 
However, the situation after Independence changed, the easy import substitution opportunities 
had been exhausted and an export growth lower than GDP growth could only be sustained with 
a combination of net resource inflows and investment cutbacks. 
But the government’s position was that investments should increase. As a result, high 
levels of external debts accumulated in the first years after Independence. External loans played 
a significant role in financing the imports needed for the high rate of growth in the first two 
years of independence and to cover the increased social expenditures (GoZ 1988). Increased 
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borrowing and aid kept the balance of payments in surplus. However, the current account deficit 
in 1981-82 when imports exceeded exports, forced the government to borrow at commercial 
terms. The use of short-term commercial borrowing worsened the situation. Debt servicing 
increased and the debt service to exports ratio rose from 15% in 1981 to about 36% in 1987 
(Ndlovu 1994, Table 5.4). During the 1980s, the government continued to meet all debt service 
obligations on time, which increased pressure to earn exports as the repayments mounted. This 
accumulating burden of foreign debt repayments was a significant contributing factor to 
Zimbabwe’s trade problems at the end of the 1980s.  
Despite a trade surplus from 1984-1987 (see figure 1, and table A.0 in Statistical 
Appendix), there was a pressing need to boost exports at the end of the 1980s (GoZ 1988), and 
as such the overall trade performance in the period can be classified as being poor. Table 3 
illustrates the miserable export performance (when measured in US dollars) where exports in 
1988 were at the same level as in 1980. 
 
Table 3 
Export performance 1980-1989 (million US dollars) 
Year Exports 
1980 1415 
1981 1408 
1982 1276 
1983 1135 
1984 1155 
1985 1113 
1986 1302 
1987 1427 
1988 1415 
1989 1542 
   
Source: UNCTAD. 2000. Handbook of Statistics. CD-ROM. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
 
The independence period can be summarized as a decade with major difficulties in managing 
the external sector. Despite several attempts to boost exports, the growth from 1979-1980 
(figure 2, and table A.0 in Statistical Appendix) could not be maintained as the easiest 
opportunities to expand into new markets were quickly exhausted. With the failure to expand 
exports, the new government receded to the previous government’s measure, namely to squeeze 
imports so as to turn the trade balance positive. However, after the setback in 1987, the trade 
balance was slightly in deficit in 1988 and 1989 (figure 1).  
 
The 1990s  
Export strategy 
To minimise the levels of external financing required to implement the 1991-1995 ESAP, the 
government stated that “every effort will be made to maximise export growth (…)” (GoZ 1990: 
Preface).  
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As part of the reforms in the 1990s, a new scheme was set up to stimulate growth of 
exports which was seen as necessary for a successful import liberalisation programme. The 
government introduced an Export Retention Scheme (ERS) in 1990 (GoZ 1990). Under this 
scheme, productive sectors were allowed to retain a certain proportion of their export earnings 
in foreign exchange for the purchase of machinery and raw materials needed to boost output. 
Initially exporters were allowed to retain 5% of their export earnings, but the proportion of 
retention was increased overtime until 1994 when all exporters were allowed 100% retention 
(Chipika & Davies 1998, Ndlovu 1994).  
Another important factor in the government’s efforts to induce Zimbabwean firms to 
seek out export markets, was the exchange rate policy. For the first time since 1982, the 
Zimbabwe dollar was heavily devalued in the third quarter of 1991 “in support of trade 
liberalisation” (Ndlela & Robinson 1995:147). In response to rising inflation, it was devalued 
again in 1993 to keep exports competitive (see table 2). Chipika & Davies explain that “The 
exchange rate was allowed to continue to depreciate in real terms in order to encourage a shift 
of resources to the export sector and sustain export competitiveness” (Chipika & Davies 
1998:17). Given the sluggish economic performance during ESAP, one could expect a change 
in policies in the ZIMPREST document. Indeed, the programme states the intention to “Improve 
policies to support beneficiation and export development” (GoZ 1998:44). However, this did 
not imply any deviation from the liberalisation policies pursued under ESAP. 
 
Export performance 
According to Chipika & Davies, one of the major objectives of ESAP was to expand ‘non-
traditional exports’ of which manufactured exports were to form a significant part. But 
Zimbabwe’s export performance under ESAP has been disappointing:  
“Some of the reasons for the poor export performance of the manufacturing sector 
include the 1992 severe drought, poor external marketing, and poor support 
infrastructure (telecommunications). While total exports in US$ value rose by 9% 
annually from 1985-1990, they rose by on average 6% annually from 1990-1994.” 
(Chipika & Davies 1998:18). 
Manufactured exports increased each year in Zimbabwe dollar terms, but declined when 
measured in US dollars by more than 15% between 1990 and 1991 (see table A.6 in the 
Statistical Appendix). This poor export performance was particularly tormenting for Zimbabwe 
as the start of the ESAP marked an intensification of export incentives for manufacturers 
(Ndlela & Robinson 1995).  
The study by Ndlela & Robinson found that because the export incentive structure only 
rewarded final exporters, textile and leather producers would rather “export their products 
directly than strive to provide the range and quality of inputs required by clothing and footwear 
exporters” (Ndlela & Robinson 1995:194). In this way, opportunities to export processed 
(manufactured) products were bypassed. Another factor was that competitive imports penetrated 
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domestic Zimbabwean markets earlier than had been envisaged in the original design of the 
trade liberalisation process (as pointed to above).  
Table 4 shows the export performance in the 1990s. The picture for the first half of the 
decade is depressing. Moreover, it can be seen from the table that exports picked up from 1994 
to 1998. During the drought in 1992, many producers turned to export markets, as the 
deregulation and liberalisation of foreign currency had given them “the flexibility to do so, and 
rapid growth in exports followed” (GoZ 1998:64). But the sizeable deficit on the trade balance 
in the 1990s, which exceeded 400 million US dollars in all four years from 1994-1998 (see table 
A.0 in Statistical Appendix), made the overall trade performance worse than ever due to the 
increased import bill that came with liberalisation and due to food imports after the drought. 
To sum up, the 1990s presented a fundamental shock to the external sector of 
Zimbabwe as imports were fully liberalised in the first part of the decade, in a much more rapid 
pace than envisaged by the experts who outlined the plan. Despite a not insignificant growth in 
exports in the latter part of the period, the trade balance deteriorated to a historically low level 
instigating severe economic constraints to the entire nation. 
 
Table 4 
Export performance 1990-1998 (million US dollars) 
Year Exports 
1990 1726 
1991 1532 
1992 1445 
1993 1568 
1994 1885 
1995 2119 
1996 2397 
1997 2464 
1998 2432 
 
 
 
Source: UNCTAD. 2000. Handbook of Statistics. CD-ROM. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
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Production structure and export 
structure 
This section will identify and depict key characteristics of the production structure and the 
export structure that has evolved in Zimbabwe from 1965 to 1997. Knowledge of the production 
structure of Zimbabwe’s economy in the years examined, is essential when studying 
specialisation of the economy. Still, it should be underlined that most emphasis is placed on the 
export structure in analysing the relationship between specialisation of export production and 
competitive advantages. The export structure will be analysed in the second section.  
 
Production Structure 
Zimbabwe’s production structure is atypical compared to other African economies. The most 
salient feature is the relatively low share of agriculture in total output, which is around or below 
20%, and the relatively high share of manufacturing, averaging around 25%. In addition, 
employment in manufacturing as a percentage of total employment is unusually high compared 
to the average in Sub-Saharan Africa (ILO 1998). Many studies have pointed to the 
manufacturing sector’s unusually important role in Zimbabwe18.  
Figure 3 shows the production structure spanning over the years 1965-1997. The data 
for 1965-1992 is extracted from various issues of the UN Yearbook of National Accounts 
Statistics, whereas data for 1993-1997 is extracted from the Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
publication National Accounts 1985-199719. The relative shares in percentage are calculated 
from base data in current prices (see table A.1 and A.2 in Statistical Appendix). The categories 
used in these publications follow the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) with 
two exceptions. The first is that ‘Business services’ are included in division 9, rather than 
division 8. The second is that data for 1993-1997 in my category 9 ‘SERV’ is the sum of 
‘Education, Health, Domestic and Other services’ given in the CSO publication. Another effect 
from using a different data source (the CSO publication) is that categories 6 WHOL and 8 FIRE 
both seem unlikely large for 1993-1997.  
The application of different data sources creates some difficulties. After 1992 there is a 
serious drop in agriculture, manufacturing and to some extent mining, as shares of total output 
(see table A.2). It is possible that this trend is partly due to adoption of another data source. The 
fact that these sectors’ contribution to total private sector output in absolute numbers rise 
substantially (as is also true for the other sectors, see table A.1) is probably due to considerable 
price inflation in this period (the data is measured in current prices) and perhaps also to some 
over-reporting in the second data source.  
 
                                                 
18
 Probably the most comprehensive exploration of this subject is Riddell (1990).  
19
 The data from CSO are based on reporting from a sample of firms. Allegedly this sample has not been 
updated since 1980. Since then, many of the firms have closed down, and new firms have been 
established but not included in the sample. This undermines the validity and reliability of the data. 
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Figure 3 Production Structure 1965-1997
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Categories 
1 AGRI  Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  
2 MINE  Mining and quarrying 
3 MANU  Manufacturing 
3 ELEC  Electricity, gas and water 
5 CONS Construction 
6 WHOL  Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 
7 TRAN  Transport, storage and communication 
8 FIRE  Finance, insurance and real estate 
9 SERV  Community, social, personal and business services 
  
Note: Data for 1993-1997 is taken from CSO. 1998. National Accounts 1985-1997. Table 2.1(a). 
Categories 6 WHOL and 8 FIRE both seem unlikely large in this period.  
Category 9 SERV is the sum of Education, Health, Domestic Services and Other services. 
 
Sources: Own calculations based on the following statistics: Output data for 1965-1992 from 
UN National Accounts Statistics issues for 1975, 1981, 1988 and 1995. Output data for 
1993-1997 from CSO National Accounts 1985-1997. See Statistical Appendix table A.1 and A.2  
for output data and details of calculation. 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates that manufacturing has by far contributed most to national output 
throughout the period. And accordingly, the most noticeable feature of change is the dramatic 
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slump in the relative importance of manufacturing in the 1990s. The tendency that can be 
observed is of a severe de-industrialisation. Still, the decline in manufacturing is somewhat 
over-represented due to the adoption of a new data source from 1993 onwards. According to 
table A.2 in the Statistical Appendix, manufacturing contributed with 31% to total private sector 
production in 1992 (UN data), whereas in 1993 it contributed with 24% (CSO data). Controlling 
for differences between the two sources by using data for the years 1985-1992, covered in both 
sources, I found a difference of 6% in the absolute numbers (Zim-dollars). A deviation of 6% 
must be considered significant, but even if it modifies the tendency observed, it does not alter 
the direction of the observed tendency altogether. The categories used by the two sources are 
the same, and CSO is understood to be the original source for the UN data. Nevertheless, the 
CSO data themselves report a downturn in manufacturing output from 24% in 1993 to 18% in 
1997. This downward trend over the last five years for which I have data, cannot be discarded. 
Especially if the stability in the UN data is considered (table A.2 in the Statistical Appendix). 
Another feature is the strong fluctuations in the contribution of agriculture to national private 
output, underscoring the climatic conditions with recurrent droughts. The figure also gives the 
impression that the relative importance of WHOL (Wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and 
hotels) increased dramatically in the 1990s (doubling from 1992 to 1993) after a steady 
downturn from 17% in 1965 to 9% in 1992. But as indicated above, this is probably misleading 
due to the adoption of another data source from 1993 onwards. Similar arguments apply to 
FIRE (Finance, insurance and real estate). If these two categories are over-reported, the real 
effect will be that the other categories have a more positive trend from 1993 onwards.  
 
Export Structure 
Zimbabwe mainly exports unprocessed and semi-processed products of agriculture and mining. 
The main exports are flue-cured tobacco, iron and steel, gold, ginned cotton, textiles, nickel 
alloys, maize, asbestos, foodstuffs, fresh cut flowers and fertilizers. Principal export markets are 
South Africa, the European Union (predominantly United Kingdom and Germany), Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) and Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA) / Preferential Trade Agreement of Southern and East African states (PTA) 
(predominantly Botswana, Zambia, Malawi, Namibia and Mozambique). 
To get a picture of the export structure I have extracted export data in US dollars on the 
nine SITC categories (Standard International Trade Classification) from various issues of the 
UN’s International Trade Statistics Yearbook (see table A.3 to A.9 in the Statistical Appendix 
for base data and calculations). I have reproduced these data in absolute values (US dollars) and 
in relative values (in per cent), for each of the nine SITC groups and for two constructed 
categories (primary exports and manufactured exports).  
Box 2 presents the SITC categories which are used, and it also singles out which 
commodities under the different SITC groups that are significant exports from Zimbabwe. 
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Box 2 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) 
  
Description 
Significant Zimbabwean export 
commodities in each group 
   
SITC 0 Food and live animals Unmilled maize, sugar and honey, coffee, 
tea and meat 
SITC 1 Beverages and tobacco Tobacco (mostly unmanufactured tobacco 
leaves) 
SITC 2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels Raw cotton, crude asbestos, granite and 
sandstone, cut flowers, iron, sawn lumber 
and soya beans 
SITC 3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials  
Coal and briquettes, and petroleum 
products (of marginal importance) 
SITC 4 Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes  
Processed vegetable oils (only for some 
years) 
SITC 68 Non-ferrous metals Unwrought copper and nickel alloys 
SITC 5 Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. Dyes, medicinal and pharmaceutical 
products, soap and fertilizers 
SITC 6 Manufactured goods classified chiefly by 
material 
(Less 68:) Textile and fabrics, and iron 
and steel 
SITC 7 Machinery and transport equipment Aircraft engines, electric machinery, road 
and railway vehicles, and ‘other machinery 
for special industries’ 
SITC 8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles Furniture, clothing, and footwear 
SITC 9 Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere in the SITC 
Special transactions and commodities not 
classified according to kind, and non-
monetary gold 
Source: Based on various issues of UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook. 
 
Figure 4 displays Zimbabwe’s export structure in the years from 1976-1997 broken down in 
primary and manufactured exports. These two broad categories are aggregated from the nine 
main SITC categories. Primary exports are the sum of SITC 0 to 4 plus SITC 68. Manufactured 
exports are the sum of SITC 5 to 8 less SITC 68. SITC 68, non-ferrous metals, represent one of 
the more significant export commodities. This category covers unwrought copper and nickel 
alloys. As these goods are unwrought (or ‘unworked’) I have chosen to classify them as primary 
rather than manufactured exports. This method is also adopted in Wood & Mayer (2001). I have 
labelled exports classified as SITC 9 as ‘Other’. As figure 4 shows, primary exports averaged 
just below 70% of total exports in the years 1976-1987 and 1989-1997, and manufactured 
exports averaged around 30% of total exports in the entire period. One observation worth 
mentioning, is the stability of the share of primary and manufactured exports in total exports 
despite changing trade policies and export performance.  
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Figure 4 Export Structure 1976-1997
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Note: See table A.10 and A.11 in Statistical Appendix for detailed data on the various commodity 
groups. Data for 1987-1989 not available. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 
1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
 
Figure 5 presents a more detailed picture of the same export structure as figure 4, displaying all 
the nine SITC commodity groups. As the figure shows, SITC categories (in rising order) 1; 6 
less 68; 0; 2; 8 and 68, are the most significant. This indicates that Zimbabwe’s most important 
exports are flue-cured tobacco, textiles, iron and steel, maize, cotton, asbestos, fresh cut flowers, 
fertilizers, nickel alloys and gold. The major changes that have taken place over the period 
under review are the following: Group 68 (copper and nickel alloys) have diminished from 13% 
in 1976 to 5% in 1997, whereas group 1 (flue-cured tobacco) have increased from 17% in 1976 
to 35% in 1996 (see table A.11 in Statistical Appendix for detailed data in percent).  
In other words, a more detailed look at the export structure reveals some significant 
shifts, where the share of ‘almost manufactured’ copper and nickel alloys are more than halved 
from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s, and where the share of a primary product like tobacco leaves 
is practically doubled over the same period. As for the latter, the share of ‘raw’ tobacco leaves 
in total exports, increased from 24% in 1990 to 35% in 1991 (table A.11 Statistical Appendix). 
In absolute numbers tobacco exports increased from 1990-1991 whereas total exports declined 
in absolute numbers (table A.10 in Statistical Appendix). Flue-cured tobacco has in the 1990s 
become the by far most important export commodity for Zimbabwe (accounting for 35% of 
total exports in 1996). Being an agricultural product, this export commodity is vulnerable to 
changes in climate, and is subject to relatively inelastic demand (there is a limit to how many 
cigarettes a person can smoke) and is also subject to diminishing returns at some point. Still, it 
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could be possible for Zimbabwe to increase its exports of tobacco even more, if other 
competitors on the world market are unable to compete with Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, increased 
dependence upon this commodity, after liberalisation and increased exposure to external shocks, 
may be considered as not particularly favourable for long-term development.  
 
Figure 5 Detailed Export Structure 1976-1997
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Note: Export structure according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC)  
commodity grouping. See table A.10 and A.11 in Statistical Appendix for detailed data on the  
various commodity groups. Data for 1987-1989 not available. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 
1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
 
Chapter 5 will discuss possible determinants of competitive advantages in Zimbabwe, partly 
based on this illustration of the country’s export structure. 
It may be worthwhile to note, that I have not presented Zimbabwe’s import structure. 
Import structures vary much less across countries than export structures because trade 
encourages each country to specialise in producing a few goods for export, and correspondingly 
to rely on imports from other countries to meet domestic demand for the majority of tradable 
goods. I therefore considered the export structure to be most relevant. 
 
Summary 
The picture emerging from the exploration of Zimbabwe’s export strategy in the period under 
review, can be summarised as follows:  
In the UDI-period from 1965-1979, a de facto ISI-strategy was pursued. The strictly 
controlled trade regime was based on full government control with the allocation of foreign 
exchange to importers. With these policies, the government managed to keep the current 
 49 
account in quite good balance, but failed to boost exports due to poor access to export markets 
and insufficient commitment to export. After Independence in 1980, the controlled trade regime 
was maintained with some modifications. Growth in exports was completely stagnant in the 
1980s when measured in US dollars. Taken together, the protective regimes in these two periods 
managed to maintain a trade surplus for most of the years (except for 1981-82, and quite small 
deficits after 1987).  
After liberalisation in 1990, however, the trade balance had a considerable deficit. In 
tandem with its trade liberalisation, Zimbabwe experienced a breakdown of its capacity to 
import, adding to its balance of payments difficulties. The intended ‘gradual phasing’ of trade 
liberalisation went much faster than projected in the reform programme. Moreover, a tendency 
of de-industrialisation can be observed, following the opening up of the economy.  
The shares of primary and manufactured exports in total exports have been more or less 
stable throughout the period, despite changing trade policies and changing export performance. 
A more detailed look at the export structure reveals some significant shifts. The most notable 
being the share of tobacco leaves in total exports doubling from the mid-1970s to the mid-
1990s. A substantial part of its increased share came in concert with liberalisation at a time 
when total exports declined. As flue-cured tobacco has become by far the most important export 
commodity, the external economy in Zimbabwe is highly vulnerable to changes in climate 
affecting agricultural production. This export commodity is also subject to inelastic demand and 
diminishing returns at some point.  
In short, the situation of Zimbabwe’s external economy after liberalisation is 
characterised by substantial current account deficits, de-industrialisation, increased exposure to 
external shocks, and increased dependence upon tobacco.  
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4  Employment, real wages and 
labour costs in Zimbabwe  
“Employment regulations are attractive with free hiring and firing of labour as well as 
free collective bargaining at firm or industrial levels. In addition to this, labour costs are 
low and industrial relations harmonious.” (From the internet presentation of ZIMtrade, a 
government-sponsored trade information and trade promoting centre: 
http://www.zimtrade.co.zw downloaded 2001-04-24).  
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed picture of the trend in real wages, as real 
wages are seen as a major determining factor in establishing a country’s competitiveness (as 
maintained in chapter 1). First, I will present the employment and wage policies in Zimbabwe 
during the three periods under review to provide a backdrop to the actual evolution of the real 
wages. Then I will present statistical evidence of the real wage development from 1972-1997. 
Finally, I will present data on Zimbabwe’s labour costs compared to other countries in the 
region. 
 
Employment and wage policies 
Employment 
During UDI, industrial and agricultural diversification was undertaken to help manufacturing 
survive and maintain employment in order to sustain sufficient internal demand. No firm was 
allowed to lay off their workers (Ndlovu 1994). The measures that were taken stimulated 
economic activity. Investments started to grow again from 1967, and employment rose as well. 
Low wages for black workers in all sectors of the economy, and the determination of and co-
operation between the government and the white business- and farming community are common 
explanations of these successes (Ndlovu 1994, ILO 1993).  
At the time of Independence in 1980 there were about 1 million people in formal wage 
employment out of a labour force of 2.5 million. In 1990 by contrast, there were about 1.2 
million people in formal wage employment out of an estimated labour force of 4 million (ILO 
1993). In other words, during the 1980s, labour force growth radically outstripped formal sector 
employment growth. But, it is important to bear in mind that compared to other African 
countries, Zimbabwe had (in 1980) an unusually high proportion of formal sector employment 
(ILO 1993). This is due to the previous discriminatory regime before 1980, where black 
workers in urban areas were not allowed to become self-employed. After 1980 this situation has 
gradually changed, and with the massive retrenchments in the 1990s (Sachikonye 1999), 
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informal self-employment in Zimbabwe is not very different from other African countries. 
According to the ZIMPREST document (GoZ 1998), formal sector employment creation during 
the 1980s averaged only 18000 jobs a year, which was about one tenth of what was required to 
absorb the net increase to the labour force.  
In the 1990s, the ESAP programme (1991-1995) had employment creation as one of its 
main objectives, but failed to deliver the necessary employment opportunities. Therefore, a 
rapid expansion in job creation was the main objective for the 1996-2000 ZIMPREST 
programme (GoZ 1998). But as the economic crisis accelerated from 1998 onwards, 
unemployment increased even more. Formal sector employment growth has generally been 
weak both before and after liberalisation, falling below the population growth rate of 3% per 
year (Chipika & Davies 1998). 
The ‘Framework for Economic Reform 1991-95’ (GoZ 1990) embodied a long annex 
entitled ‘Assessing and Addressing Social Dimensions of Adjustment’. Although the 
unemployed were not one of the groups specifically examined, it was predicted that there would 
be at least 45-50 thousand retrenchments in the formal sector (public and private), 
disproportionately affecting the lowest paid (Gibbon 1995). It also predicted that at least half of 
those still employed, mainly semi- and unskilled, would face wage erosion and that a further 
10% would see their incomes fall below the ‘Poverty Datum Line’ (Gibbon 1995). 
Contraction in formal employment in Zimbabwe in the 1990s, has resulted in the 
emergence of an informal sector that is absorbing retrenches and new entrants in the job market, 
“providing a ‘dumping ground’ for retrenched labour and a waiting station for job seekers” 
(Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 2001:4).  
The informal sector also provides supplementary incomes for those who remain in 
formal employment where real wages have been falling sharply (Tekere 2001). In other words, 
there is a growing trend for formal sector workers to also engage in informal sector activities. 
Such supplementary activities range from selling clothes, cross-border shopping and security 
guard work to various vending activities (Raftopolous 2001). The result is that workers now 
have to survive on a multiplicity of income sources each with its specific problems. 
The informal sector is characterised by gross underemployment, which implies the 
sector has “too may people working too hard to produce very little and for incomes that are 
much too low. (…) it is trapped in a low income, low productivity trap.” (Chiripanhura & 
Makwavarara 2001:4). 
  
Wage policies 
During UDI, wage policies were discriminatory, benefiting the white minority. Even in 1965, 
before the new government took seat in November that year, wages in non-agricultural sectors 
were more than 7 times higher for Non-Africans than for Africans (ILO 1972). And in 
agriculture, wages were staggeringly 20 times higher for Non-Africans (ILO 1972).  
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At Independence it was expected that the economy would benefit from the lifting of 
economic sanctions. Under these circumstances the new government made attempts to narrow 
the income gaps through the introduction of minimum wages (Ndlovu 1994). Starting in 1981, 
the government set minimum wages and directly controlled wage increases for various income 
groups, in order to address inherited income distribution disparities and improve standards of 
living for lower paid groups (Ndlovu 1994). Although the socialist government had income 
equity as a stated goal, income gaps persisted. Data given in a study by ILO (1993 Table 8.4) 
suggests that inter-industry minimum wage differentials decreased during the 1980s, but started 
to increase again from 1990.  
Arguing for more outward orientation in the latter part of the 1980s, the World Bank 
found that labour costs in Zimbabwe were too high, emphasising that “High labour costs 
contribute to making exports uncompetitive in world markets” (World Bank 1987a:xviii). When 
ESAP was introduced in 1990, free bargaining in wage determination began to be allowed in all 
sectors (except in public service) “in the expectation that it would drive down wages.” (ILO 
1993:124). Furthermore, the procedures for hiring and firing of individual employees were 
relaxed, and a mechanism for quick retrenchment of workers was introduced (GoZ 1990).  
 
Real wages 
Real wages are sometimes used as an indicator of human welfare. However, real wages are 
difficult to estimate meaningfully, since a gradually shrinking number of people have ‘real jobs’ 
or jobs in the formal sector (as pointed to above). But this being said, remittances from those 
employed in the formal sector (mostly in urban areas) are also redistributed to others (notably in 
the countryside), and to workers in the informal sector, including indirectly via the purchasing 
power of formal sector workers by purchase of goods and services from the informal sector. 
Henceforth, real wages can be a useful indicator of welfare, albeit an imperfect one.  
Table 5 and 6, and figure 6 and 7, show the overall trend in real wages for the entire 
period (1972-1997). Data on wages in agriculture for 1982-1986 was not available in my source 
(ILO’s Yearbook of Labour Statistics 1991). But Kanyenze (1996) shows that for all sectors 
(including agriculture), 1982 was the peak year. From table 5 and 6, and figure 6 and 7, a 
picture emerges, showing that real wages have declined significantly since 1982. This implies a 
declining standard of living for Zimbabweans since 1982.  
It is well known that structural adjustment programs may cause reductions in aggregate 
demand due to decreased government spending and increased real interest rates. A World Bank 
study (Verner 1999a) found that the main cause of falling real wages in Zimbabwe was 
precisely reduced economic activity. The same study also found wages to be flexible rather than 
rigid, and in line with the World Bank’s way of thinking on this subject, viewed this positively – 
as the decrease in aggregate demand could be “mitigated by falling wages” and, therefore, 
causing a more limited increase in unemployment or informal sector activity than if wages were 
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rigid and unable to adjust downwards. The view adopted by the World Bank and the view taken 
in my study, diverge completely with regard to whether ‘downward adjustment’ of real wages is 
necessarily positive. Rather, I suggest that such a development can be essentially negative for 
social welfare and living standards and thereby also for international competitiveness, as 
defined in chapter 1. 
The main reason for the low real wages includes the high level of inflation that have 
characterised the Zimbabwean economy in recent years (see figure 8). The high trends in the 
inflation rate have largely been emanating from the manner in which the budget deficit has been 
financed, i.e. through money printing and domestic borrowing (Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 
2001). The exchange rate depreciation has also fuelled the decline in real wages (see table 2).  
 
For measuring real wages I have re-calculated nominal wages given in various issues of ILO’s 
Yearbook of Labour Statistics into wages in constant prices with 1972, 1980 and 1990 as base 
years. I have then re-calculated the consumer price index (CPI) given in IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics (CD-ROM 2000) from constant 1995-prices into constant prices with 1972, 
1980 and 1990 as base years. This has given me comparable measures of wages and prices. I 
have then divided wages on prices, and multiplied with 100 to get an expression of real wages. 
Of course, my annual averages based on annual averages of nominal wage data from ILO, may 
actually be artificial or non-existent in reality in the sense that the average may represent figures 
that are both below what some people earn, and above what most workers earn. As the data are 
only available on an aggregated level, there is not much to do about this. It is also worth to 
notice that in agricultural wages there is likely to be seasonal fluctuations. These are not 
recorded in the statistics as they only report annual averages. But employment statistics (see 
CSO 1997) show that employment in agriculture tends to be lower in June (in the winter), which 
is the low-season. This may suggest that wages in agriculture are likely to be higher in the 
spring (during planting in October/November) and in the fall (during harvesting in April-May) 
because of more activity. Moreover, it should be clear to the reader that workers of European 
descent in Zimbabwe are generally better educated and better skilled and therefore occupy jobs 
that are better paid, in contrast to the majority of workers of African descent.  
 
As explained in the Introduction, I have discovered what I consider to be an incorrect U-turn in 
the data series. The real wages for Zimbabweans employed in formal sector activities could not 
possibly have increased by more than one third in 1996 and 1997, when the economic crisis 
worsened drastically and inflation soared. Minor fluctuations in real wages may of course 
happen from one year to another. However, the sudden change in the data series is simply too 
large to be plausible. I have, therefore, chosen to include data for 1996 and 1997 in the tables 
(table 5, 6, 11 and 12) but not in the illustrative figures (figure 6 and 7).  
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All figures on real wages are in constant prices. In order to illustrate the trend from the 
initial year, the scale on every Y-axis is portraying the same range above and below the starting 
point (which is 100). However, the scale on the Y-axis on the two figures involving the 
consumer price index (figure 8 and 9), only portray the range above 100 as the price level for 
obvious reasons only rise in constant prices based on the first year. 
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Table 5 
Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1972-1997 (1972=100) 
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100
1972 100.00 100.00 1972 100.00
1973 104.32 103.12 1973 101.17
1974 106.20 109.83 1974 96.70
1975 130.63 120.86 1975 108.08
1976 145.67 134.05 1976 108.67
1977 168.23 147.96 1977 113.70
1978 176.69 156.35 1978 113.00
1979 197.36 184.65 1979 106.88
1980 235.90 194.72 1980 121.14
1981 274.95 220.14 1981 124.90
1982 324.46 243.65 1982 133.17
1983 352.77 300.00 1983 117.59
1984 388.18 360.43 1984 107.70
1985 381.30 391.13 1985 97.49
1986 479.76 447.00 1986 107.33
1987 531.75 502.88 1987 105.74
1988 511.90 540.29 1988 94.75
1989 663.13 609.83 1989 108.74
1990 807.94 715.59 1990 112.91
1991 872.34 882.73 1991 98.82
1992 1 099.92 1 253.96 1992 87.72
1993 1 262.55 1 600.00 1993 78.91
1994 1 482.58 1 956.12 1994 75.79
1995 1 831.58 2 398.08 1995 76.38
1996 2 442.63 2 901.68 1996 84.18
1997 3 462.49 3 457.79 1997 100.14
 
Figure 6 Real wages (1972-1995) for workers in non-agricultural 
activities (1972=100)
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Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) 
from IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics. Issue 1982, 1991, 1997 and 2000. See table A.12 in Statistical Appendix 
for details of calculation. 
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Table 6 
Real wages for workers in agriculture 1972-1997 (1972=100) 
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100 
1972 100.00 100.00 1972 100.00 
1973 111.13 103.12 1973 107.77 
1974 122.20 109.83 1974 111.26 
1975 144.47 120.86 1975 119.53 
1976 161.13 134.05 1976 120.20 
1977 177.80 147.96 1977 120.17 
1978 194.46 156.35 1978 124.37 
1979 227.80 184.65 1979 123.37 
1980 255.53 194.72 1980 131.23 
1981 413.33 220.14 1981 187.75 
1982 n.a. 243.65 1982 n.a. 
1983 n.a. 300.00 1983 n.a. 
1984 n.a. 360.43 1984 n.a. 
1985 n.a. 391.13 1985 n.a. 
1986 n.a. 447.00 1986 n.a. 
1987 814.66 502.88 1987 162.00 
1988 920.66 540.29 1988 170.40 
1989 1 004.66 609.83 1989 164.74 
1990 1 219.32 715.59 1990 170.39 
1991 1 355.32 882.73 1991 153.54 
1992 1 143.99 1 253.96 1992 91.23 
1993 1 625.98 1 600.00 1993 101.62 
1994 1 912.65 1 956.12 1994 97.78 
1995 1 972.05 2 398.08 1995 82.23 
1996 2 675.91 2 901.68 1996 92.22 
1997 3 514.30 3 457.79 1997 101.63 
Figure 7 Real wages (1972-1995) for workers in agriculture (1972=100)
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
175
200
1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994
 
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Price (CPI) from IMF. 2000. 
International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
Issue 1982, 1991, 1997 and 2000. Wage data for 1982-1986 is not listed in ILO's Yearbook of 
Labour Statistics (Issue 1991). See table A.13 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation. 
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During UDI, real wages both in agriculture and in non-agricultural activities increased steadily 
(see table 7 and 8). The growth in real wages was most pronounced in agricultural activities. In 
non-agricultural activities however, the pattern was more customary (resembling an S-curve 
rather than a straight line, see table 7) with a slump in 1974, and then a marked growth in 1975, 
and a new downturn in 1979 before it was to shoot up at Independence in 1980 (see table 5 and 
figure 8).  
 
Table 7         
Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1972-1979 (1972=100)  
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100     
1972 100.00 100.00 1972 100.00     
1973 104.32 103.12 1973 101.17     
1974 106.20 109.83 1974 96.70     
1975 130.63 120.86 1975 108.08     
1976 145.67 134.05 1976 108.67     
1977 168.23 147.96 1977 113.70     
1978 176.69 156.35 1978 113.00     
1979 197.36 184.65 1979 106.88     
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from 
IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics. Issue 1982. See table A.12 and A.14 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation.  
 
Table 8         
Real wages for workers in agriculture 1972-1979 (1972=100) 
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100    
1972 100.00 100.00 1972 100.00    
1973 111.13 103.12 1973 107.77    
1974 122.20 109.83 1974 111.26    
1975 144.47 120.86 1975 119.53    
1976 161.13 134.05 1976 120.20    
1977 177.80 147.96 1977 120.17    
1978 194.46 156.35 1978 124.37    
1979 227.80 184.65 1979 123.37    
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from 
IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics. Issue 1982. See table A.13 and A.14 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation.  
 
In most sectors, real wages went up immediately after Independence (see table 9 and 10). 
Workers in agricultural activities experienced a remarkable increase in their real wages due to 
the introduction of minimum wages (figure 7 and table 10). From 1982, however, real wages 
dropped gradually until the end of the decade (table 9 and 10). In this period, real wages 
dropped considerably in non-agricultural activities (whereas wage data for workers in 
agriculture is not available for 1982-1986). As pointed to above, other studies – such as 
Kanyenze (1996) – show that real wages in all sectors plummeted after 1982. Still, it must be 
underscored that compared to 1972, the years 1980-1982 brought the most generous real wage 
levels in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities experienced by Zimbabweans during 
the entire period under review (see table 5 and 6).  
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Table 9         
Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1980-1989 (1980=100)  
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100    
1980 100.00 100.00 1980 100.00    
1981 116.56 113.06 1981 103.10    
1982 137.54 125.13 1982 109.92    
1983 149.54 154.07 1983 97.06    
1984 164.56 185.10 1984 88.90    
1985 161.64 200.87 1985 80.47    
1986 203.38 229.56 1986 88.59    
1987 225.41 258.26 1987 87.28    
1988 217.00 277.47 1988 78.21    
1989 281.11 313.18 1989 89.76    
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from  
IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics. Issue 1991 and 1997. See table A.12 and A.14 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation.  
Table 10        
Real wages for workers in agriculture 1980-1989 (1980=100) 
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100   
1980 100.00 100.00 1980 100.00   
1981 161.76 113.06 1981 143.08   
1982 n.a. 125.13 1982 n.a.   
1983 n.a. 154.07 1983 n.a.   
1984 n.a. 185.10 1984 n.a.   
1985 n.a. 200.87 1985 n.a.   
1986 n.a. 229.56 1986 n.a.   
1987 318.82 258.26 1987 123.45   
1988 360.30 277.47 1988 129.85   
1989 393.18 313.18 1989 125.54   
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from 
IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics. Various issues. Wage data for 1982-1986 is not listed in ILO's Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics (Issue 1991). See table A.13 and A.14 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation.  
 
In the 1990s the general tendency has been for real wages to decline (table 11 and 12). The drop 
in real wages for agricultural workers was particularly severe in the drought-year 1992 (table 
12), when inflation reached almost 50% while salaries were hardly adjusted (ILO 1993). As 
shown in table 13 and figure 8, inflation accelerated immensely from 1991 onwards. This aspect 
was given concern in the ZIMPREST document: 
“The resulting inflation has eaten away at ordinary people’s ability to meet the basic 
needs of their families. These unfavourable conditions, which prevailed at the end of 
ESAP, cannot be allowed to continue.” (GoZ 1998:6). 
The ‘unfavourable conditions’ for the average Zimbabwean did not get better in the latter part of 
the 1990s. Rather, there has been a persistent decline in real wages for those in formal 
employment during the period with trade liberalisation in the 1990s (table 11 and 12). Data for 
the two last years in the data set (1996 and 1997) indicate a significant upward movement (table 
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11 and 12). I have omitted data for these two last years in the illustrative figures (figure 6 and 
7), because the data for 1996 and 1997 are apparently erroneous. The study Poverty in 
Zimbabwe (CSO 1998b) contends that poverty in Zimbabwe increased from 1990 to 1996, and 
underlines that this finding does not depend on the choice of poverty line. The prevalence of 
poor people increased immensely from 52.8% to 75.6% out of the total population during the 
1990s (CSO 1998b:36). Moreover, the worsening economic crisis in Zimbabwe during the latter 
part of the 1990s provides evidence for a continued downward trend in real wages. This is 
further supported by the fact that inflation climbed steadily (see figure 8).  
 
Table 11         
Real wages for workers in non-agricultural activities 1990-1997 (1990=100)  
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100     
1990 100.00 100.00 1990 100.00     
1991 107.97 123.37 1991 87.52     
1992 136.14 175.26 1992 77.68     
1993 156.27 223.62 1993 69.88     
1994 183.50 273.39 1994 67.12     
1995 226.70 335.16 1995 67.64     
1996 302.33 405.55 1996 74.55     
1997 428.56 483.27 1997 88.68     
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from  
IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour  
Statistics. Issue 2000. See table A.12 and A.14 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation. 
 
Table 12         
Real wages for workers in agriculture 1990-1997 (1990=100)    
Year Wage (W) Price (P) Year W/P*100     
1990 100.00 100.00 1990 100.00     
1991 111.15 123.37 1991 90.10     
1992 93.82 175.26 1992 53.53     
1993 133.35 223.62 1993 59.63     
1994 156.86 273.39 1994 57.38     
1995 161.73 335.16 1995 48.26     
1996 219.46 405.55 1996 54.11     
1997 288.22 483.27 1997 59.64     
Source: Own calculations based on the following data: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from  
IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour  
Statistics. Various issues. See table A.13 and A.14 in Statistical Appendix for details of calculation.  
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Table 13         
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1972-1997 (1972=100)     
Year CPI       
1972 100.00       
1973 103.12       
1974 109.83       
1975 120.86       
1976 134.05       
1977 147.96       
1978 156.35       
1979 184.65       
1980 194.72       
1981 220.14       
1982 243.65       
1983 300.00       
1984 360.43       
1985 391.13       
1986 447.00       
1987 502.88       
1988 540.29       
1989 609.83       
1990 715.59       
1991 882.73       
1992 1 253.96       
1993 1 600.00       
1994 1 956.12       
1995 2 398.08       
1996 2 901.68       
1997 3 457.79       
 
Figure 8 Consumer Price Index 1972-1997 (1972=100)
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Source: Own calculations based on data in constant 1995-prices on Consumption Price Index  
(CPI) from IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. CD-ROM. See table A.14 in Statistical  
Appendix for details of calculation. 
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As can be seen from figure 9, the growth rate of nominal wages followed the growth rate of 
prices during UDI (specifically from 1972-1980). On the positive side, the growth rate of wages 
for agricultural workers exceeded prices in 1982, and from 1986 to 1991. On the negative side, 
one can observe that from 1992 onwards, the growth rate of wages has been below the growth 
rate of the consumer price index, particularly the wages in non-agricultural activities. One 
concern that must be pointed to here is that the curve showing the growth-rates of wages in non-
agricultural activities is surprisingly stable. It does not follow the more plausible S-pattern for 
wages in agriculture. Therefore, it makes sense to be cautious with relying too much on the 
wage data for non-agricultural activities.  
 
Figure 9 Wages compared to CPI 1972-1997 (1972=100)
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Source: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from IMF. 2000. International Financial 
Statistics. 
CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Issue 1982, 1991, 1997 and 
2000.  
Wage data for 1982-1986 is not listed in ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Issue 1991). 
See table A.15 in Statistical Appendix. 
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Labour costs 
Labour cost per worker is often used as a measure of international competitiveness. Looking at 
labour costs and not only real wages implies studying the same matter from the opposite side. 
Whereas real wages are what matters for workers and their welfare, labour costs are what 
matters for employers, and for governments struggling to acquire competitiveness through 
realisation of competitive advantages. Labour costs are measured differently than real wages. 
Usually it includes all compensation paid by employers beyond just the wages received by 
workers.  
 
Labour costs in Zimbabwe 
Table 14 show labour costs per worker in manufacturing in Zimbabwe for five-year periods 
from 1960 until 1994. In the source used (Rama & Artecona 2000), data was not available for 
the last period (1995-99) and data on labour costs in agriculture were only available for 1980-
89, but was calculated in a different way and it was therefore pointless to compare the two 
sectors. As table 14 shows, labour costs jumped considerably after Independence. What is worth 
noting, is that labour costs per worker measured in current US dollars declined in the latter part 
of the 1980s and declined further in the first period of the 1990s, indicating a downward trend 
in labour costs accompanying the liberalisation process.  
 
Table 14   
Labour costs in Zimbabwe 1960-1994 (US dollars per year) 
Year WGEIND  
1960-64 1 089,03  
1965-69 1 227,31  
1970-74 1 741,23  
1975-79 2 776,11  
1980-84 4 096,92  
1985-89 3 742,01  
1990-94 3 421,78  
 
Note: WGEIND: Labour cost per worker in manufacturing in current US dollars per year.  
Calculated as the ratio between total compensation and the number of workers in the manufacturing 
sector as a whole. Compensation includes direct wages, salaries and other remuneration paid  
directly by the employer; plus all employers’ contributions to social security programs on behalf of 
their employees.   
Source: Rama & Artecona (2000). 
 
This downward trend in labour costs is positive to foreign investors holding ‘hard’ currency 
(such as US dollars), and who are seeking cost advantages. However, as pointed to by Amsden 
(1992), this is not equally positive to domestic investors seeking to exploit the same cost 
advantages. Because of the strong depreciation of the Zimbabwe-dollar against US dollars (see 
table 2) in the same period that labour costs dropped when measured in current US dollars, the 
pattern is reverse when measured in current Zimbabwe dollars. By using data in table 2, I 
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arrived at an average of the exchange rate for the period 1980-84, which was 1.22 US dollar per 
Zimbabwe dollar. The average for 1990-94 was 0.23 US dollar per Zimbabwe dollar. By 
dividing the average labour cost of 4096 US dollars on the average exchange rate of 1.22 for the 
period 1980-84, I arrived at an average labour cost of 3357 Zimbabwe dollars. By dividing the 
average labour cost of 3421 US dollars on the average exchange rate of 0.23 for the period 
1990-94, I arrived at an average labour cost of 14873 Zimbabwe dollars. In other words, when 
measured in current Zimbabwe dollars, labour costs per worker in manufacturing increased 
from 3421 to 14873 Zimbabwe dollars. Of course, taking into consideration the dramatic 
inflation over the same period (see table 13), manufacturers who do not export receive more in 
output prices, but they also have to pay more in other input costs apart from labour costs. 
Particularly in manufacturing which depends on imported inputs, the exchange rate is important. 
On balance, therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that the trend in labour costs has been to 
the benefit of foreign investors (due to the depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar against US 
dollars) and detrimental to domestic investors, assuming they save in the domestic currency.  
 
Zimbabwe’s labour costs in a comparative 
perspective 
Of most concern to this study is labour costs measured in US dollars because it is this measure 
that allows us to compare labour costs across countries. Does Zimbabwe have a comparative 
labour cost advantage? That depends on which countries Zimbabwe is compared to. Table 15 
show labour costs per worker in manufacturing in five countries in Southern Africa (data was 
not available on Malawi, Mozambique and Namibia). As can be seen from table 15, South 
Africa has the highest labour costs in manufacturing, and Mauritius the lowest. Moreover, 
labour costs in manufacturing increased in South Africa, Zambia and Mauritius, between the 
two periods, but fell in Zimbabwe and Botswana.  
 
Table 15         
Labour cost per worker in manufacturing (US dollars per year)   
Country  1980-84 1990-94     
South Africa 6 261 8 475     
Zambia  3 183 4 292     
Zimbabwe  4 097 3 422     
Botswana  3 250 2 884     
Mauritius  1 465 1 973     
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000. Washington, D.C. 
 
Note: Labour cost per worker in manufacturing is obtained by dividing the total payroll by the 
number of employees, or the number of people engaged, in manufacturing establishments. 
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Summary 
The discriminatory wage regime biased against black workers during UDI secured relatively 
high formal employment levels. After Independence, formal sector employment creation has 
been insufficient, unable to absorb retrenched workers and new entrants in the job market. As a 
consequence, informal self-employment has increased rapidly. Following the liberalisation in 
1990, there has been a growing trend for formal sector workers to also engage in informal sector 
activities. Together, these factors have resulted in more insecurity for both wage-earners and 
self-employed, who are now more dependent on a multiplicity of volatile income sources.  
The minimum-wage legislation introduced in 1981 helped to push real wages to a peak 
level in 1982. Compared to the situation in 1972, workers in agriculture enjoyed a substantial 
increase in real wages, as their wage level had been considerably below that in non-agricultural 
activities. Relatively, the rise from 1979 to 1982 was largest for workers in agriculture, and the 
fall in real wages after 1982 was also largest for them (particularly after 1990). For workers in 
non-agricultural activities, there was a gradual decline in real wages from 1982-1990.  
However, after 1990, the fall in real wages for workers in all sectors, was much steeper 
than in the 1980s. This may partly be ascribed to the fact that minimum wages were removed in 
1991 as part of the ESAP package. The World Bank, which first promoted and then supported 
the ESAP, considers flexibility of wages – or their ability to adjust downwards – as a positive 
development. The reductions in real wages, involved a declining standard of living for 
Zimbabweans as inflation accelerated together with trade liberalisation. The prevalence of poor 
people out of the total population increased from 52.8% in 1990/91 to 75.6% in 1995/96 (CSO 
1998b).  
Labour costs per worker in manufacturing measured in US dollars increased after 
Independence, but fell in the latter part of the 1980s and fell further in the 1990s, indicating a 
downward trend in labour costs accompanying the liberalisation process. However, labour costs 
measured in Zimbabwe dollars increased from the first half of the 1980s to the first half of the 
1990s. This suggests that the trends in labour costs have relatively been to the benefit of foreign 
investors and detrimental to domestic investors in manufacturing activities. Compared to other 
countries in the region labour costs are not particularly high – or low.  
The findings above on the historical evolution of employment and wage policies, trends 
in real wages, and development in labour costs compared to other countries in the region, 
determine Zimbabwe’s prospective labour cost advantage in international trade. The question of 
competitive labour cost advantage is explored further in chapter 5.  
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5  Zimbabwe’s competitive 
advantages 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse Zimbabwe’s competitive advantages in 
international trade, primarily based on evidence presented in chapter 3 and 4. First, factors 
determining comparative advantage are clarified. Second, Zimbabwe’s competitive labour cost 
advantage is reviewed in light of its competition with other countries in international trade. 
Third, human capital in Zimbabwe and its linkages to exports and wages is highlighted. Fourth, 
realisation of comparative advantage is analysed with reference to the notions of natural 
advantage in primary production and created advantage in manufacturing, and the relationship 
between the two. Fifth, Zimbabwe’s experience with trade liberalisation is assessed based on the 
foregoing presentation of evidence on Zimbabwe’s export strategies. 
It should be noted that an ex post identification cannot explain competitive advantage. 
Such an exploratory investigation can only help to identify where competitive advantage lies 
(not why). Similarly, I only attempt to identify to what extent Zimbabwe has a competitive 
labour cost advantage. I do not attempt to explain why it may have one.  
 
Possible determinants of 
comparative advantage  
Which factors determine comparative advantage in Zimbabwe? Zimbabwe’s export structure as 
exposed in chapter 3, clearly underpins the notion that realisation of competitive advantage in 
Zimbabwe has been in natural resource based activities. The picture that emerged in chapter 3 
demonstrated that Zimbabwe’s most important exports are flue-cured tobacco, textiles, iron and 
steel, maize, cotton, asbestos, fresh cut flowers, fertilizers, nickel alloys and gold. Furthermore 
it was pointed out that the share of flue-cured tobacco in total exports had more than doubled 
from 1976 to 1996 (from 17% to 35%), making it by far the most important export commodity.  
The most obvious determinant of comparative advantage in Zimbabwe, as in any 
country, is its natural resource endowments. But as stated in the Introduction, Zimbabwe is 
considered to be the most highly industrialised economy in Sub Saharan Africa (with the 
exception of South Africa). This is also reflected in its production structure presented in chapter 
3, with manufacturing output averaging around 25% of total GDP. This may give reason to 
expect Zimbabwe’s competitive advantage to lie in manufacturing. Manufactured exports out of 
total exports have averaged around 30% during the period under review. But even if these 
numbers are high compared to other African countries, the fact remains that export of primary 
goods accounts for as much as two thirds of total exports, and a great deal of the 30% of exports 
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that are ‘manufactured’ are heavily based on natural resources. This gives a central role for 
natural resource endowments.  
Wood & Jordan (2001:103) argue that “Zimbabwe can produce manufactures relatively 
more cheaply than other countries with similar human and natural resources.” In principle, this 
cost advantage might reflect policies rather than fundamental economic causes. However, they 
find this implausible, as the share of manufactures in exports has remained roughly constant 
during almost four decades of changing trade policies. The share has averaged around 30% 
(from 24% to 38%, see table A.9 in the Statistical Appendix), but there has been no clear trend 
towards a growing share of manufactures vis-à-vis primary goods, neither in exports nor in GDP 
(see table A.2 in Statistical Appendix).  
Wood and Jordan (2001) consider it more likely that Zimbabwe’s cost advantage has 
deeper economic and historical roots. They go a long way to substantiate their argument that 
Zimbabwe has created an ‘unusually strong’ competitive advantage in manufacturing compared 
to other African countries. They see Zimbabwe’s acquisition of a competitive advantage in 
manufacturing as a result of inflow of a large number of Europeans who settled in the country, 
“bringing know-how from (and connections with) the more industrialised regions of the world” 
(Wood and Jordan 2001:110).  
Obviously, the European settler know-how also contributed to development of the 
country’s primary exports. But the advantage in manufacturing came as a result of deliberate 
policy actions over a long period to promote development of the sector. Without the policy, 
there would have been less incentive for people with manufacturing know-how to migrate to 
Zimbabwe, and the further accumulation of know-how would probably have been channelled 
less into manufacturing and more into other sectors.  
However, Zimbabwe’s unusually large manufactured output (relative to its supplies of 
natural resources and labour) is only partly a result of competitive advantage. It is also a result 
of policy barriers to manufactured imports (Ndlovu 1994, Riddell 1990, Wood & Jordan 2001). 
 
As advantage is comparative, it is interesting to see where Zimbabwe’s exports go, and how 
much that goes to potentially competing countries. A sufficiently detailed review of exports by 
country of destination is not provided in the UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook, which 
is my source of export data. But using data from the UN COMTRADE database (which I did 
not have access to), Wood & Jordan (2001:107, table 4), provide such data for 1990 (see table 
16).  
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Table 16 
Composition of exports by destination, 1990 (%) 
     
   
Africa 
Rest of 
world 
 
Total 
     
Manufactures  45.1 24.8 31.2 
 Iron and steel 9.4 16.8 14.6 
 Textiles 6.1 2.1 3.3 
 Clothing 1.4 3.1 2.6 
 Footwear 1.1 0.1 0.4 
 Transport equipment 2.4 0.4 1.1 
 Non-electrical machinery 1.3 1.0 1.1 
 Chemicals 3.2 0.9 1.6 
 Metal manufactures 4.1 0.2 1.3 
 Cement and asbestos products 2.9 0.2 1.0 
 Other manufactures 13.2 0.0 4.3 
Primary  54.9 75.2 68.8 
 Nickel 0.2 9.7 6.9 
 Copper 1.7 1.9 1.9 
 Tobacco leaves 6.9 30.4 23.4 
 Unmilled cereals 23.4 0.8 7.5 
 Cotton lint 3.1 7.1 5.9 
 Coffee beans 0.5 5.7 4.1 
 Raw sugar 0.0 4.9 3.4 
 Other primary 19.1 14.7 15.6 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 
     
Share of destination in total 32.0 68.0 100.0 
     
Note: Manufactures in this table are SITC 5 to 8 less 68, and 
primary exports are SITC 0 to 4 plus 68.  
SITC 9, including gold exports, which are under-reported in their 
source (COMTRADE CD-ROM), is omitted. 
 
Source: Wood & Jordan (2001) Table 4 (p. 107). 
 
In all, 32% of exports went to other African countries (including 8.8% to South Africa) whereas 
the African average is about 7% (Wood & Jordan 2001:107). Table 16 shows that Zimbabwe’s 
exports to other African countries contain a much larger share of manufactures (45%) than do 
its exports to the rest of the world (25%). It can also be seen from the table that a single 
category, iron and steel products, accounts for two-thirds of all Zimbabwe’s manufactured 
exports to non-African countries, while its manufactured exports to other African countries is 
far more diverse. In other words, Zimbabwe’s manufactured exports to the rest of the world 
outside Africa are highly concentrated, specialised in activities in which Zimbabwe has a 
natural comparative advantage. 
 
Keeping in mind that advantage is comparative, it is important to note that an unusually high 
proportion of Zimbabwe’s exports go to other African countries.  
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“The size and composition of Zimbabwe’s exports to other African countries are a 
reflection of the country’s comparative advantage. That Zimbabwe trades more 
extensively with other African countries than they do with each other, that its exports to 
them contain a large share of manufactures, and that these manufactures are of many 
kinds, all suggest that it has an unusual advantage in most sorts of manufacturing over 
other countries in the region. Compared to the rest of the world, however, Zimbabwe’s 
advantage in manufacturing seems less unusual and more concentrated on basic metals” 
(Wood & Jordan 2001:108). 
Another aspect is the kind of export destinations and their ‘purchasing power’. Has Zimbabwe 
managed to hitch itself to economies that have experienced high rates of economic growth or 
are poised to experience growth? Reviewing the period 1985-1995, Chipika & Davies (1998) 
found a slight increase in the share of exports going to high-growth countries. However, the 
share going to economies which had experienced negative growth rates also rose.  
 
Zimbabwe is land-locked, with roughly 480 kilometres by railway from the capital Harare, to 
the nearest port, Beira in Mozambique. High transport costs squeeze value added in 
manufactured exports in both ends, by raising input costs and by reducing factory-gate output 
prices. Henceforth, transport costs are a disadvantage for Zimbabwe’s export prospects.  
Because competitive production of basic metals depends on low transport costs, it could 
be argued that Zimbabwe’s advantage in iron and steel exports (i.e. most of its exports of 
manufactures to non-African countries) is a result of its natural mineral resources. But Wood & 
Jordan (2001) disregard this explanation in favour of their own (which is supply of local know-
how and links to foreign know-how and markets, combined with infant industry promotion and 
import protection policies). The justification for why natural resource endowments are only part 
of the explanation of Zimbabwe’s competitive advantage seems obvious. Other African 
countries (with at least comparable access to ports and overseas markets) also have rich mineral 
resources, and none of them, apart from South Africa, export metals at such an advanced stage 
of processing as Zimbabwe.  
 
It also seems worthwhile to point to characteristics that may single out Zimbabwe positively or 
negatively compared to other, potentially competing, countries. Chipika & Davies (1998) list 
several factors explaining the relatively weak export-oriented FDI in Zimbabwe (see box 3). 
These factors also inform the context of Zimbabwe’s competitive advantage. Even though 
export-oriented FDI is just one (and special) form of export-oriented production in Zimbabwe, 
the list of advantageous and disadvantageous factors for location of such production signal the 
possibilities and constraints that influence whether a potential competitive advantage will be 
realised or not.  
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Box 3 
Advantageous and disadvantageous factors for location of export-oriented production in 
Zimbabwe 
Advantageous Factors 
 A large and diverse natural resource base (agriculture and mining) 
 Cheap, literate, English-speaking and relatively disciplined labour 
 Preferential markets under PTA and the EU 
 A more liberalised investment environment with respect to incentives 
 A diversified, established industrial sector and fairly sophisticated financial sector 
 A relatively well developed transport and communication network 
 A pleasant and safe living environment for expatriates 
Disadvantageous Factors 
 A relatively small, slowly growing domestic market 
 Political instability and drought effects in the region 
 Lack of FDI policy credibility in the midst of indigenisation drive, land reform, slow 
implementation of EPZs and still cumbersome bureaucratic procedures  
 A land-locked terrain with cumbersome cross-border delays for transport 
 A lack of technical skills 
 An inadequate technological infrastructure 
 A limited range of suppliers of raw materials, parts and components 
 Macroeconomic instability 
 
Source: Chipika & Davies (1998:22-23) 
 
Competitive labour cost advantage 
The findings in chapter 4 suggested a downward trend in labour costs measured in current US 
dollars accompanying the liberalisation process. Comparing the two periods 1980-84 and 1990-
94, labour costs in manufacturing fell in Zimbabwe while they increased in some of the other 
countries in the region such as South Africa, Zambia and Mauritius. Still, the latest data which 
run until 1994 (table 15) demonstrate that both Botswana and Mauritius have a competitive 
labour cost advantage compared to Zimbabwe (most pronounced in Mauritius), whereas 
Zimbabwe has a competitive labour cost advantage compared to Zambia and South Africa. The 
ILO study for example, noted that Zimbabwean manufacturers enjoyed a “considerable labour 
cost advantage over their South African counterparts” (ILO 1993:79). However, at an 
aggregate level it is impossible to give an exact account of to what extent Zimbabwe has a 
competitive advantage in low labour costs. It will be a question of the specific production 
process and its labour intensity - labour compared to other input and production costs (e.g. 
transport, machinery, social or organisational capital, design and marketing, and so on). And it 
will also be a question of which other countries that can be meaningfully compared to 
Zimbabwe. They do not necessarily have to be neighbouring countries. Countries on other 
continents may also have equivalent natural endowments and other resources needed to export 
the same product, including comparable transport costs to the preferred export market despite a 
great difference in absolute distance to this market. Evidence presented in Chipika & Davies 
(1998) based on UNIDO’s Industrial Development Report 1996, shows that Zimbabwe’s real 
wages in 1994 were only 15% of real wages in the mature Asian Tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, 
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Singapore and Hong Kong) and approximately 50% of real wages in Malaysia and Thailand. In 
sum, the evidence presented in chapter 4, sustains – at a general level – that Zimbabwe, at least 
in the same magnitude as other poor countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, can be said to have a 
competitive advantage in low labour costs when compared to other countries with higher labour 
costs measured in current US dollars.  
It was not only labour costs (measured in current US dollars) that fell in Zimbabwe after 
liberalisation. Also real wages fell in the 1990s. A World Bank study (Verner 1999b) found that 
larger exporting firms in Zimbabwe pay workers marginally less than the average firm. The 
same study also found that the exporting firms themselves benefit more than their employees do 
from trade openness. As there is no reason to assume that exporting firms need higher profits 
than firms producing for the domestic market – it seems plausible to suggest that exporting 
firms may have to keep labour costs low to stay competitive. This may be the case if the 
activities in which the exporting firms compete in, are activities where they compete on price 
and not quality-dimensions. I do not have information on inter-industry wage differentials. 
Nevertheless, such data would probably not distinguish between export-oriented industries and 
production for the domestic market. Hypothetically, of course, it could be assumed that the 
national wage level do not reflect labour costs in export-oriented industries. However, I have no 
reason to assume that labour costs in export-oriented industries are substantially lower or higher 
than the national wage level. 
The issue of profits contra wages is significant. Using data from the Quarterly Digest of 
Statistics, CSO December 1998, Chiripanhura & Makwavarara (2001) show the functional 
distribution of gross domestic income. The share of wages and salaries in gross domestic 
income declined from 54% in 1987 to 39% by 1997. The share of profits increased 
correspondingly, overtaking that for wages, from 47% in 1987 to 61% by 1997. This may be 
taken as an indication of how workers have been economically marginalized after liberalisation. 
 
Human capital development  
Most available data on skill levels in Zimbabwe are from firm studies. The challenge arising 
from this is that, as Lall puts it: “The analysis of individual firm studies may not clearly capture 
skill deficiencies, since it is difficult to evaluate competence by international standards at the 
micro level and economic researchers are often dependent on information given by firms.” (Lall 
1999b:20). 
 
Skills and exports 
Söderbom & Teal (2001) use micro-data to study how skills have impacted on investment and 
exports from manufacturing firms in four African countries, including Zimbabwe. They 
particularly address reasons for why the possible growth of unskilled labour-intensive exports 
fail to occur. Their findings are for the most part inconclusive. They do not find support for the 
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view that increasing efficiency is the key to firms being able to enter the export market. 
However, surprisingly perhaps, they find that efficiency plays some role in the exit from export 
markets. They hypothesize that there can be a mismatch between (high) wage costs and 
productivity, which deter manufacturing firms in most African countries from exporting their 
products. However, they do not consider unskilled wages to be too high, but rather point to the 
fact that large manufacturing firms in the export market pay wages “substantially above the 
price of labour” (Söderbom & Teal 2001:38). This results in scepticism on the part of other 
manufacturing firms to enter into exports. They suggest that African economies lack the 
potential for a successful and profitable export sector because manufacturing firms pay prices 
that exceeds the opportunity costs of labour.  
If human capital is scarce in Africa we should expect exports to use relatively little of it. 
A consequence of this would be that African countries would not be able to export manufactures 
as they lack the necessary skills. Accordingly, it has been argued that the underlying cause of 
the lack of manufacturing exports from African economies is that the relative scarcity of skilled 
labour in Africa ensures that African countries has a competitive advantage in natural resource 
exports (Wood & Berge 1997). This argument has also been extended from a narrow definition 
of manufactures to one that includes processed primary products within the definition of 
manufactured exports (Owens & Wood 1997).  
 
Skills and wages 
Despite the fact that skilled labour is relatively scarce in Sub-Saharan Africa, it has been argued 
that the return to education is not high (Bennell 1996 in Bigsten et al. 1998). Analysing the rates 
of return to human capital in five African countries including Zimbabwe, Bigsten et al. (1998) 
found that the average return was low in all the countries examined. However, for those with 
skills from secondary school and beyond the returns were very high. And insofar as these skills 
are those used intensively in successful manufacturing, the relative scarcity of such skills is 
consistent with the failure of African economies to develop a successful manufacturing sector 
(Bigsten et al. 1998).  
Verner (1999b) finds that skills (formal education, training and experience) affect 
wages positively in Zimbabwe. She also found that there is a wage premium for workers who 
completed secondary school, but she suggests that this does not necessarily reflect greater 
productivity, but may rather indicate a shortage of educated workers. This situation, however, is 
likely to change, as there is a much higher enrolment ratio among younger age groups today 
than before Independence. According to data for 1992 presented in Lall (1999b: Table 1.5), 
48% of the relevant age group were enrolled in secondary school, whereas 119% of the relevant 
age group were enrolled in primary school. (The extra 19% were obviously not from the 
relevant age group but from older age groups). Moreover, the 1992 data show that Zimbabwe 
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had a higher secondary enrolment rate than Thailand, and almost the same tertiary enrolment 
rate as Malaysia (Lall 1999b).  
 
Human resource development in Zimbabwe 
Before Independence (pre 1980), only 4% of black children completed four years of secondary 
education. This was a deliberately designed policy to ensure that no competition evolved 
between blacks and whites (Riddell 1979 in Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 2001). At 
Independence the new government adopted a policy of education for all. One side-effect of this 
massive expansion was that many who failed to attend school during the war, went to school 
during the 1980s and chronologically completed their ordinary level education after 1990 
(Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 2001). This coincided with the introduction of economic 
reforms, and contributed to the worsening unemployment situation. But it has also prepared the 
ground for skills formation and human resource development. By 1999 the literacy rate was as 
high as 87.8% (CSO, Labour Force Survey 1999 in Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 2001).  
The rapid and massive expansion of the education system in Zimbabwe following the 
attainment of Independence has been characterised as a success story (ILO 1993). However, this 
rapid expansion was at high costs in terms of the quality of outputs. According to Chiripanhura 
& Makwavarara (2001) over 90% of those who sat the exams in 1996 joined the ranks of the 
unemployed.  
“… the pass rate in the education system has been declining over the years. The major 
problem is that the system is academically oriented, and those who fail to meet the 
standard have no chance of procuring formal employment. Except for those that can 
enter vocational training centres and apprenticeships, there are no other ways of skills 
acquisition that can benefit the academically weak” (Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 
2001:30).  
Historically, formal apprenticeship is the main avenue for skills formation in 
Zimbabwe. Since its peak intake of 2072 apprentices in 1991, the number of apprentices 
has declined by 38% to 1149 by 1998 (Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 2001). Firms in all 
industries have cut back on apprenticeship and those that qualify are not guaranteed 
employment. According to Chiripanhura & Makwavarara (2001) the educational 
institutions are not able to meet the demands for skills. Some institutions have archaic 
training equipment, and thus pass on obsolete skills to the trainees who then need to be 
retrained by the recipient firms.  
In Zimbabwe, limited apprentice programs are available. Moreover, apprentices are paid 
a low wage, while employers of apprentices are not compensated (Verner 1999b). It is of the 
interest for both the employer and the employee to form a long-run employment relationship, 
thereby helping to build and retain firm-specific skills. In line with this argument, Verner 
(1999b) found that workers with permanent contracts obtain higher wages than workers with 
temporary contracts.  
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The study made for the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), points to 
problems with the apprenticeship system and possible reasons for low levels of human capital: 
“A major weakness of the skills-development process in Zimbabwe was its neglect of 
technical training and the acquisition of manual skills. This had been reinforced through 
heavy reliance on migrant labour, which undermined the development of a 
comprehensive apprenticeship training and technical education (see Raftopoulos 1986). 
Furthermore, the apprenticeship system relied exclusively on employers, resulting in 
under-investment (case of market failure). These developments still have a bearing on 
the problems of skill shortages in some strategic areas” (Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 
2001:28) 
Bearing in mind the massive expansion efforts in the 1980s, and the common cutbacks in public 
spending and introduction of user fees accompanying economic reforms, it is not surprising that 
the average expenditure on education as a proportion of budgetary allocations increased during 
the period 1982/83 to 1990/91, and then declined during the 1990s (to 4% in 1999/2000) 
(Chiripanhura & Makwavarara 2001).  
Lall & Wangwe aptly summarise the lessons for industrial strategy from Zimbabwe’s 
experience with human capital development in the different periods:  
“Since the industrial base of Zimbabwe owed much to import substitution, and to the 
incentives for deepening provided during its long period of isolation during UDI, there 
had clearly been benefits in past industrial strategies. Zimbabwe also had the advantage 
of higher levels of entrepreneurial talent and general human capital, which allowed it to 
use import substitution to better effect than its neighbours. This suggests that any 
adjustment and liberalisation that does not take account of underlying capabilities and 
the process of acquiring them is likely to be seriously flawed in promoting future 
industrial development” (Lall & Wangwe 1998:84).  
The observations presented above, suggest that human capital development in Zimbabwe has 
been insufficient to meet the requirements for a dynamic quality-based competitive advantage. 
 
Natural versus created comparative 
advantage 
In the years before the structural adjustment programme was initiated, the World Bank 
advocated strongly in favour of outward orientation (World Bank 1987a, 1987b). Chipika & 
Davies (1998) suggest that the World Bank-supported reforms in the 1990s may have had a 
more significant impact on the expansion of traditional exports (primary goods) than non-
traditional exports (manufactures). This would accord with the orthodox view in standard trade 
theory of the likely impact of a shift from a regulated to an unregulated economy: The 
distortions from the regulations work against the dictates of natural comparative advantage, 
while their reduction allows it to reassert itself. In other words, the World Bank-supported 
liberalisation have presumably directed Zimbabwe’s export production more towards primary 
production, making more intensive use of abundant resources such as tobacco leaves, cereals, 
minerals, and cheap labour. As a result, industrial development is not oriented towards export of 
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some selected high-quality products, promoted through active government policy to create a 
sustainable ‘dynamic’ long-term competitive advantage.  
Long-term competitive advantage will usually be a function of the evolution of firms 
and industries over time. Therefore, to create a competitive advantage is not simply a matter of 
promoting new activities that seems attractive. It also requires technical and managerial 
competence that can only be accumulated through years of practise (Porter 1990). 
Consequently, comparative advantage will most likely be found in areas where firms have 
existed for some time creating a craft-basis. In its first assessment of structural adjustment in 
Zimbabwe, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) wrote: 
“After more than 25 years of extensive protection, it is by no means clear where the 
long-term comparative advantage of Zimbabwean industry lies. Even some of the basic 
resource-based industries are looking vulnerable as the structural adjustment 
programme proceeds” (ILO 1993:75). 
An obvious concern, therefore, is the fact that new and viable areas for long-term competitive 
advantage have not been created during the last 20 years after Independence. Already in 1982, 
in the Transitional National Development Plan (TNDP), the government pointed out: “… 
industries in which the economy has a long-term competitive advantage [are] principally raw 
material processing and/or employing labour-intensive production methods …” (TNDP 1982 
para 13.3, cited in Davies 1991:289). Twenty years later, the economy is still critically 
dependent upon raw material processing and utilisation of its relatively lower labour costs.  
 
Zimbabwe’s experience with 
liberalisation 
The situation of Zimbabwe’s external economy after liberalisation is characterised by 
substantial current account deficits (or a breakdown of the capacity to import); de-
industrialisation; increased exposure to external shocks; and increased dependence upon export 
of one single primary commodity (tobacco). Moreover, in basic activities like tobacco 
production, in which Zimbabwe has a natural comparative advantage, the vital productivity 
growth required for long-term development is not achievable. This hardly resembles the 
scenario offered by the IMF of ‘reaping the benefits of globalisation’. According to Lall, the 
capacity to export manufactures in Zimbabwe  
“is based on capabilities built up during import-substitution: it is not clear that these 
capabilities will continue to grow once the existing comparative advantages have been 
fully exploited, regional markets have opened up to full international competition, and 
the special privileges for exporting to regional and European markets are eroded” (Lall 
1999b:235).  
Keeping in mind that Zimbabwe has exported unusually much manufactures to other African 
countries, the intensified competition in regional markets that are now also opened up is likely 
to have a major bearing on Zimbabwe’s prospects of exporting manufactures.  
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In Zimbabwe, domestic real wages have declined, whereas labour costs measured in US 
dollars are not especially low even though the Zimbabwe dollar has depreciated. However, what 
is critical for the country’s competitiveness in the long-term, is its ability to raise real wages 
while generating necessary export revenues. The pattern of specialisation that has evolved 
throughout all the three periods considered in this study, may be recognised most clearly in the 
period with import liberalisation. Export-oriented production has been increasingly directed 
towards production making intensive use of basic factors, rather than being subject to quality-
based technological upgrading. As observed by Chipika & Davies (1998), this has allowed the 
dictates of natural comparative advantage to reassert itself after 25 years of controlled trade 
regimes. As the natural comparative advantage in basic factors is vulnerable to climatic 
conditions that affect agricultural production, and to lower labour-costs in competing countries, 
Zimbabwe’s economy seems to be more vulnerable after liberalisation. Recognising that the 
increased dependence on basic factors also implies an increased dependence on activities 
subject to diminishing returns, points to a declining ability to accumulate export revenues in the 
long-term. Moreover, compared to the initial situation in 1972, workers in all sectors have seen 
their real wages fall below the 1972-level after 1991. So even if their real wages were stagnant 
or declining after 1982, their real wages first fell below what they originally had in 1972 after 
liberalisation was undertaken in 1990-1991.  
Another indicator of unfavourable development during liberalisation, is the declining 
share of wages in gross domestic income. Before liberalisation, more than half of domestic 
income was in the form of wages. By 1997, the share of wages was less than 40%, whereas the 
share of profits in gross domestic income had grown to more than 60%. This implies that the 
average worker gets a smaller part of the created wealth during liberalisation – compared to 
before, and the small business-owning upper-class gets a larger share of the values created in 
Zimbabwe.  
Together, the findings above all suggest that Zimbabwe’s experience with liberalisation 
has been a painful one for the average worker, and negative for the country’s long-term 
specialisation in international trade.  
 
Summary 
Here, I summarise the main findings from the evidence and arguments presented above. The 
most significant determinants of competitive advantage in Zimbabwe include:  
1. Natural resource endowments (particularly tobacco, minerals and maize).  
2. The historical trajectory of manufacturing know-how brought in by European settlers 
and accumulated through years of practice and the general evolution of Zimbabwean 
manufacturing industries over time.  
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3. The government’s deliberate policy actions over a long period to promote 
manufacturing (infant industry promotion and import protection policies), especially 
under the pressure of international sanctions.  
4. Relatively low labour costs measured in current US dollars, especially in larger 
exporting firms.  
The bottom line of these four determinants relating to our particular foci, suggests that exporting 
firms may need to keep labour costs low to stay competitive (mostly in production of processed 
primary products), which negatively affects the opportunity to raise real wages as specialisation 
is reinforced in existing activities along with trade liberalisation.  
Another finding is that more than three decades with changing trade policies have not 
brought a substantially renewed and improved competitive advantage in manufacturing 
activities that were relatively robust already in the late 1960s, nor in upstream and downstream 
production of the related industries. In particular, the IMF and World Bank-supported 
liberalisation in the 1990s has allowed the dictates of natural comparative advantage to reassert 
itself after years of regulations and active (but not too successful) government intervention. The 
result has been a stronger orientation of export production towards primary goods, making more 
intensive use of abundant resources such as tobacco leaves, cereals, minerals, and cheap labour. 
Moreover, a number of observations suggest that human capital development in Zimbabwe has 
been insufficient to meet the requirements for a dynamic quality-based competitive advantage. 
Reasons include limited apprentice programs and insufficient attention given to the process of 
skill-acquisition while carrying out liberalisation policies.  
In short, based on its experience over the last 30 years, Zimbabwe’s competitive 
advantages can be said to lie in activities that make intensive use of basic factors such as 
tobacco leaves, cereals, minerals, and cheap labour.  
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6  Implications for standard trade 
theory 
Introduction  
As indicated in chapter 2, neo-Schumpeterian approaches appreciate the dynamic and 
cumulative elements involved in specialisation in international trade, and emphasise the effects 
of not only increasing but also diminishing returns to scale. To substantiate this proposition, 
some examples of such theorising will be examined more closely in this chapter to draw 
implications from neo-Schumpeterian insights for standard trade theory.  
 
Self-reinforcing specialisation in 
inferior activities 
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches have directed special attention to aspects of cumulative 
mechanisms of increasing and diminishing returns to scale, that are weakly developed or 
completely neglected in prevailing standard approaches to trade theory. Based on the more 
realistic assumptions of both increasing and diminishing returns, I will argue that these 
approaches qualify the more static standard neo-classical approaches to specialisation patterns 
following trade liberalisation.  
 
Market size and productivity growth  
A basic assumption underlying the low-wage strategy for competitiveness is the expectation that 
decreasing relative unit costs of labour will make a product more competitive and allow it a 
growing market share. Contrary to this assumption, Nicholas Kaldor has pointed out that over 
the long term, growing market shares and increasing relative unit costs (or prices) move 
together, rather than the other way around. Investigations by Fagerberg and ul Haque support 
this ‘Kaldor paradox’ that growing market shares and increasing relative unit labour costs tend 
to be positively associated, and thereby complement the findings by Kaldor. Specifically, 
Fagerberg (1996) shows a positive relationship between a country’s rate of income growth and 
the change in the world market share of its exports. By the same token, ul Haque (1995, in ILO 
1998, Ch. 5) has recorded a positive relationship between manufacturing export growth and 
productivity growth in manufacturing. How can this be explained? One explanation for this 
phenomenon may be that countries which have high rates of income and productivity growth, 
also have high rates of investment.  
With more investment (in infrastructure, physical and human capital, etc.) these 
countries may have a faster turnover of production equipment (depending on the nature of the 
 78 
investment), which enables them to take advantage of more advanced production processes that 
can yield higher productivity (Lall 1997). Hence rich countries can be more prone to initiate and 
take advantage of technological progress, and may therefore experience greater learning by 
doing and faster development of new products. The potential for such a development may be 
clarified by the observation by Kaldor that: “the growth of a country’s exports should itself be 
considered as the outcome of the efforts of its producers to seek out potential markets and to 
adapt their product structure accordingly” (Kaldor 1981:603). In other words, Kaldor 
emphasised that it is the innovative ability and the adaptive capacity of a country’s 
manufacturers that determine whether the demand of foreign countries for this country’s 
products will tend to be relatively large or small. This is so because “technical progress (…) 
takes the form of the development of marketing of new products which provide a new 
preferable way of satisfying some existing want” (Kaldor 1981:603). In other words, 
technological change is a continuous process where new products gradually replace existing 
ones20. The relevant implication for this investigation is that the exports of countries achieving 
rapid productivity growth may become more competitive without having to compete through 
lower wage levels. Rather, they experience a virtuous circle with more investment in skilled 
labour, more productivity growth, more exports and more income.  
 
Economies of scale and cumulative causation 
The term ‘cumulative causation’ was first used by Gunnar Myrdal in his classic book Economic 
Theory and Underdeveloped Regions in 1957 (Thirlwall 1994). In Myrdal’s theory, trade is a 
mechanism which in practice is likely to perpetuate or exacerbate existing inequalities between 
different regions.  
“Trade benefits the strong at the expense of the weak, particularly if some regions are 
forced by comparative advantage to specialise in diminishing return activities, while 
other regions specialise in increasing return activities. Diminishing returns depresses the 
growth of productivity and per capita incomes and makes regions less competitive, 
while increasing returns does the opposite” (Thirlwall 1994:62-63).  
In his discussion on division of labour and the resulting specialisation of production, Adam 
Smith (1776) argued that the division of labour is limited by the extent of the market, but the 
extent of the market is in turn affected by the division of labour. The aspect of economies of 
scale, which by definition requires much production, which in turn is dependent on ‘the extent 
                                                 
20
 This understanding of technological change is similar to how Schumpeter (1934) saw it. Schumpeter 
also distinguished technological change from ‘economic development proper’, by focusing on the two 
processes as respectively being continuous and discontinuous: 
“To produce other things, or the same things by a different method, means to combine these materials 
and forces differently. In so far as the ‘new combination’ may in time grow out of the old by 
continuous adjustment in small steps, there is certainly change, possibly growth, but neither a new 
phenomenon nor development in our sense. In so far as this is not the case, and the new combinations 
appear discontinuously, then the phenomenon characterising development emerges.” (Schumpeter 
1934:65-66, emphasis added).  
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of the market’, was taken up by the American economist Allyn Young in 1928, who observed 
that: 
“Adam Smith’s famous theorem amounts to saying that the division of labour depends 
in large part on the division of labour. [But] this is more than a mere tautology. (…) – 
change becomes progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative way” (Young 
1928:533 in Thirlwall 1994:63).  
The analysis of the division of labour being not only determined by, but also itself determining, 
the size of the market, was later revisited by Nicholas Kaldor in 1972 (Kitson & Michie 2000). 
Kaldor (1981) argues that owing to increasing returns to scale in manufacturing, success breeds 
further success and failure begets more failure. According to Kaldor, as a result of such 
cumulative causation, free trade in manufactured goods leads to concentration of manufacturing 
in certain areas – what he calls a ‘polarisation process’ – which inhibits the growth of 
manufacturing activities in some areas and concentrates them in others. Kaldor describes how 
this polarisation process has made some countries specialise in the production of raw materials 
and minerals which only could offer employment to limited numbers of workers. He maintains 
that “the poverty was a consequence, not of low productivity of labour in their export sectors, 
but of the limited employment capacity of their ‘profitable’ industries” (Kaldor 1981:597). 
Kaldor argues that specialisation in export of primary products is inconsistent with high living 
standards because only a small fraction of the labour force can be effectively employed in land-
based activities. If diminishing returns (in agriculture) are allowed for in economic theory, 
production may be limited by a land-constraint (if land is limited). Therefore, Kaldor argues for 
‘land-saving innovations’, i.e. technological progress that enables more resources to be 
extracted out of a given natural environment (Kaldor 1981).  
Lucas (1988 in Fagerberg 1996) argues that because of the cumulative character of 
technological progress, existing patterns of specialisation will tend to be reinforced through 
time. Thus, market forces may strengthen, or reinforce, a specialisation pattern that implies slow 
growth (a low-growth trap). Lucas argues, that in this situation it may pay off for a country to 
change its specialisation by a combination of subsidies and protection (Fagerberg 1996). Reinert 
(1999) has argued along similar lines.  
Finally, it should also be noted that a country with a large home market may, due to 
dynamic economies of scale, consequentially acquire an advantage also in exports (Kaldor 
1981).  
 
Economies of scale and self-reinforcing lock-in 
mechanisms  
In the case of economic activities subject to increasing returns, Arthur (1988, 1989, 1990) 
suggests that small ‘random’ events may select a particular historical path for the economic 
activity. As the events accumulate and become magnified by positive feedbacks, the activity 
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may become locked into this particular path regardless of the advantages of alternative paths. 
Through a theoretical example, Arthur (1989) shows the circumstances under which an 
economy might become locked-in by historical events to the monopoly of an inferior 
technology: Small economic shifts, or historical events, may by chance give one increasing-
return technology an initial advantage in adoptions, which explains how one particular path is 
selected which the activity eventually locks into.  
By the same token, it may be argued that in the case of activities subject to constant or 
diminishing returns to scale, similar self-reinforcing lock-in mechanisms may operate. This 
could be labour-intensive activities competing on costs, not involving sophisticated technology, 
such as the positive-feedback mechanisms identified by Myrdal and Kaldor (Arthur 1990). 
Random historical events may create a lock-in in ‘perfect specialisation’ in the most efficient 
technology in a diminishing-return activity. In other words, a particular technology may be 
adopted or selected as being the most efficient or most favourable, due to (random) historical 
events. However, diminishing returns may themselves drive the use and adoption of a product 
into developing a production process that has inferior long-run potential. Reinert (1995) has 
shown this with his example of baseball-manufacturing by using needle and thread technology, 
as pointed to in chapter 1. By definition, economies that are specialising in constant or 
diminishing-return activities are excluded from the potentially positive synergy effects that 
Arthur has identified in the case of increasing return activities.  
 
Summary 
In the exposition above, I have made the case that due to (a) inherent differences between 
economies (i.e. their specialisation in different activities of production) and (b) the existence of 
both increasing and diminishing returns to scale (including the fact that different activities are 
subject to either increasing or diminishing (or almost constant) returns, or to different degrees of 
one of the forms) and (c) the self-reinforcing nature of specialisation (the division of labour 
‘deepens’ along with the extension of the market): it can be argued that specialisation in the 
‘wrong’ activities (characterised by diminishing returns and competition on costs) are subject to 
cumulative causation and may result in a lock-in in the existing form of specialisation. The 
mechanisms described in the analysis above may also contribute to explain trade-induced 
divergences in national development paths. 
Neo-Schumpeterian approaches that incorporate mechanisms such as economies of 
scale and cumulative causation in determining patterns of trade specialisation, suggest that 
specialisation in activities subject to diminishing returns and competition on costs, may weaken 
a country’s position in international trade relative to countries which specialise in competition 
on quality where technological upgrading is critical. Consequently, neo-Schumpeterian 
theorising which allows for economies of scale and cumulative causation in patterns of 
specialisation in international trade avoids unrealistic assumptions made in standard 
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approaches21. By doing so, neo-Schumpeterian approaches qualify and perhaps even contradict 
the standard approaches, and thereby the theoretical underpinnings of the mainstream policy 
advice.  
 
                                                 
21
 As pointed out in chapter 2, other artificial, or unrealistic, assumptions include those of perfect 
competition and technology as freely available. As Lall writes: “The economic case for rapid and 
sweeping liberalisation, with no strategy to help upgrading, is based on assumptions of market efficiency 
and costless learning that bear little relation to reality” (Lall 1999b:271).  
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7  Implications for policy 
Introduction  
The overall objective of this chapter is to assess the merits of the mainstream policy based on 
implications from exposition of theoretical developments that qualify the assumptions in 
standard trade theory. Specifically, I attempt to identify implications this has for policy 
recommendations. First I point to some dilemmas with designing trade strategies and exposing a 
national economy to international trade. Then I assess the low-wage strategy for 
competitiveness, and point to policy implications from appreciating the roles of technology; of 
aggregate demand; of self-reinforcing mechanisms in specialisation; of poverty traps of 
individuals; and of linkages between poverty at the individual and national levels. I end by 
drawing some core lessons for designing trade strategies.  
 
Dilemmas with different trade 
regimes 
Policies to take advantage of income opportunities embodied in international trade may have 
undesirable by-products. Pursuing one goal may result in ruining another. For poor countries 
that urgently need foreign exchange to import necessary inputs to vital production, export 
earnings are indispensable. However, questions of how they design their export strategies; 
which national factors of advantage they try to use; how they combine utilization of existing 
natural advantages with development of created advantages based on potent factors; of short-
term and long-term motives; and on which terms they engage in international trade, are not as 
straightforward to answer as donor governments and policy advisors suggest. But in addition to 
these questions, there are also dilemmas concerning the degree to which a country can pursue a 
trade strategy without experiencing unintended negative side-effects. 
 
Dilemmas with export-led growth 
Growth of exports may have negative effects on a country’s economy. The success of some 
export industries can push up the costs of labour, inputs and capital, making other export 
industries uncompetitive. This phenomenon is often referred to as the ‘Dutch disease’ after the 
effects of North Sea gas discoveries on the Dutch economy in the 1960s. The effect was a sharp 
decline in the profitability of the traditional export industry; emergence of new export 
commodities; and an increase in the price of non-tradables (Evans 1989). Notably, the export 
success in Holland was due to a natural resource bonus, rather than to sustainable productivity 
growth in industry. The dividend was “used to finance a bloated social welfare system rather 
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than the education, research, or infrastructure necessary to boost future productivity” (Porter 
1990:774).  
When countries attempt to specialise according to their comparative advantages, many 
developing countries end up specialising in the same primary product, or group of products. 
When trade liberalisation and export-oriented policies lead to export expansion for several 
countries that mainly export the same particular product, they collectively face the fallacy of 
composition problem. The demand curve on the world market for a particular product, e.g. 
coffee or tobacco, is closer to being inelastic than perfectly elastic (as pointed out in chapter 2 
regarding Engel’s law). The result of increased export production may be decreasing prices and 
less export revenues.  
Finally, it has been suggested that periods of pure ‘export-led growth’ are unlikely to be 
sustained (Helleiner 1990). In Arthur Lewis’ words: “The engine of growth should be 
technological change, with international trade serving as a lubricating oil and not as fuel” 
(Lewis 1978:74 in Helleiner 1990:213).  
 
Dilemmas with import liberalisation and 
import substitution  
According to theory, exposure to world prices through trade liberalisation generates a process of 
competitive selection which firms might not survive if they owe their existence largely to 
previously sheltered markets or subsidised input supplies. Sachikonye (1999) found evidence of 
this effect on the textile and metal sectors in Zimbabwe after liberalisation.  
Another issue is the direct effect of trade liberalisation on the poor; because, in order to 
benefit from trade liberalisation, the poor need to enjoy trade-induced price reductions for 
consumer goods, as well as reduced input and increased output prices which they face as 
producers. And, as referred to in chapter 2, Gerry Helleiner has pointed to the tendency of 
absence of a responsive capacity to import liberalisation in poor countries. 
A further dilemma, pointed out by Mehlum (1999) is that short-run consequences of 
trade liberalisation can generate compatibility problems in the exchange rate regime, with 
depreciation resulting in strikes and social unrest that may undermine reforms. And trade 
reforms that lack credibility may prove difficult to sustain (Rodrik 1992a).  
On the other hand, there are also dilemmas with import substitution. A strategy of 
import substitution is likely to have an expansionary impact initially, that may increase 
domestic output and employment (Kitson & Michie 2000). However, these benefits may prove 
difficult to sustain over time. According to Hawkins in Ndlovu (1994), evidence suggests that 
ISI tends to shift the pattern of imports away from final consumption items to raw materials, 
intermediate and capital goods rather than reducing dependence on imports altogether. This 
means that the degree to which a country can compress its imports in times of crisis is greatly 
reduced, which may lead to severe adjustment problems and perhaps a necessity to depress 
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consumption. This may in turn adversely affect income, output and employment. In 1987, the 
Zimbabwean economy experienced such a crisis and had to face the accompanying problems 
(Ndlovu 1994).  
 
Questioning the low-wage strategy 
for competitiveness 
As observed in the Introduction, current policy recommendations by agenda-setting and policy-
making institutions like the World Bank and IMF, advise poor countries to open up and exploit 
their natural comparative advantage in low labour costs. However, there are several reasons to 
question the long-term effects from specialising in ‘basic factors’ (such as low labour costs) 
alone. This reasoning will be exposed below.  
 
Voluntary underdevelopment? 
The underlying concern of this thesis has been to point to the danger of being caught up in a 
low-wage trap on a long-term basis. Recent and persuasive research has emphasised the critical 
role played by technology when pointing out the weaknesses of a low-wage strategy for 
competitiveness:  
“[For] a country (…) which is committed to compete in international markets on a long-
term basis, the choice of internationally competitive technology is crucial. This means 
that employment generation must mainly be sought by the widespread adoption of 
advanced technologies and not by the transition to a low wage, technologically 
backward (…) economy. To rely on low wages as an inducement for the choice of 
labour-intensive techniques and the major source of competitive leverage in world 
markets would be a path of voluntary underdevelopment” (Freeman & Soete 1987:47).  
The implications suggested are unmistakable for countries on a path towards almost complete 
openness. Moreover, Freeman & Soete argue on behalf of well-developed industrial economies, 
such as the UK in the mid-1980s: 
“we do not see wage reduction as the main route to a stable high employment, high 
growth economy. As a long-term solution we believe it could lead to a low productivity, 
low technology, low growth, socially divisive ‘shoe-shine boy economy’ as in many 
Third World countries, or to a dual economy, in which one part was high wage and 
ultra-high technology and the other was based on low-wage casual employment” 
(Freeman & Soete 1987:260). 
With increasing international economic integration, it seems natural that this argument can be 
extended to developing countries as well. As Porter has aptly put it: 
“The expansion of exports because of low wages and a weak currency, at the same time 
as the country imports sophisticated goods that its firms cannot produce with sufficient 
productivity to compete with foreign rivals, may bring trade into balance or even 
surplus, but lowers the nation’s standard of living” (Porter 1990:8-9).  
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It is precisely this potential problem for countries with competitive advantage in low labour 
costs, which can arise as a result of trade liberalisation and the increased pressure to export. The 
question if this much promoted advantage truly is a sustainable advantage in the long term, is an 
issue of great consequence that deserves to be pushed higher on the agenda of policymakers.  
The renowned development economist Sanjaya Lall is quite direct and explicit when 
describing the suggested advantage of having abundant supplies of cheap labour. In developing 
countries, according to him, “the growth of ‘raw’ labour can be dismissed as a growth-
promoting factor” (Lall 1990:26).  
 
Intelligent versus un-intelligent use of low 
labour costs 
Most of the international competition that poor countries already are engaged in is competition 
primarily on costs. Partly for this reason, the policy advice to use the advantage of low labour 
costs is easily adhered to. Furthermore, evidence of catching-up by East Asian economies 
during the last decades has been used to substantiate the virtues of the recommended low-wage 
strategy for competitiveness (see IMF 2000).  
Indeed, prudent and ‘intelligent’ use of low labour costs in a catching-up strategy may 
be helpful. However, in a report written for the ILO, Lall argues that insofar as the advantage of 
low labour costs exists in reality, it is temporary: 
“Competitiveness in the new technological context requires more of developing 
countries than just providing cheap labour. The competitive advantage given by low 
wages for unskilled or semi-skilled workers should certainly be exploited, but it is only 
a starting point. Such an advantage is temporary and evanescent; it cannot support rising 
wages or better living standards unless skills and technologies are upgraded to allow 
labour to be used in more productive, higher value-added activities” (Lall 1999a:3). 
It is using this cost-advantage as part of careful and conscious upgrading, with realistic aims of 
attaining capabilities for competitiveness in what Reinert (1994) calls ‘high-quality activities’, 
that deserve the label ‘intelligent’. As Reinert (1980) writes: 
“Any nation which has the factor endowment of being desperately poor and specialises 
in the international division of labour as being poor, producing labour intensive goods 
will automatically stay poor. The only way to escape this is by following a conscious 
strategy like Taiwan and South Korea of specialising in relatively high-technology but 
labour intensive products in which technological development and productivity 
development are still achievable” (Reinert 1980:138-139).  
This view is also supported by Freeman & Soete: “the example of South Korea already shows 
that catch-up can be a process which leads to better conditions of labour, as well as higher 
wages” (Freeman & Soete 1994:163).  
But as shown above, they also warn of what I call the ‘un-intelligent’ path. Freeman & 
Soete (1994) argue strongly against a low-wage strategy for the advanced OECD-countries. 
Why should such policies have a better long-term effect in poor countries? Of course, poor 
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countries’ export performance would most likely have benefited from a development where 
productivity rose more rapid than real wages, so that unit labour costs declined. As Shapiro & 
Taylor put it: “it is clear that aiming for low wages alone is not a viable or sustainable strategy. 
South Korea would never have shifted its exports from human hair and cheap garments to 
automobiles and electronics had its wages stayed at the levels of 1955” (Shapiro & Taylor 
1992:872, italics in original).  
Moreover, standard macroeconomic policies for liberalisation have a tendency to ignore 
the fact that real wages are not only a cost factor, but are also an important determinant of 
aggregate demand (Taylor 1988 in Van der Hoeven & Taylor 2000). In arguing for industrial 
strategy, Shapiro & Taylor (1992) suggest that growth of real wages may be necessary for 
industrialisation in the long run: The greater part of demand for advanced products that may 
help stimulate an industrialisation process, must come from exports (foreign demand) or 
domestic wage income. The linkages from rising real wages via larger domestic demand to 
industrialisation are frequently overlooked by those advocating low labour costs and wage 
levels. Moreover, efficiency arguments for higher wages suggest that worker motivation and 
efficiency depend on good pay (Bowles & Boyer 1988 in Shapiro & Taylor 1992). Finally, 
lower effective demand at a lower real wage level can actually cause unemployment to rise, 
creating a larger supply of cheap labour in a vicious circle (Van der Hoeven & Taylor 2000). If 
development strategies neglect such important mechanisms, and there is no conscious and 
strategic upgrading of skills and production technologies, the use of low labour-cost advantages 
may well prove to be unintelligent in the long-term.  
The basic lesson for catching-up suggested here, is that real wages should rise (not 
decline as in Zimbabwe), but productivity should rise even more.  
 
Diminishing real wages and increasing self-
exploitation 
When one factor grows, according to the neo-classical Rybczynski theorem, the output of the 
commodity which intensively use the increased factor expands, and the output of the other 
commodity contracts (Rybczynski 1955 in Reinert 1980). As for the consequences for trade 
between rich countries (having much capital) and poor countries (having much cheap labour), 
Reinert suggests that the Rybczynski-effect may give the following situation: 
“a nation which specialises in labour intensive production, will lose its capital intensive 
production to its trading partners. But since economic progress and productivity 
improvements are achieved in economic growth theory through the increasing 
proportion of capital to labour, the nation which specialises indiscriminately according 
to its comparative advantage of having cheap labour will see its labour growing 
increasingly cheaper. The only assumption which has to be made in order to achieve 
this result, is a world supply of cheap and unskilled labour at a price which is fixed 
close to subsistence minimum in the long run” (Reinert 1980:139-140).  
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This assumption seems to be consistent with observations of actual supply and costs of labour in 
poor countries. Referring to the recent experience by African least developed countries, 
UNCTAD suggests that without the necessary finance, the ongoing processes of adjustment can 
be “driven by intensified self-exploitation of all the family driven by pressing minimal 
consumption needs” (UNCTAD 2000:127). And for Zimbabwe, Peter Gibbon observes in the 
introduction to a set of studies on ‘the working poor in Zimbabwe’ that “The picture emerging 
from the studies is of a working-class, formal and informal, generally on the verge of 
destitution” (Gibbon 1995:30).  
 
Poverty at the individual and household levels  
The poorer people are, and the less educated or skilled, the more their livelihood is likely to 
involve physical work, whether in farming or other labour-intensive activities in urban or rural 
areas. Therefore, the body is the main asset for many poor people (Narayan et al. 2000). 
Consequently, poor people are vulnerable to situations in which they overexert or maltreat their 
bodies, as they may have to do in low-paid jobs in poor countries. Poverty assessment studies 
suggest that the poor tend to overwork themselves: As economic conditions deteriorate, people 
work harder with greater negative effects for their main asset. In the face of rising costs of 
living, poor people agree to work harder regardless of the workload and time: 
“In a fishing community in Malawi participants complain that employers usually take 
advantage of people’s desperate situations to make them work more for low wages. (…) 
“…we get some K 500, buy some maize for one day’s consumption; when it is finished 
we go again… The problem is that these boat owners know that we are starving. As 
such we would accept any little wages they would offer to us because they know we are 
very desperate… we want to save our children from dying…”.” (Narayan et al. 
2000:96).  
As poverty is multidimensional, the poor find themselves in a vicious circle where one problem 
gives rise to another one – or aggravates an existing one. The poorer people are, the more 
adversely affected from this vicious circle are they likely to be: Due to minimum food intake in 
crisis periods, men and women cannot perform labour-intensive work. Consequently, they are 
paid less. The poor also tend to get paid less reliably (Narayan et al. 2000).  
Despite the fact that poverty is multidimensional, this study has only focused on low 
income in the form of low real wages. By contrast, Amartya Sen has argued compellingly for a 
perspective where absolute poverty is seen as deprivation of basic capabilities:  
“What the capability perspective does in poverty analysis is to enhance the 
understanding of the nature and causes of poverty and deprivation by shifting primary 
attention away from means (…) to ends that people have reason to pursue, and, 
correspondingly, to the freedoms to be able to satisfy these ends” (Sen 2000:90, italics 
in original).  
Notably, the two perspectives of income poverty and capability poverty are fully related. Not 
only is income an important means to capabilities, but enhanced capabilities would typically 
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tend to expand a person’s ability to be more productive and earn a higher income. Because the 
poor’s most significant asset is their labour, the most effective way to improve their welfare 
may be to increase their employment opportunities and the productivity of their labour through 
investment in education, health and nutrition. However, poor families have to make hard 
choices between investments in human capital of each child and the number of children they 
have. This suggests that there is a case for a development strategy which includes policies that 
help to create demand for skilled workers, thus providing positive incentives for families to send 
their children to school. A strategy that primarily advocates specialising in the advantage of low 
labour costs, will not contribute to creating such demand.  
 
Poverty at the national level  
Essentially, low real wage levels, low labour costs, or abundant supplies of cheap labour, all 
signify poverty at the national level.  
In its Poverty Reduction Handbook (World Bank 1993), the World Bank provides 
guidance to World Bank operational task managers about ‘good-practice’ operational 
approaches. On wage and employment policies, the message is as simple as it is clear: “When 
enforced, [minimum wage regulation] raise the cost of labour to employers and therefore result 
in less employment and fewer jobs” (World Bank 1993:38). The positive effects that rising real 
wages are likely to have on poverty reduction are downplayed and for the most part neglected 
completely.  
In fact, the handbook provides an empirical illustration that happens to be extracted 
from a World Bank discussion paper from 1987 on Zimbabwe. Incidentally, this was the time 
when the World Bank began to prepare the ground for the country’s first structural adjustment 
programme (Trålim 1999). Not surprisingly, the finding was “the increase in wages due to 
minimum wage legislation led to a decline in employment” (Box 2.4 in World Bank 1993:38). 
The negative effects of declining real wages in both agricultural and non-agricultural activities 
from 1982 onwards, observed in chapter 4 (table 5 and 6), seem not to have been sufficiently 
important to be mentioned in the handbook that guided World Bank task managers in the 1990s. 
This allure of the virtues of labour-market flexibility was also evident in the World Bank studies 
by Verner (1999a, 1999b) used in chapter 4 and 5, but has been forcefully criticised by Van der 
Hoeven & Taylor (2000).  
Another element which can be seen as linked to the ‘labour-market flexibility’-
argument, is the idea promoted by the IMF – that deeper specialisation in low labour cost 
advantages is actually pro-poor because it increases or sustains employment opportunities for 
the poor. The focus is not on real wages and incomes per se, but on employment generation for 
poor unskilled workers. It is evident that those willing to work for the lowest wage are those 
who will be given jobs if labour costs become the principal factor determining hiring of 
employees. However, the argument rests on rather weak assumptions. An expected short-term 
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effect from the shift in resource allocation towards natural comparative advantage (as a result of 
trade liberalisation) is the closing down of uncompetitive industries. In this process however, 
retrenchments of workers is an unavoidable outcome. This results in a situation where a larger 
number of unemployed are offering their labour to the anticipated new export industries that use 
cheap labour intensively. The argument depends on how ‘pro-poor’ is defined. Existing income 
inequalities may only be moderately reduced as those who had better paid jobs before 
liberalisation gets no wage at all, assuming that even poorer workers get the new jobs. 
Moreover, it may be too simplistic to assume that by shifting production to activities that make 
intensive use of cheap labour, in itself will make the poor sufficiently attractive to employers 
who need to keep labour costs low. Experience-based skills are critical for productivity also in 
many simple activities that make intensive use of cheap labour. In this scenario, some poor 
previously unemployed may get paid jobs and income inequality may be less severe. However, 
income per person will decline, and if prices increase while wages stay low, the net effect for 
the community may be lower living standards. On balance, it has not been proven (as the IMF 
suggests) that to pursue a low-wage strategy for competitiveness is necessarily ‘pro-poor’.  
 
The competitive advantage of poverty at the 
individual and national levels 
Policies at the macro level have an impact at the micro level. Likewise, actions of individuals at 
the micro level combine to affect macro policy. The first case can be represented by 
macroeconomic policies of trade liberalisation and labour market flexibility to support a low-
wage strategy for international competitiveness. These policies affect the incentives and 
constraints of employers, which in turn affect the pay scales for workers. The second case may 
be represented by many poor people offering their labour for low wages (or at low costs), giving 
a national competitive advantage in cheap labour.  
There is an ongoing debate, and dispute, over how policies for economic growth at the 
national level affect the welfare of individuals at the micro level22. How changes in the macro 
environment affect the poor has important implications for designing policy interventions to 
benefit the poor. Correspondingly, changes in the situation of individuals may affect national 
prosperity. The flow of influence between the two levels is not unidirectional (see figure 10). 
For instance, increasing poverty in the form of low real wages for individual workers reduce 
aggregate demand in the national economy. This may cause the government to run a budget 
deficit financed through domestic borrowing that increases inflation, which in turn affects real 
wages. Moreover, high levels of poverty indicate under-utilised human resources, which may 
act as a constraint on national economic growth and competitiveness. Moreover, poverty and 
                                                 
22
 As policies affect different people in different ways, issues of inequality are intimately tied to issues of 
national economic growth and prosperity. In countries with high inequality, it is possible to observe 
economic growth at the national level with increasing poverty at the individual level (Datt & Ravallion 
1992, in Morrissey 1997).  
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intensive self-exploitation may negatively affect workers’ ability to work and consequently their 
pay. Likewise, (trade) liberalisation policies that aim for downward flexibility of wages may 
give increased pressure on employers’ input costs and result in lower wages.  
In short, the individual worker’s ‘competitive advantage of being poor’ affects the 
aggregated competitive advantage of a country in international trade. Similarly, a country 
pursuing a strategy to take advantage of low labour costs, may, due to the self-reinforcing nature 
of specialisation in international trade, adversely affect the possibilities for workers to get 
higher real wages.  
 
In the introduction to this thesis, I pointed out that in order to advance from being a poor 
country to becoming a rich country, an outward-oriented economy must be able to raise its 
national wage level and still be able to sell its products on international markets. This implies 
that even if its most important export-products compete on costs rather than quality, the main 
source or ‘competitive factor’ in its international competitiveness should not be its level of 
labour costs. There has to be some other factor (like transport, technology, organisational 
process, design or something else), or combination of factors, that makes the product cheaper 
than what firms in other countries can produce for international markets. Otherwise it cannot 
raise the national wage level and the inhabitants will still be poor.  
Still, as has been emphasised by neo-Schumpeterian approaches, it is (by definition) 
more favourable to compete on quality than on costs, due to incentives for upgrading.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 
Linkages of competitive advantage of poverty at the individual and national levels 
 
Macro 
level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Micro  
level 
Poverty at the national level 
Low real 
wages 
Downward pressure on 
employers’ input costs 
Low aggregate 
demand 
Opportunities for 
specialisation in 
low labour-costs 
Policies of labour 
market flexibility 
Less ability to work 
Less investment in 
human resources 
 91 
 
 
 
 
Lessons for trade strategy 
Under the heading ‘In Praise of Cheap Labour: Bad Jobs at Bad Wages are Better than No Jobs 
at All’, Paul Krugman has argued that “some combination of factors that we still don’t fully 
understand (…) has reduced the disadvantages of producing in developing countries” (Krugman 
1998:82). He continues to describe the success story of export-led growth in the last two 
decades, where low wages allowed developing countries to break into world markets in 
manufacturing (they were already competitive in agriculture). Wherever the new export 
industries have grown, the growing industry has offered a somewhat higher wage than workers 
could get elsewhere, which according to Krugman has given measurable improvement in the 
lives of ordinary people. With the growth of manufacturing, “the pressure on the land becomes 
less intense, so rural wages rise; the pool of unemployed dwellers always anxious for work 
shrinks, so factories start to compete with each other for workers, and urban wages also begin to 
rise” (Krugman 1998:83). Unsurprisingly, Krugman mentions South Korea and Taiwan as 
examples of this process.  
“The only reason developing countries have been able to compete with those industries 
is their ability to offer employers cheap labour. Deny them that ability, and you might 
well deny them the prospect of continuing industrial growth, even reverse the growth 
that has been achieved” (Krugman 1998:84-85).  
It has been argued that low labour costs are seen by international investors as the factor 
triggering late industrialisation. According to the assumptions in standard neo-classical 
approaches, capital (in the form of Foreign Direct Investment, FDI) will flow to competitive 
localities where labour costs are low. According to these approaches, capital will be invested in 
production, which creates employment, resulting in gradual wage improvement as demand for 
labour grows.  
However, according to Amsden (1992) it is not the ‘attractiveness’ given by low labour 
costs to attract FDI, which drives economic development. Rather, Amsden suggests it is 
domestic productivity growth which is based on other forms of profitability than low costs:  
“Neo-dependency, flying geese, and product life cycle theories of economic 
restructuring regard Third World development as a response to investment relocation 
decisions of the multinationals, but given the insignificance of such investments in the 
total capital formation of even the most gracious host countries and given the tendency 
for such investments to lag rather than lead rapid increases in GNP, this way of viewing 
industrial development is wagging the dog by the tail” (Amsden 1992:64).  
The story told by Krugman is same story being told by the IMF and may be considered as the 
‘mainstream story’. The story may not be wrong in itself. But it is easy to draw the wrong 
Poverty at the individual / household level 
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lessons. The countries that have experienced successful export-led growth while taking 
advantage of low labour costs, have not specialised their economies according to this 
competitive cost-advantage.  
There are of course a number of context-specific factors that are also necessary parts of 
the explanation for their success (political and macroeconomic stability, market access, etc.). 
But if these other factors are held constant, it seems clear that the efforts by these countries to 
take advantage of their competitive labour cost advantage have been embedded in conscious and 
targeted attempts supported by government intervention, of upgrading the technological level of 
production; of managerial and technical skills; of flexibility to adjust products to differentiated 
and changing demand; and to have a long term strategy to gradually create domestic linkages by 
providing competitive supply of domestic inputs to export production. These efforts seem to be 
in line with suggestions from neo-Schumpeterian approaches. Such ‘intelligent’ use of low 
labour costs – as a temporary part of a broader strategy – stand in sharp contrast to 
‘unintelligent’ and passive use of low labour costs as the main source of competitiveness 
(besides natural resource endowments).  
The cumulative effects of self-reinforcing specialisation, may make ‘unintelligent’ use 
of low labour costs a race to the bottom. The continued downward squeeze on wages as a result 
of the dominant policy advice, may force many workers to increase their ‘self-exploitation’ by 
consuming less and if possible work more. This is not only detrimental for the individual 
worker and the worker’s family. It is also negative for aggregate demand in the entire domestic 
economy. These factors suggest that a result of such specialisation in international trade may be 
strong cumulative synergies of poverty growth. As wage-earners, individual workers are 
dependent upon the relative supply and demand for labour. In poor countries, supply of cheap 
labour tends to be abundant. Demand for labour in a liberalised economy is dependent upon 
competitive pressures determining the costs of labour as input to production. A country which 
has liberalised trade and labour markets, and in which its competitive advantage lies in low 
labour costs, may provide an incentive structure to employers that promotes demand for cheap 
labour – but does not nourish demand for skilled labour. The vicious circle of poverty is likely 
to be perpetuated by a policy whose principal aim is to make use of the competitive advantage 
of low labour costs in international trade. The ‘competitive advantage of poverty’ may not be an 
advantage at all – but rather a trap which allows the self-reinforcing mechanisms of continued 
specialisation (resulting from increased liberalisation) to lock a country into a situation in which 
it cannot raise the real wages of its workers while being dependent upon export to world 
markets.  
 
Summary 
Policy implications pointed to in this chapter, include: 
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1. There are dilemmas with the pursuit of particular trade strategies, concerning the degree 
to which a country may pursue a trade strategy without experiencing unintended 
negative side-effects.  
2. Choice of internationally competitive technology is crucial for competitiveness on 
international markets in the long-term.  
3. An intelligent use of low labour costs is the use of labour-cost advantages as a 
temporary part of a conscious strategy for upgrading production into activities in which 
technological progress and productivity growth is still achievable.  
4. An unintelligent use of low labour costs aims for low costs alone (including low wages) 
as the principal source of international competitiveness. It is therefore unintelligent to 
see low wage levels as pro-poor, only because employers making use of labour-
intensive production methods may hire more workers.  
5. To attain international competitiveness without hampering living standards, real wages 
should rise but productivity should rise even more.  
6. According to the neo-classical Rybczynski theorem, a country which specialises 
according to the advantage of having cheap labour will see its abundant factor (labour) 
growing increasingly cheaper (poorer), provided the working poor can be driven by 
increasing self-exploitation.  
7. As poor people tend to overwork themselves, they get paid less. They are also paid less 
reliably, and have insufficient incentives to invest in human capital (e.g. send their 
children to school).  
8. Policy recommendations to governments from the World Bank and the IMF promote 
downward flexibility of wages as ‘pro-poor’. The rationale is the expectation that new 
jobs will materialise in labour-intensive production where poor countries have a natural 
comparative advantage. This assumption has not been proven to be pro-poor, and the 
importance of real wages for living standards is neglected in the recommendations.  
9. The combined poverty of individuals may be aggregated to the poverty of a country in 
the international system. The comparative advantage of a country with many poor 
people, may be self-reinforced through specialisation according to the advantage of 
cheap labour supply, and with increasing trade liberalisation and specialisation, the 
country may eventually be locked into the competitive advantage of poverty.  
10. If low labour costs are the main source of competitiveness, an increasingly outward-
oriented economy may due to cumulative causation, be unable to raise its wage level. 
While it is more favourable to compete on quality than on costs, due to incentives for 
upgrading, it is less favourable to rely on low labour costs alone than (a combination 
of) other factors. 
11. It is easy to draw the wrong lessons from evidence of successful export-led growth 
experiences based partly on low labour costs.  
 94 
8  Conclusions 
Introduction 
There is a need to re-examine the effectiveness of the economic policies proposed to poor 
countries. Seemingly well-designed policies have frequently failed and been discredited for 
want of tangible benefits in terms of robust (and poverty reducing) economic development. As 
the ILO pointed out in its World Employment Report 1998-99, countries across the world must 
be able to change their competitive positions to adapt to new (ever-changing) circumstances:  
“The dynamics of the growth process show that in the long run a country’s international 
competitive position is closely tied to its standard of living. In order to be competitive it 
must adapt to the new circumstances of an unprecedented strengthening of world 
competition as the immediate consequence of trade liberalisation and advances in 
technology. A country which is slow to adapt may find, through cumulative causation, 
that it falls further behind and may end up with an unfavourable product mix from the 
perspective of long-term productivity growth” (ILO 1998:116).  
It is precisely this concern of marginalisation and lock-in into poverty in the long-term as a 
result of such an ‘unfavourable product mix’, where a country is dependent upon activities that 
use basic factors intensively (including labour), that has guided the investigation in this thesis.  
 
The argument 
The central argument that has been advanced throughout this analysis is that when taking 
advantage of their competitive labour cost advantage, poor countries should do this in what may 
be termed ‘the intelligent’ way. This requires a high degree of consciousness of the potentially 
severe implications of self-reinforcing dependency of long-term specialisation in low-cost, low-
skill activities. In other words, there is a strong case for caution when exploiting low labour-cost 
advantage. On the one hand, this advantage is liable to be short-lived in the sense of cost-
competitiveness, as other countries may easily be able to offer lower costs. On the other, 
specialisation in this advantage may be self-reinforcing, resulting in increased dependence in the 
long-term on the ability to supply cheap labour. Consequently, ‘unintelligent’ use of low labour 
costs may result in a continually self-reinforcing specialisation, which in the long-term may 
impede the opportunity to raise real wages (and thereby living standards). I have made the case 
that the view adopted in policy-documents produced by the World Bank and the IMF – that 
regards ‘downward adjustment’ of real wages as essentially positive for national economic 
development and ‘pro-poor’ for job-seeking individuals – may not be consistent with the aim to 
raise living standards through rising real wages. 
The preceding analysis has arrived at two fundamental lessons for trade strategy: 
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First, what may be termed the intelligent way to use labour-cost advantages, necessitate 
a strategy in which labour-cost advantage is a temporary part of a conscious strategy for 
upgrading production into activities in which technological progress and productivity growth is 
still achievable. 
Second, by first adopting an understanding of competitiveness for outward-oriented 
economies that includes the ability to raise national wage levels sufficiently to provide increased 
real wages and thereby rising living standards, it becomes clear that trade strategies should aim 
for a development where real wages rise, but where productivity increase even more.  
 
The case 
The basis for my empirical enquiry has been critical analysis of secondary literature and 
existing data sets from official statistics. I consider the validity of the data sources to be high, 
and thereby also the relevance of my findings – despite the fact that I have not visited 
Zimbabwe. However, I consider the reliability of the statistics I have used to be fairly good 
compared to African standards, but relatively low compared to Norwegian standards. The 
reliability of the statistics on production structure appears to be of particularly low reliability. In 
the case of nominal wage data for 1995-1997, I consider the reliability to be unsatisfactory. I 
make no attempt to generalise based on Zimbabwe’s experience. 
Reviewing the export strategies pursued by Zimbabwe from 1965-1997, a number of 
observations suggest that Zimbabwe’s experience with liberalisation has been a painful one for 
the average worker, and negative for the country’s long-term specialisation in international 
trade. Rather than experiencing quality-based technological upgrading, Zimbabwe has 
experienced a pattern of specialisation where export-oriented production has made increasingly 
intensive use of basic factors such as tobacco leaves, cereals, minerals, and cheap labour. 
Zimbabwe’s exports have become increasingly more dependent upon one single primary 
commodity (tobacco). Moreover, Zimbabwe’s manufactured exports to the rest of the world 
outside Africa are highly concentrated in processing of minerals like iron and steel. In short, the 
liberalisation in the 1990s has allowed the dictates of natural comparative advantage to reassert 
itself, resulting in a stronger orientation of export production towards primary goods, making 
more intensive use of abundant resources (basic factors). In these activities in which Zimbabwe 
has a natural comparative advantage, the vital productivity growth required for long-term 
development is not achievable.  
Real wages have declined in Zimbabwe since 1982, implying a declining standard of 
living for the average Zimbabwean. However, after liberalisation in 1990, the fall in real wages 
for workers in all sectors was much steeper than in the 1980s. This may partly be ascribed to 
the removal of minimum wages as part of the ESAP package, supported by the World Bank to 
allow flexibility – including downward adjustment – of wages. Another contributing factor is 
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the exceptionally strong inflation after 1990. The outcome was a growth in the prevalence of 
poor people from 52.8% in 1990/91 to 75.6% in 1995/96 (CSO 1998b). 
There has also been a downward trend in labour costs measured in current US dollars 
accompanying the liberalisation process. Another indicator of unfavourable development during 
liberalisation is the declining share of wages in gross domestic income. After liberalisation, the 
average worker has received a declining part of the created wealth compared to the situation 
before liberalisation. Whereas the small business-owning upper-class, has received a larger 
share of the wealth created in Zimbabwe after liberalisation. Moreover, a number of 
observations suggest that the government has given insufficient attention to the process of skill-
acquisition while carrying out its liberalisation policies.  
Keeping in mind that advantage is comparative, Zimbabwe’s competitive advantage 
must be understood and situated in relation to other competitors, especially South Africa’s 
competitive advantages. Furthermore, it has not been the objective of this thesis to explore and 
suggest possible paths for the Zimbabwean economy to enter a more virtuous circle.  
To sum up, the liberalisation in Zimbabwe seems to have induced a self-reinforcing 
specialisation in natural comparative advantages in which productivity growth is not achievable 
with available technology and technological capabilities.  
 
Limitations of the argument 
advanced in this thesis 
Stiglitz (1987) makes a distinction between static (natural) comparative advantage, and dynamic 
(created) comparative advantage. In his words, optimal development strategies should not focus 
on current comparative advantage, but look at dynamic comparative advantage. However, the 
‘optimal development strategy’ is not easy to design: 
“In ascertaining static comparative advantage, we need only look at current resources 
and capabilities relative to those of other countries. In ascertaining dynamic 
comparative advantage, we need to look at future resources and capabilities relative to 
those of other countries. And these are, at best, conjectural: is there any a priori reason 
why Switzerland should have a long-run comparative advantage in watches?” (Stiglitz 
1987:142).  
In other words, the argument advanced in this thesis calls for a development strategy that is 
complicated to design. Moreover, ‘optimal’ or preferred policies must be adapted to local 
realities. More still, if policies are to be effective they require appropriate responsive capacity, 
so that they may be followed up and enforced properly.  
From this also follows that any labour-cost advantage is context-specific. A big country 
may have more supply of cheap labour than a small one. However, the small one may be more 
prone to have a concentrated export structure, whereas the big one may have a broader range of 
other capabilities that can be used constructively to create dynamic competitive advantages. The 
size of developing country exporters relative to each other may have an effect on their 
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competition, and on the subsequent impact on their pattern of specialisation and level of labour 
costs. If small exporters individually are too small to affect terms of trade, considerations of 
expanding market share are likely to dominate, which may result in downward pressure on 
labour costs to expand output and export revenues (Chau & Kanbur 2000). Big developing 
countries like China or India may therefore experience lower degrees of (country-wide) 
specialisation in low labour costs relative to other competitive advantages, than small countries 
like Zimbabwe.  
Another challenge, also concerning the gap between preferred and practicable policies 
suggested above is the point made by Krugman (1998) that bad jobs at bad wages are better than 
no jobs at all. Of course, Krugman does have a point in arguing that a policy of good jobs in 
principle, but no jobs in practice, is not in the interest of the working poor in developing 
countries. Moreover, typically ‘good jobs’ may be in high-quality manufacturing activities using 
sophisticated technology that would not be labour-intensive.  
In this thesis I have argued that to passively follow specialisation in trade according to 
natural comparative advantages may result in a lock-in situation characterised by many poor 
people – or much poverty. Evidently, policies for employment generation – including for poor 
unskilled labour – are critical for poverty reduction in developing countries. Consequently, it 
does not make sense to suggest that poor countries should not nourish demand among 
entrepreneurs for cheap unskilled labour. The point is that when opening up their economies to 
largely uncontrolled forces in international trade, poor countries should be aware of the possibly 
devastating effects that may come into operation if their economies get specialised according to 
their natural comparative advantage in low labour costs. As the starting point for new 
development strategies is that most poor countries now undertake policies of trade liberalisation, 
the lessons for policy-making are significant. The implications are that a different path of 
specialisation should be strived for. This specialisation would be in a competitive advantage that 
has to be created. Previous experiences suggest that such an advantage may be created by a 
conscious upgrading of existing capabilities that could be used in activities where there are 
achievable, but untapped opportunities for further productivity growth.  
As pointed out in chapter 2, Porter (1990) has suggested that these could be niches 
ignored by other producers in other countries. These activities should have hitherto unexploited 
potential for productivity growth given the available technology. However, selecting them and 
exploiting them in practice seems extremely difficult and complicated for poor countries with 
limited resources available to spend on R&D. 
 
The bottom line 
Poverty may be a comparative advantage in international trade. But it is a short-lived one. In 
fact, it is so unsustainable that it may be more of a handicap than advantage. Due to the 
attractiveness in terms of low production costs represented by cheap labour, high levels of 
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poverty may themselves encourage a specialisation in low labour-cost advantages. The self-
reinforcing dynamics of specialisation may perpetuate the dependence on supply of cheap 
labour. Such cumulative causation may aggravate the vicious circle of poverty, locking an 
outward-oriented economy into dependence on low costs and low wage levels. This situation 
may impede the possibilities to raise real wages and thereby standards of living for the majority 
of workers and their families. 
Consequently, poor countries with small open economies should not place all their eggs 
in one basket and follow the low-wage strategy for international competitiveness. Rather they 
should explore other possible paths that allow rising real wages – though not necessarily attempt 
to pursue ‘high-wage’ strategies. For every country, a distinctive country-specific strategy may 
be identified. The different strategies may use a varying mix of basic and advanced factors of 
production. To identify the best possible factor mix in an export-strategy for Zimbabwe requires 
a study in its own right.  
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Statistical Appendix 
 
Table A.0  
     
Exports, Imports and Trade balance 1965-1998 (in million US dollars) 
 
Year Exports Imports Trade balance   
1965 452 386 66    
1966 280 273 7    
1967 272 301 -29    
1968 263 333 -70    
1969 325 321 4    
1970 370 378 -8    
1971 404 456 -52    
1972 515 478 37    
1973 688 606 82    
1974 863 865 -2    
1975 932 932 0    
1976 891 703 188    
1977 877 710 167    
1978 900 685 215    
1979 1053 929 124    
1980 1415 1448 -33    
1981 1408 1696 -288    
1982 1276 1639 -363    
1983 1135 1205 -70    
1984 1155 1098 57    
1985 1113 1031 82    
1986 1302 1132 170    
1987 1427 1205 222    
1988 1415 1448 -33    
1989 1542 1623 -81    
1990 1726 1847 -121    
1991 1532 2055 -523    
1992 1445 2203 -758    
1993 1568 1820 -252    
1994 1885 2241 -356    
1995 2119 2660 -541    
1996 2397 2817 -420    
1997 2464 3068 -604    
1998 2432 3029 -597    
       
Source: UNCTAD. 2000. Handbook of Statistics. CD-ROM. UNCTAD, Geneva.  
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Table A.1 Production Structure 1965-1997      
 
Output data by kind of activity in current prices. Million of Zimbabwean dollars   
Year AGRI MINE MANU ELEC CONS WHOL TRAN FIRE SERV TPSP 
1965 115,8 48,3 134,7 21,8 31,9 104,5 60,2 27,3 76,7  621,20 
1966 134,9 45,2 122,9 24,2 32,6 89,5 54,5 30,7 84,7 619,2 
1967 152,0 46,2 142,1 25,8 40,3 101,2 50,5 34,8 88,3 681,2 
1968 121,0 48,4 157,2 26,2 50,4 111,6 58,4 37,6 95,7 706,5 
1969 166,1 62,6 182,4 29,7 57,7 124,8 71,0 47,7 105,3 847,3 
1970 153,0 71,0 209,0 32,0 55,0 152,0 88,0 69,0 142,0 971,0 
1971 200,0 72,0 250,0 34,0 58,0 171,0 103,0 76,0 156,0 1 120,0 
1972 234,0 76,0 297,0 38,0 74,0 192,0 114,0 92,0 170,0 1 287,0 
1973 215,0 104,0 343,0 41,0 81,0 198,0 122,0 102,0 184,0 1 390,0 
1974 315,0 136,0 421,0 42,0 82,0 258,0 138,0 119,0 213,0 1 724,0 
1975 323,0 131,0 447,0 50,0 94,0 258,0 159,0 130,0 246,0 1 838,0 
1976 350,0 152,0 480,0 57,0 88,0 262,0 172,0 139,0 270,0 1 970,0 
1977 334,0 149,0 460,0 56,0 84,0 242,0 184,0 149,0 290,0 1 948,0 
1978 305,0 158,0 514,0 64,0 68,0 296,0 191,0 154,0 314,0 2 064,0 
1979 321,0 226,0 625,0 71,0 92,0 425,0 188,0 167,0 347,0 2 462,0 
1980 451,0 285,0 802,0 70,0 91,0 451,0 211,0 202,0 478,0 3 041,0 
1981 640,0 252,0 1 016,0 78,0 138,0 603,0 306,0 240,0 588,0 3 861,0 
1982 669,0 217,0 1 121,0 73,0 190,0 741,0 365,0 283,0 777,0 4 436,0 
1983 544,0 393,0 1 441,0 195,0 258,0 783,0 403,0 334,0 856,0 5 207,0 
1984 748,0 320,0 1 475,0 142,0 205,0 742,0 434,0 342,0 965,0 5 373,0 
1985 1 314,0 335,0 1 488,0 144,0 154,0 777,0 431,0 411,0 1 178,0 6 232,0 
1986 1 179,0 446,0 1 832,0 229,0 168,0 971,0 582,0 441,0 1 275,0 7 123,0 
1987 1 123,0 335,0 2 089,0 276,0 225,0 1 001,0 671,0 570,0 1 399,0 7 689,0 
1988 1 596,0 681,0 2 518,0 307,0 243,0 1 152,0 787,0 736,0 1 652,0 9 672,0 
1989 1 753,0 607,0 3 580,0 370,0 318,0 1 258,0 930,0 863,0 1 878,0 11 557,0 
1990 2 391,0 676,0 4 130,0 394,0 362,0 1 569,0 1 067,0 977,0 2 423,0 13 989,0 
1991 3 709,0 939,0 5 585,0 520,0 499,0 1 898,0 1 243,0 1 133,0 3 197,0 18 723,0 
1992 5 692,0 1 226,0 7 760,0 687,0 499,0 2 145,0 1 865,0 1 271,0 3 616,0 24 761,0 
1993 5 836,0 1 625,0 8 930,0 1 234,0 1 152,0 6 926,0 2 807,0 4 206,0 5 037,0 37 753,0 
1994 9 592,0 2 531,0 10 701,0 1 810,0 1 330,0 8 289,0 3 105,0 5 811,0 6 309,0 49 478,0 
1995 8 312,0 1 142,0 11 871,0 1 563,0 1 261,0 11 844,0 3 615,0 5 977,0 7 194,0 52 779,0 
1996 16 427,0 1 317,0 13 297,0 2 409,0 1 708,0 15 107,0 4 175,0 6 578,0 10 887,0 71 905,0 
1997 16 371,0 1 384,0 15 376,0 2 828,0 2 289,0 17 163,0 5 180,0 10 136,0 14 241,0 84 968,0 
Categories 
         
AGRI  1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing       
MINE  2 Mining and quarrying        
MANU  3 Manufacturing         
ELEC  4 Electricity, gas and water        
CONS 5 Construction         
WHOL  6 Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels     
TRAN  7 Transport, storage and communication      
FIRE  8 Finance, insurance and real estate       
SERV  9 Community, social, personal and business services     
TPSP Total Private Sector Production (= GDP less public administration)    
Note: Data for 1993-1997 is taken from CSO. 1998. National Accounts 1985-1997. Table 2.1(a). 
Category 9 SERV is the sum of Education, Health, Domestic Services and Other services.  
Sources: Output data for 1965-1992 from UN National Accounts Statistics issues for 1975,  
 
1981, 1988 and 1995. Output data fro 1993-1997 from CSO National Accounts 1985-1997. 
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Table A.2 Production Structure 1965-1997     
  
Output data by kind of activity in current prices. In percentage.     
Year AGRI MINE MANU ELEC CONS WHOL TRAN FIRE SERV TPSP 
1965 19 % 8 % 22 % 4 % 5 % 17 % 10 % 4 % 12 % 100 % 
1966 22 % 7 % 20 % 4 % 5 % 14 % 9 % 5 % 14 % 100 % 
1967 22 % 7 % 21 % 4 % 6 % 15 % 7 % 5 % 13 % 100 % 
1968 17 % 7 % 22 % 4 % 7 % 16 % 8 % 5 % 14 % 100 % 
1969 20 % 7 % 22 % 4 % 7 % 15 % 8 % 6 % 12 % 100 % 
1970 16 % 7 % 22 % 3 % 6 % 16 % 9 % 7 % 15 % 100 % 
1971 18 % 6 % 22 % 3 % 5 % 15 % 9 % 7 % 14 % 100 % 
1972 18 % 6 % 23 % 3 % 6 % 15 % 9 % 7 % 13 % 100 % 
1973 15 % 7 % 25 % 3 % 6 % 14 % 9 % 7 % 13 % 100 % 
1974 18 % 8 % 24 % 2 % 5 % 15 % 8 % 7 % 12 % 100 % 
1975 18 % 7 % 24 % 3 % 5 % 14 % 9 % 7 % 13 % 100 % 
1976 18 % 8 % 24 % 3 % 4 % 13 % 9 % 7 % 14 % 100 % 
1977 17 % 8 % 24 % 3 % 4 % 12 % 9 % 8 % 15 % 100 % 
1978 15 % 8 % 25 % 3 % 3 % 14 % 9 % 7 % 15 % 100 % 
1979 13 % 9 % 25 % 3 % 4 % 17 % 8 % 7 % 14 % 100 % 
1980 15 % 9 % 26 % 2 % 3 % 15 % 7 % 7 % 16 % 100 % 
1981 17 % 7 % 26 % 2 % 4 % 16 % 8 % 6 % 15 % 100 % 
1982 15 % 5 % 25 % 2 % 4 % 17 % 8 % 6 % 18 % 100 % 
1983 10 % 8 % 28 % 4 % 5 % 15 % 8 % 6 % 16 % 100 % 
1984 14 % 6 % 27 % 3 % 4 % 14 % 8 % 6 % 18 % 100 % 
1985 21 % 5 % 24 % 2 % 2 % 12 % 7 % 7 % 19 % 100 % 
1986 17 % 6 % 26 % 3 % 2 % 14 % 8 % 6 % 18 % 100 % 
1987 15 % 4 % 27 % 4 % 3 % 13 % 9 % 7 % 18 % 100 % 
1988 17 % 7 % 26 % 3 % 3 % 12 % 8 % 8 % 17 % 100 % 
1989 15 % 5 % 31 % 3 % 3 % 11 % 8 % 7 % 16 % 100 % 
1990 17 % 5 % 30 % 3 % 3 % 11 % 8 % 7 % 17 % 100 % 
1991 20 % 5 % 30 % 3 % 3 % 10 % 7 % 6 % 17 % 100 % 
1992 23 % 5 % 31 % 3 % 2 % 9 % 8 % 5 % 15 % 100 % 
1993 15 % 4 % 24 % 3 % 3 % 18 % 7 % 11 % 13 % 100 % 
1994 19 % 5 % 22 % 4 % 3 % 17 % 6 % 12 % 13 % 100 % 
1995 16 % 2 % 22 % 3 % 2 % 22 % 7 % 11 % 14 % 100 % 
1996 23 % 2 % 18 % 3 % 2 % 21 % 6 % 9 % 15 % 100 % 
1997 19 % 2 % 18 % 3 % 3 % 20 % 6 % 12 % 17 % 100 % 
Categories 
         
AGRI  1 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing       
MINE  2 Mining and quarrying        
MANU  3 Manufacturing         
ELEC  4 Electricity, gas and water        
CONS 5 Construction         
WHOL  6 Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels     
TRAN  7 Transport, storage and communication      
FIRE  8 Finance, insurance and real estate       
SERV  9 Community, social, personal and business services     
TPSP Total Private Sector Production (= GDP less public administration)    
Note: Data for 1993-1997 is taken from CSO. 1998. National Accounts 1985-1997. Table 2.1(a). 
Category 9 SERV is the sum of Education, Health, Domestic Services and Other services.  
Sources: Output data for 1965-1992 from UN National Accounts Statistics issues for 1975,  
 
1981, 1988 and 1995. Output data fro 1993-1997 from CSO National Accounts 1985-1997. 
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Table A.3 Base Data on Export Structure 1976-1997 
      
In thousand US dollars          
Year SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 4 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 SITC 9 Total 
1976 154 187 140 481 195 847 10 271 4 993 9 573 259 169 24 221 45 072 n.a. 843 814 
1977 154 909 126 197 201 703 11 610 7 581 8 011 239 827 22 746 33 753 n.a. 806 337 
1978 155 616 150 405 183 353 11 681 8 429 7 322 247 148 24 097 33 001 n.a. 821 052 
1979 187 498 145 783 250 421 16 769 10 327 9 719 368 347 28 695 40 588 n.a. 1 058 147 
1980 153 553 183 402 253 851 17 253 3 225 11 551 430 251 22 693 39 704 13 351 1 128 834 
1981 189 354 324 846 240 981 14 987 1 497 16 920 345 404 27 836 41 036 3 839 1 206 700 
1982 174 408 256 433 183 441 16 786 n.a. 16 957 304 445 39 003 27 218 n.a. 1 018 691 
1983 152 363 228 892 178 941 16 181 n.a. 11 635 333 151 24 456 22 330 n.a. 967 949 
1984 134 037 227 213 190 694 13 121 n.a. 18 900 332 402 17 503 27 827 41 259 1 002 956 
1985 157 533 226 629 180 253 26 472 n.a. 17 391 315 917 18 670 24 406 17 676 984 947 
1986 195 623 254 786 169 440 28 978 n.a. 14 583 324 449 22 806 31 111 10 565 1 052 341 
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 419 565 
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1 630 741 
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1990 285 572 345 875 217 559 10 919 n.a. 24 501 446 403 54 048 62 596 18 581 1 466 054 
1991 167 850 444 446 158 627 6 147 n.a. 25 244 378 198 27 310 65 359 12 866 1 286 047 
1992 86 337 441 753 153 404 4 779 n.a. 36 592 380 527 37 801 84 410 22 751 1 248 354 
1993 149 246 394 158 185 559 7 647 n.a. 37 747 371 956 39 939 125 155 7 881 1 319 288 
1994 389 200 669 000 218 000 14 100 4 900 36 200 412 000 49 300 159 800 15 400 1 967 900 
1995 306 000 484 900 232 800 23 700 2 600 46 600 531 300 49 200 161 900 6 500 1 845 500 
1996 329 600 740 300 264 000 31 900 1 300 56 000 465 100 59 300 141 400 33 600 2 122 500 
1997 362 800 591 400 337 300 31 300 12 000 70 600 491 300 72 600 147 700 11 200 2 128 200 
Note: Export structure according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) commodity grouping. 
  
SITC group 0 - Food and live animals. SITC group 1 - Beverages and tobacco. SITC group 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels.  
SITC group 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. SITC group 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes.  
SITC group 5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. SITC group 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material.  
SITC group 7 - Machinery and transport equipment. SITC group 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles.   
SITC group 9 - Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC. n.a. = not available.    
Data on SITC 4 are not reported for the years 1982-1993, suggesting that none of these products were exported in the period.  
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
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Table A.4 Base Data (in %) on Export Structure 1976-1997 
      
Year SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 3 SITC 4 SITC 5 SITC 6 SITC 7 SITC 8 SITC 9 Total  
1976 18 % 17 % 23 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 31 % 3 % 5 % n.a. 100 %  
1977 19 % 16 % 25 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 30 % 3 % 4 % n.a. 100 %  
1978 19 % 18 % 22 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 30 % 3 % 4 % n.a. 100 %  
1979 18 % 14 % 24 % 2 % 1 % 1 % 35 % 3 % 4 % n.a. 100 %  
1980 14 % 16 % 22 % 2 % 0 % 1 % 38 % 2 % 4 % 1 % 100 %  
1981 16 % 27 % 20 % 1 % 0 % 1 % 29 % 2 % 3 % 0 % 100 %  
1982 17 % 25 % 18 % 2 % n.a. 2 % 30 % 4 % 3 % n.a. 100 %  
1983 16 % 24 % 18 % 2 % n.a. 1 % 34 % 3 % 2 % n.a. 100 %  
1984 13 % 23 % 19 % 1 % n.a. 2 % 33 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 100 %  
1985 16 % 23 % 18 % 3 % n.a. 2 % 32 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 100 %  
1986 19 % 24 % 16 % 3 % n.a. 1 % 31 % 2 % 3 % 1 % 100 %  
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
1990 19 % 24 % 15 % 1 % n.a. 2 % 30 % 4 % 4 % 1 % 100 %  
1991 13 % 35 % 12 % 0 % n.a. 2 % 29 % 2 % 5 % 1 % 100 %  
1992 7 % 35 % 12 % 0 % n.a. 3 % 30 % 3 % 7 % 2 % 100 %  
1993 11 % 30 % 14 % 1 % n.a. 3 % 28 % 3 % 9 % 1 % 100 %  
1994 20 % 34 % 11 % 1 % 0 % 2 % 21 % 3 % 8 % 1 % 100 %  
1995 17 % 26 % 13 % 1 % 0 % 3 % 29 % 3 % 9 % 0 % 100 %  
1996 16 % 35 % 12 % 2 % 0 % 3 % 22 % 3 % 7 % 2 % 100 %  
1997 17 % 28 % 16 % 1 % 1 % 3 % 23 % 3 % 7 % 1 % 100 %  
Note: Export structure according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) commodity grouping. 
  
SITC group 0 - Food and live animals. SITC group 1 - Beverages and tobacco. SITC group 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels.  
SITC group 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. SITC group 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes.  
SITC group 5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. SITC group 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material.  
SITC group 7 - Machinery and transport equipment. SITC group 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles.    
SITC group 9 - Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC. n.a. = not available.    
Data on SITC 4 are not reported for the years 1982-1993, suggesting that none of these products were exported in the period.  
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
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Table A.5 Calculation of Primary Exports 
       
In thousand US dollars          
Year SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 68 SITC 3 SITC 4 Primary exports    
1976 154 187 140 481 195 847 106 714 10 271 4 993 612 493     
1977 154 909 126 197 201 703 107 361 11 610 7 581 609 361     
1978 155 616 150 405 183 353 102 506 11 681 8 429 611 990     
1979 187 498 145 783 250 421 132 928 16 769 10 327 743 726     
1980 153 553 183 402 253 851 114 685 17 253 3 225 725 969     
1981 189 354 324 846 240 981 94 173 14 987 1 497 865 838     
1982 174 408 256 433 183 441 102 017 16 786 n.a. 733 085     
1983 152 363 228 892 178 941 109 920 16 181 n.a. 686 297     
1984 134 037 227 213 190 694 92 529 13 121 n.a. 657 594     
1985 157 533 226 629 180 253 90 221 26 472 n.a. 681 108     
1986 195 623 254 786 169 440 85 600 28 978 n.a. 734 427     
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.     
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.     
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.     
1990 285 572 345 875 217 559 134 283 10 919 n.a. 994 208     
1991 167 850 444 446 158 627 113 609 6 147 n.a. 890 679     
1992 86 337 441 753 153 404 96 896 4 779 n.a. 783 169     
1993 149 246 394 158 185 559 74 133 7 647 n.a. 810 743     
1994 389 200 669 000 218 000 109 400 14 100 4 900 1 404 600     
1995 306 000 484 900 232 800 110 200 23 700 2 600 1 160 200     
1996 329 600 740 300 264 000 102 900 31 900 1 300 1 470 000     
1997 362 800 591 400 337 300 106 100 31 300 12 000 1 440 900     
Note: Export structure according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) commodity grouping. 
 
SITC group 0 - Food and live animals. SITC group 1 - Beverages and tobacco. SITC group 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels. 
SITC group 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. SITC group 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes.  
SITC group 5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. SITC group 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material.  
SITC group 7 - Machinery and transport equipment. SITC group 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles.   
SITC group 9 - Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC. n.a. = not available.   
Data on SITC 4 are not reported for the years 1982-1993, suggesting that none of these products were exported in the period. 
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
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Table A.6 Calculation of Manufactured Exports 
    
Table A.7 Calculation of SITC 6 less 68 
In thousand US dollars       In thousand US dollars  
Year SITC 5 6 less 68 SITC 7 SITC 8 Manufactured exports  Year SITC 6 SITC 68 6 less 68 
1976 9 573 152 455 24 221 45 072 231 321    1976 259 169 106 714 152 455 
1977 8 011 132 466 22 746 33 753 196 976    1977 239 827 107 361 132 466 
1978 7 322 144 642 24 097 33 001 209 062    1978 247 148 102 506 144 642 
1979 9 719 235 419 28 695 40 588 314 421    1979 368 347 132 928 235 419 
1980 11 551 315 566 22 693 39 704 389 514    1980 430 251 114 685 315 566 
1981 16 920 251 231 27 836 41 036 337 023    1981 345 404 94 173 251 231 
1982 16 957 202 428 39 003 27 218 285 606    1982 304 445 102 017 202 428 
1983 11 635 223 231 24 456 22 330 281 652    1983 333 151 109 920 223 231 
1984 18 900 239 873 17 503 27 827 304 103    1984 332 402 92 529 239 873 
1985 17 391 225 696 18 670 24 406 286 163    1985 315 917 90 221 225 696 
1986 14 583 238 849 22 806 31 111 307 349    1986 324 449 85 600 238 849 
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.    1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.    1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.    1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1990 24 501 312 120 54 048 62 596 453 265    1990 446 403 134 283 312 120 
1991 25 244 264 589 27 310 65 359 382 502    1991 378 198 113 609 264 589 
1992 36 592 283 631 37 801 84 410 442 434    1992 380 527 96 896 283 631 
1993 37 747 297 823 39 939 125 155 500 664    1993 371 956 74 133 297 823 
1994 36 200 302 600 49 300 159 800 547 900    1994 412 000 109 400 302 600 
1995 46 600 421 100 49 200 161 900 678 800    1995 531 300 110 200 421 100 
1996 56 000 362 200 59 300 141 400 618 900    1996 465 100 102 900 362 200 
1997 70 600 385 200 72 600 147 700 676 100    1997 491 300 106 100 385 200 
Note: Export structure according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) commodity grouping. 
  
SITC group 0 - Food and live animals. SITC group 1 - Beverages and tobacco. SITC group 2 - Crude materials, inedible, except fuels.  
SITC group 3 - Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. SITC group 4 - Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes.   
SITC group 5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. SITC group 6 - Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material.   
SITC group 7 - Machinery and transport equipment. SITC group 8 - Miscellaneous manufactured articles.    
SITC group 9 - Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC. n.a. = not available.    
Data on SITC 4 are not reported for the years 1982-1993, suggesting that none of these products were exported in the period.  
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
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Table A.8 Aggregated Export Structure 1976-1997 
 
Table A.9 Aggregated Export Structure 1976-1997 (in %) 
In thousand US dollars    In percent      
Year Prim. exp. Manu. exp. Other Total  Year Prim. exp. Manu. exp. Other Total  
1976 612 493 231 321 n.a. 843 814  1976 73 % 27 % n.a. 100 %  
1977 609 361 196 976 n.a. 806 337  1977 76 % 24 % n.a. 100 %  
1978 611 990 209 062 n.a. 821 052  1978 75 % 25 % n.a. 100 %  
1979 743 726 314 421 n.a. 1 058 147  1979 70 % 30 % n.a. 100 %  
1980 725 969 389 514 13 351 1 128 834  1980 64 % 35 % 1 % 100 %  
1981 865 838 337 023 3 839 1 206 700  1981 72 % 28 % 0 % 100 %  
1982 733 085 285 606 n.a. 1 018 691  1982 72 % 28 % n.a. 100 %  
1983 686 297 281 652 n.a. 967 949  1983 71 % 29 % n.a. 100 %  
1984 657 594 304 103 41 259 1 002 956  1984 66 % 30 % 4 % 100 %  
1985 681 108 286 163 17 676 984 947  1985 69 % 29 % 2 % 100 %  
1986 734 427 307 349 10 565 1 052 341  1986 70 % 29 % 1 % 100 %  
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
1990 994 208 453 265 18 581 1 466 054  1990 68 % 31 % 1 % 100 %  
1991 890 679 382 502 12 866 1 286 047  1991 69 % 30 % 1 % 100 %  
1992 783 169 442 434 22 751 1 248 354  1992 63 % 35 % 2 % 100 %  
1993 810 743 500 664 7 881 1 319 288  1993 61 % 38 % 1 % 100 %  
1994 1 404 600 547 900 15 400 1 967 900  1994 71 % 28 % 1 % 100 %  
1995 1 160 200 678 800 6 500 1 845 500  1995 63 % 37 % 0 % 100 %  
1996 1 470 000 618 900 33 600 2 122 500  1996 69 % 29 % 2 % 100 %  
1997 1 440 900 676 100 11 200 2 128 200  1997 68 % 32 % 1 % 100 %  
            
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook 
 
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook 
 
 (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998).  (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
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Table A.10 Detailed Export Structure 1976-1997 
        
In thousand US dollars           
Year SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 68 SITC 3 SITC 4 SITC 5 6 less 68 SITC 7 SITC 8 SITC 9 Total 
1976 154 187 140 481 195 847 106 714 10 271 4 993 9 573 152 455 24 221 45 072 n.a. 843 814 
1977 154 909 126 197 201 703 107 361 11 610 7 581 8 011 132 466 22 746 33 753 n.a. 806 337 
1978 155 616 150 405 183 353 102 506 11 681 8 429 7 322 144 642 24 097 33 001 n.a. 821 052 
1979 187 498 145 783 250 421 132 928 16 769 10 327 9 719 235 419 28 695 40 588 n.a. 1 058 147 
1980 153 553 183 402 253 851 114 685 17 253 3 225 11 551 315 566 22 693 39 704 13 351 1 128 834 
1981 189 354 324 846 240 981 94 173 14 987 1 497 16 920 251 231 27 836 41 036 3 839 1 206 700 
1982 174 408 256 433 183 441 102 017 16 786 n.a. 16 957 202 428 39 003 27 218 n.a. 1 018 691 
1983 152 363 228 892 178 941 109 920 16 181 n.a. 11 635 223 231 24 456 22 330 n.a. 967 949 
1984 134 037 227 213 190 694 92 529 13 121 n.a. 18 900 239 873 17 503 27 827 41 259 1 002 956 
1985 157 533 226 629 180 253 90 221 26 472 n.a. 17 391 225 696 18 670 24 406 17 676 984 947 
1986 195 623 254 786 169 440 85 600 28 978 n.a. 14 583 238 849 22 806 31 111 10 565 1 052 341 
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1990 285 572 345 875 217 559 134 283 10 919 n.a. 24 501 312 120 54 048 62 596 18 581 1 466 054 
1991 167 850 444 446 158 627 113 609 6 147 n.a. 25 244 264 589 27 310 65 359 12 866 1 286 047 
1992 86 337 441 753 153 404 96 896 4 779 n.a. 36 592 283 631 37 801 84 410 22 751 1 248 354 
1993 149 246 394 158 185 559 74 133 7 647 n.a. 37 747 297 823 39 939 125 155 7 881 1 319 288 
1994 389 200 669 000 218 000 109 400 14 100 4 900 36 200 302 600 49 300 159 800 15 400 1 967 900 
1995 306 000 484 900 232 800 110 200 23 700 2 600 46 600 421 100 49 200 161 900 6 500 1 845 500 
1996 329 600 740 300 264 000 102 900 31 900 1 300 56 000 362 200 59 300 141 400 33 600 2 122 500 
1997 362 800 591 400 337 300 106 100 31 300 12 000 70 600 385 200 72 600 147 700 11 200 2 128 200 
             
Note: Data for 1987-1989 not available. 
         
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 113 
 
Table A.11 Detailed Export Structure 1976-1997 (in %) 
       
In percent             
Year SITC 0 SITC 1 SITC 2 SITC 68 SITC 3 SITC 4 SITC 5 6 less 68 SITC 7 SITC 8 SITC 9 Total 
1976 18 % 17 % 23 % 13 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 18 % 3 % 5 % n.a. 100 % 
1977 19 % 16 % 25 % 13 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 16 % 3 % 4 % n.a. 100 % 
1978 19 % 18 % 22 % 12 % 1 % 1 % 1 % 18 % 3 % 4 % n.a. 100 % 
1979 18 % 14 % 24 % 13 % 2 % 1 % 1 % 22 % 3 % 4 % n.a. 100 % 
1980 14 % 16 % 22 % 10 % 2 % 0 % 1 % 28 % 2 % 4 % 1 % 100 % 
1981 16 % 27 % 20 % 8 % 1 % 0 % 1 % 21 % 2 % 3 % 0 % 100 % 
1982 17 % 25 % 18 % 10 % 2 % n.a. 2 % 20 % 4 % 3 % n.a. 100 % 
1983 16 % 24 % 18 % 11 % 2 % n.a. 1 % 23 % 3 % 2 % n.a. 100 % 
1984 13 % 23 % 19 % 9 % 1 % n.a. 2 % 24 % 2 % 3 % 4 % 100 % 
1985 16 % 23 % 18 % 9 % 3 % n.a. 2 % 23 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 100 % 
1986 19 % 24 % 16 % 8 % 3 % n.a. 1 % 23 % 2 % 3 % 1 % 100 % 
1987 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1988 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1989 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1990 19 % 24 % 15 % 9 % 1 % n.a. 2 % 21 % 4 % 4 % 1 % 100 % 
1991 13 % 35 % 12 % 9 % 0 % n.a. 2 % 21 % 2 % 5 % 1 % 100 % 
1992 7 % 35 % 12 % 8 % 0 % n.a. 3 % 23 % 3 % 7 % 2 % 100 % 
1993 11 % 30 % 14 % 6 % 1 % n.a. 3 % 23 % 3 % 9 % 1 % 100 % 
1994 20 % 34 % 11 % 6 % 1 % 0 % 2 % 15 % 3 % 8 % 1 % 100 % 
1995 17 % 26 % 13 % 6 % 1 % 0 % 3 % 23 % 3 % 9 % 0 % 100 % 
1996 16 % 35 % 12 % 5 % 2 % 0 % 3 % 17 % 3 % 7 % 2 % 100 % 
1997 17 % 28 % 16 % 5 % 1 % 1 % 3 % 18 % 3 % 7 % 1 % 100 % 
             
Note: Data for 1987-1989 not available. 
         
Source: UN International Trade Statistics Yearbook (issues 1980, 1984, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1994 and 1998). 
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Table A.12 
        
Wages in non-agricultural activities 
      
Year Nom.wage 1972=100 1980=100 1990=100      
1972 88,67 100,00        
1973 92,50 104,32        
1974 94,17 106,20        
1975 115,83 130,63        
1976 129,17 145,67        
1977 149,17 168,23        
1978 156,67 176,69        
1979 175,00 197,36        
1980 209,17 235,90 100       
1981 243,80 274,95 116,56       
1982 287,70 324,46 137,54       
1983 312,80 352,77 149,54       
1984 344,20 388,18 164,56       
1985 338,10 381,30 161,64       
1986 425,40 479,76 203,38       
1987 471,50 531,75 225,41       
1988 453,90 511,90 217,00       
1989 588,00 663,13 281,11       
1990 716,40 807,94  100      
1991 773,50 872,34  107,97      
1992 975,30 1 099,92  136,14      
1993 1 119,50 1 262,55  156,27      
1994 1 314,60 1 482,58  183,50      
1995 1 624,06 1 831,58  226,70      
1996 2 165,88 2 442,63  302,33      
1997 3 070,19 3 462,49  428,56      
          
Note: Nominal wages (per month) are Zimbabwe dollars in current prices.  
  
Data coverage: All persons engaged.       
Source: Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Issue 1982, 1997 and 2000.  
 
 
         
The column with nominal wages in Zimbabwe dollars in current prices are taken from ILO's  
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (issue 1982, 1997 and 2000) which are based on reporting from CSO 
in Harare. I have re-calculated the data to constant prices, so that the values became 100 for the 
chosen base year (1972, 1980, 1990).        
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Table A.13 
       
Wages in agriculture 
      
Year Nom.wage 1972=100 1980=100 1990=100     
1972 15,00 100,00       
1973 16,67 111,13       
1974 18,33 122,20       
1975 21,67 144,47       
1976 24,17 161,13       
1977 26,67 177,80       
1978 29,17 194,46       
1979 34,17 227,80       
1980 38,33 255,53 100      
1981 62,00 413,33 161,76      
1982 n.a. n.a. n.a.      
1983 n.a. n.a. n.a.      
1984 n.a. n.a. n.a.      
1985 n.a. n.a. n.a.      
1986 n.a. n.a. n.a.      
1987 122,20 814,66 318,82      
1988 138,10 920,66 360,30      
1989 150,70 1 004,66 393,18      
1990 182,90 1 219,32  100     
1991 203,30 1 355,32  111,15     
1992 171,60 1 143,99  93,82     
1993 243,90 1 625,98  133,35     
1994 286,90 1 912,65  156,86     
1995 295,81 1 972,05  161,73     
1996 401,39 2 675,91  219,46     
1997 527,15 3 514,30  288,22     
         
Note: Nominal wages (per month) are Zimbabwe dollars in current prices.  
 
Wage data for 1982-1986 is not listed in ILO's Yearbook of Labour Statistics (Issue 1991). 
Data coverage: All persons engaged.      
Source: Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Issue 1982, 1997 and 2000.  
         
The column with nominal wages in Zimbabwe dollars in current prices are taken from ILO's  
Yearbook of Labour Statistics (issue 1982, 1997 and 2000) which are based on reporting from  
CSO in Harare. I have re-calculated the data to constant prices, so that the values became 100 for 
the chosen base year (1972, 1980, 1990).      
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Table A.14 
       
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
      
Year 1995=100 1972=100 1980=100 1990=100     
1972 4,17 100,00       
1973 4,30 103,12       
1974 4,58 109,83       
1975 5,04 120,86       
1976 5,59 134,05       
1977 6,17 147,96       
1978 6,52 156,35       
1979 7,70 184,65       
1980 8,12 194,72 100,00      
1981 9,18 220,14 113,06      
1982 10,16 243,65 125,13      
1983 12,51 300,00 154,07      
1984 15,03 360,43 185,10      
1985 16,31 391,13 200,87      
1986 18,64 447,00 229,56      
1987 20,97 502,88 258,26      
1988 22,53 540,29 277,47      
1989 25,43 609,83 313,18      
1990 29,84 715,59  100,00     
1991 36,81 882,73  123,37     
1992 52,29 1 253,96  175,26     
1993 66,72 1 600,00  223,62     
1994 81,57 1 956,12  273,39     
1995 100,00 2 398,08  335,16     
1996 121,43 2 901,68  405,55     
1997 144,19 3 457,79  483,27     
         
Source: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. 
CD-ROM.         
         
Note: The CPI was given in the International Financial Statistics in constant 1995 prices. 
I have re-calculated these data to make 1972, 1980 and 1990, the base years for   
the constant prices.         
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Table A.15 
       
Wages compared to CPI 1972-1997 (1972=100) 
    
Year Non-agri. Agricult. CPI      
1972 100,00 100,00 100,00      
1973 104,32 111,13 103,12      
1974 106,20 122,20 109,83      
1975 130,63 144,47 120,86      
1976 145,67 161,13 134,05      
1977 168,23 177,80 147,96      
1978 176,69 194,46 156,35      
1979 197,36 227,80 184,65      
1980 235,90 255,53 194,72      
1981 274,95 413,33 220,14      
1982 324,46 n.a. 243,65      
1983 352,77 n.a. 300,00      
1984 388,18 n.a. 360,43      
1985 381,30 n.a. 391,13      
1986 479,76 n.a. 447,00      
1987 531,75 814,66 502,88      
1988 511,90 920,66 540,29      
1989 663,13 1 004,66 609,83      
1990 807,94 1 219,32 715,59      
1991 872,34 1 355,32 882,73      
1992 1 099,92 1 143,99 1 253,96      
1993 1 262,55 1 625,98 1 600,00      
1994 1 482,58 1 912,65 1 956,12      
1995 1 831,58 1 972,05 2 398,08      
1996 2 442,63 2 675,91 2 901,68      
1997 3 462,49 3 514,30 3 457,79      
         
Nominal wages in non-agricultural activties and in agriculture compared to consumption price index 
(CPI). 1972 = 100.Wage data for 1982-1986 in agriculture is not listed in ILO's Yearbook of  
Labour Statistics (Issue 1991).       
         
Source: Data on Consumption Price Index (CPI) from IMF. 2000. International Financial Statistics. 
CD-ROM. Wage data from ILO. Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Issue 1982, 1991, 1997 and 2000.  
  
